Defendant was convicted of escape from a prison other than the state penitentiary — a crime under SDCL 24-12-2.
After the jury had been selected and sworn the state moved to endorse the names of two additional witnesses, who were penitentiary guards, to the three names then on the information, which included the names of two other guards, as required by SDCL 23-20-4. Over defendant's objection stating surprise, that these names were well known to the state at the time of filing the information and that the defense was based on the testimony which could be given by the witnesses whose names were endorsed on the information, the court granted the request. It appears these two witnesses had testified for the state at the preliminary hearing and that their names had been inadvertently omitted. Defendant's counsel admitted he knew what the two witnesses had testified to and the state's attorney then stated they would testify the same as they had testified at the preliminary hearing. The ruling on such motions is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and unless an abuse of the court's discretion or bad faith of the state's attorney results in substantial prejudice to defendant, the ruling is not erroneous or grounds for reversal. State v. Rober, 1972,
*739
SDCL 24-12-2 provides a maximum penally of two years for this offense. Defendant and one Fischer were jointly charged with the crime. Fischer pled guilty and was sentenced for a term of 60 days; defendant pled not guilty, was tried and found guilty by a jury and was sentenced for a term of one year. Citing State v. King,
Two recent opinions of the court discuss the question at bar. In State v. Goodale, decided May 24, 1972,
'The sentencing judge exercises a broad discretion in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by statute and sentences within such limits are not reviewable on appeal.' "
More recently to the same effect is State v. Connor,
*740 The court directed that defendant's one-year sentence was to be consecutive to the sentence he was then serving; in other words, it was to commence at the expiration of the original term of his imprisonment. This was pursuant to SDCL 24-12-2 which states:
"Every prisoner confined in any prison other than the state penitentiary, or in the custody of any officer or person as a prisoner at any place, who escapes therefrom is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding two years or in a county jail not exceeding one year. If such prisoner is under sentence of imprisonment at the time of such escape, his sentence on conviction of such escape shall commence at the expiration of the original term of his imprisonment."
SDCL 23-48-22 provides:
"If the defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses before judgment on either, the judgment may be that the imprisonment on any one may commence at the expiration of the imprisonment upon any other of the offenses."
Defendant claims there is a conflict between these two sections and the court erred in pronouncing the sentence as directed by SDCL 24-12-2; this section is the specific statute which applies to defendant's situation and is a classification over which the legislature has a wide latitude under the reasoning of State v. King, supra.
Affirmed.
