State v. BurgeState v. Burge
George C. Ehmig, Covington, for appellant.
ALFORD, Judge.
Jerry Burge was charged by bill of information with distribution of marijuana, in violation of
- There is an insufficient factual basis upon which a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The sentence is excessive.
- Because of error patent on the face of the record, the conviction and sentence must be reversed. Assignments of error one and three were not briefed on appeal and are, therefore, considered abandoned. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4. In any event, this court routinely examines the record for any errors patent.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
By means of this assignment, defendant contends that his sentence is excessive.
The record reflects that defendant was convicted of the instant offense on March 17, 1986. On April 1, 1986, the state filed a bill of information charging defendant as a multiple felony offender. The bill of information sets forth only one predicate conviction, an October 27, 1981, guilty plea to possession of a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance in violation of
The record reflects that, immediately prior to sentencing, the prosecutor indicated that the state had filed a multiple offender bill against the defendant, witnesses had been subpoenaed to prove defendant‘s habitual offender status, and the state was ready to proceed with its proof unless defendant wanted to stipulate with regard to the predicate offense. In response, defense counsel stated that he was being advised by defendant that he “will waive any particular testimony or so stipulate that he has a prior conviction.” The state responded by moving that defendant be sentenced in accordance with the habitual felony offender statute. Defense counsel countered by moving that sentencing under the habitual offender statute be delayed. Following an off-the-record discussion held at the bench, the court instructed defense counsel to state his objection for the record. Defense counsel replied, “Yes, your honor. Make an objection. Please note it.” Thereupon, the court proceeded with sentencing. The court noted that defendant had been convicted of the instant offense and that it had ordered a presentence investigation report. The court informed defendant that the report showed that he had a prior felony theft conviction and asked defendant whether or not that was correct. Defendant replied in the affirmative.
The following colloquy then transpired between the court and defendant:
BY THE COURT: And also, in October of 1981, you plead guilty to distribution of a Schedule III, Schedule IV narcotic and given five years suspended and five years probation; is that correct, sir?
BY JERRY BURGE: Yes, Sir.
BY THE COURT: And you were only shortly off of probation in this when this trial came up; is that correct?
BY JERRY BURGE: I didn‘t know. I didn‘t see my probation officer no more.
BY THE COURT: Do you have anything to say by way of mitigating these circumstances or anything to say prior to the time this Court imposes sentence?
BY JERRY BURGE: I regret what I done, you know. I mean, that‘s all I got to say.
Thereafter, the court imposed a sentence of sixteen years at hard labor. The state moved that the court “consider the sentence be made” in conformity with the habitual felony offender statute. The court acknowledged that it had failed to “put that in there” and noted that the sentence
In the instant case, the trial court informed defendant of the allegation contained in the multiple offender bill, and defendant admitted it was true. However, the trial court did not inform defendant of his right to be tried as to the truth of the allegations of his prior convictions. The colloquy between the court and defendant reflects that the court‘s inquiries concerning defendant‘s prior theft and drug convictions related only to the correctness of the presentence investigation report. This fact is particularly evident since the trial court‘s inquiries related to two previous felony convictions and the multiple offender bill charged only one predicate offense. These failures of the trial court constitute error patent on the face of the record. State v. Easton, 463 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); State v. Vincent, 439 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. 4th Cir.1983), writ denied, 472 So. 2d 913 (La.1985).
For the reasons assigned, we vacate defendant‘s sentence and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the views expressed herein.
SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.