1 S.D. 401 | S.D. | 1890
On the 5th day of July, 1890, the state’s attorney of Stanley county filed an information against the plaintiff in error, in the county court of that county. On the 18th day of July, 1890, the cause came on to be heard. The plaintiff in error filed a demurrer to the information, which was overruled by the court. A j ury was impaneled against the several objections made by plaintiff in error, which objections were overruled by the court; a trial had; a verdict of guilty rendered; a motion for a new trial made and overruled; a motion in arrest of judgment made and overruled; and, on the 4th day of August, judgment of fine and imprisonment was pronounced, and a writ of error from this court was in due time sued out. The plaintiff in error makes a large number of assignments of error, but, for the purposes of this apjDeal, it is only necessary to notice the second, viz., that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the information or complaint, on the ground that the facts stated in the information do not constitute a public offense. The information filed is as follows: “ State of South Dakota, county of Stanley — ss.: The State of South Dakota v. C. M. Butcher. In the county court. July term, 1890. To the Hon. G. P. Waldron, county judge, in and for Stanley county, State of South Dakota: It appearing to me, from testimony introduced and obtained from one Richard Lewis, at an examination held before me at my office in the city of Port Pierre, on the third day of July, A. D. 1890, that intoxicating liquors have been, and now are, kept for unlawful sale or purpose at said C. M. Butcher’s place place of business on Main street, in in the city of Fort Pierre, and in said county and state; and that the said O. M. Butcher has this day, and at various other times prior hereto, sold, bartered, and given away intoxicating liquor to the said Richard Lewis and other persons, by the drink and otherwise, to be drank as a beverage on his premises and .under his control, at his said place of business, on Main street,
Section 9 of ChajJter 101, Sess. Laws 1890, provides that, ‘ ‘if the state's attorney of any county shall be notified by any officer or other person, or be cognizant himself, of any violation of any of the provisions of this act, it shall be his duty forthwith to diligently inquire into the facts of such violation, and for such purpose he is hereby authorized and required to issue his subpoena for such person or persons as he may have reason to believe have any information or knowledge of such violation to appear before him at a time and place designated in such subpoena, then and there to testify concerning any violation of this act. Said subpoena shall be directed to the sheriff or any constable in the county, and shall be served and returned to such state's attorney in the same manner as subpoenas are served and returned in criminal cases. Each witness shall be sworn by the state's attorney to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and true answers make to all questions which may be propounded to him by such state’s attorney touching any violation of the provisions of this act. The testimony of every such witness shall be reduced to writing, and signed by such witness, as in the taking of depositions in civil cases. * * * If the testimony so taken shall disclose the fact that an offense has been committed against any of the provisions of this act, the state’s attorney shall forthwith file such
When an information or complaint is filed, based upon facts disclosed upon the examination of witnesses, it may be verified by the state’s attorney, upon ‘ ‘-information and belief. ” It is the information or complaint so filed that constitutes the basis of the proceeding and trial, in the court of competent jurisdiction, of the defendant, and not the statement of the state’s attorney, or the testimony of the witnesses taken at the examination by that officer. Upon an examination of the document purporting to be a complaint or information filed in this case, it will be found to consist of two distinct paragraphs. The first paragraph is’a statement of what appears, to the mind of the state’s attorney, are the facts as disclosed by the testimony of Richard Lewis on his examination had on the 3d of July. It is but a narative of what Lewis swore to before the state’s attorney, at that time. This, if accompanied by the testimony of Lewis, would have been a proper paper to have filed in the county court, and might have been sufficient upon which to base a formal complaint against C. M. Butcher, to be verified by the state’s attorney upon “information and belief;” but as an allegation of facts constituting an offense it is defective and insufficient. The second paragraph, no doubt, was intended to be the charging portion of this complaint. If so, it is lacking in all the essentials of a legal complaint or information. There is no particularity of time, or place, or of the Dffense charged. It is the same as though the state’s attorney had gone to the county judge and said to him, “I complain of C. M. Butcher,” and then stopped. He does not say what Butcher has done, or, if he did anything, when he did it, or where the act was committed. He certifies that, to the best of his information and belief, from the testimony of Richard Lewis, the laws governing the sale of intoxicating liquors have been, and now are being, violated; but he does not say by whom violated, or when violated. Nothing is alleged in either of the paragraphs of this complaint, admitting every averment in each one of them, or as taken together, to be true, upon which a court could pass a judgment. Offenses created by statute, as well as others,