The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order dismissing a DWI charge against Patrick Burekhardt. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion and therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal order.
Factual and Procedural Background
On April 27, 1995, Burekhardt, a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada was аrrested in San Antonio, Texas for driving while intoxicated. Sixteen months later, on August 12, 1996, Burckhardt’s case had still never been set for trial; instead, his pretrial motions were reset for the eighth time. The next day, Burek-hardt filed a motion to dismiss alleging he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found sixteen months had elapsed between Burckhardt’s arrest and the filing of his motion to dismiss, the State offered no explanation for the delay, and Burekhardt made a prime facie showing of prejudice. In accordance with these findings, the trial court granted Burckhardt’s motion and dismissed the information with prejudice.
Standard of Review
The State and Burekhardt disagree on the standard of review to be employed in reviewing an order dismissing a case on speedy trial grounds. The State, citing
Williams v. State,
In the speedy trial context, the federal appellate courts review questions of law de novo and questions of fact under a clearly erroneous standard of review.
United States v. Smith,
We therefore follow
Williams
and
Hernandez
and expressly hold Texas’ abuse of discretion standard applies in reviewing an order dismissing a case with prejudice on speedy trial grounds. Therefore, to establish error, the complaining party must show the
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trial court “applied an erroneous legal standard,” misapplied the correct legal standard, or made findings of fact that are not supported by any “reasonable view of the record.”
DuBose v. State,
Discussion
In its sole point of еrror, the State argues the trial court erred in granting Burckhardt’s motion to dismiss because the delay was not particularly excessive, the record does not establish the State deliberately or intentionally caused the delay, and Burckhardt failеd to timely assert his right to a speedy trial and failed to establish prejudice. We disagree.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and imposed on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Barker v. Wingo,
If a defendant thus establishes his right to a speedy trial inquiry, the court must determine whether the right has been violated by carefully balancing the four
Barker
factors: (1) “whether delay before trial was uncommonly long,” (2) “whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay,” (3) “whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial,” and (4) “whether [the defendant] suffered prejudice” as a result of the delay.
Doggett,
1. Whether Pretrial Delay Was “Uncommonly Long”
The State argues the trial court incorrectly found sixteen months elapsed from the time Burckhardt was arrested until the hearing on his motion to dismiss because it should have reduced the total delay by two agreed continuances. We agree in part.
Between his arrest on April 27, 1995 and the hearing on his motion to dismiss, which began August 15 but was not concluded until September 5, Burckhаrdt’s case was called seven times; each time he announced “ready.” However, on August 3, 1995, the record also reflects he agreed to a continuance until September 28, 1995, a total of fifty-five days. We thus agree the trial court should have excluded this agreed continuance from consideration,
Barker,
The State also argues Burckhardt agreed to continue his case on May 2, 1996 until August 3,1996, and the trial court erred in not excluding this agreed continuance from consideration. However, as the State notes, August 3, 1996 was a Saturday; Burckhardt thus had no choice but to agree to this continuance. Accordingly, sincе this delay was not chargeable to Burckhardt, the trial court correctly did not offset it against the total effective delay.
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In sum, while we agree the record does not support the trial court’s finding of a sixteen-month delay, we hold the recоrd does support a finding of a fourteen-month delay and, as the State now concedes, this delay warrants a presumption of prejudice and necessitates an analysis of the remaining
Barker
factors.
Doggett,
2.Whether the State or Burckhardt Was More at Fault for the Pretrial Delay
The trial court found the State failed to explain the delay in bringing Burckhardt to trial. The State does not disagree with this finding аnd concedes it bears “the burden on excusing the delay....”
Turner v. State,
In sum, while the trial court did not find and there is no evidence indicating the State intentionally delayed bringing Burckhardt to triаl, the trial court properly found the State failed to explain the delay. Accordingly, there was no valid reason for the fourteen-month delay between Burckhardt’s arrest and the dismissal hearing other than the State’s negligence;
3. Whether Burckhardt Asserted His Right to a Speedy Trial in Due Course
The State argues Burckhardt did not assert his right to a speedy trial until he filed his motion to dismiss and further argues, in reliance upon
McCarty v. State,
The trial judge found Burckhardt asserted his right to a speedy trial by insisting on a May 2, 1996 special setting for his pretrial motions; in her view, Burckhardt’s insistence on this special setting established “his desire for this case to be heard at the earliest opportunity, if not on the exact date of the special setting.”
As noted above, the trial judge, not this court, is the initial factfinder, and we may not disturb the trial court’s finding under an abuse of discretion standard unless no reasonable view of the record will support it. Here, the trial court’s finding that Burek-hardt first asserted his right to a speedy trial by insisting on the May 2, 1996 special setting is a proper and reasonable inference from the evidence, particularly the evidence demonstrating both sides announced “ready” at the special setting. We also note that Burckhardt’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial is “entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant was deprived of the right [to a speedy trial].”
Barker,
4. Whether Burckhardt Was Prejudiced by Pretrial Delay
The trial court found that, as a result of the delay, Burckhardt suffered “actual prejudice in that he has lost some potentially exculpatory evidence,” “lost work and several thousands of dollars in income,” and “suffered anxiety and concern.” The State argues the evidence does not establish prejudicial delay but simply the “ordinary and inevitable delay in any criminal proceed *104 ing.” Again, however, the State fails to consider the applicable standard of review.
“The right to a speedy trial is designed to protect three general interests[:]” (A) “to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;” (B) “to minimize anxiety and concеrn of the accused;” and (C) “to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”
Chapman,
A.Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration
Since Burckhardt was only incarcerated for five hours, there is no evidence indicating аnd the trial court properly did not find that Burckhardt was subjected to oppressive pretrial incarceration.
B.Anxiety and Concern
The trial court found and the evidence establishes that Burckhardt is an artist who lived in Las Vegas and flew to San Antonio on each оf the seven occasions his ease was called on the docket. As a result of these frequent trips to Texas, the trial court found and the evidence establishes Burckhardt lost work. In fact, the record establishes Burck-hardt was forced to turn dоwn jobs in Caracas, Cairo, Louisville, Palm Desert, and Las Vegas because the unusual nature of his work and the companies that employ him “require him to be on site at all times.” The trial court also found Burckhardt lost thousands of dollars as a result. This finding is also supported by the record, which establishes Burckhardt lost a $125,000 tax-iree payment when he lost the Cairo job. Finally, the trial court found Burckhardt “suffered anxiety and concern as a result of the delay,” a finding supported by the record evidencе establishing the disruptions to Burekhardt’s work and income stream ultimately forced him to rely on unemployment benefits.
C.Impaired Defense
The trial court also found Burekhardt’s defense was “prejudiced and impaired because of the loss of memory by the police оfficer of an exculpatory circumstance.” The State argues, however, this finding is not supported by the record. We agree and therefore disregard it.
Conclusion
Although the trial court’s finding of a sixteen-month delay incorrectly faded to exclude the fifty-fivе-day delay caused by an agreed continuance, and its finding that Burekhardt’s defense was prejudiced must be disregarded, the essential facts found by the trial court are supported by the evidence. In short, for no valid reason and despite Burek-hаrdt’s insistence on a May 2, 1996 special setting, the State failed to bring Burckhardt to trial for fourteen months in what appears to have been a routine DWI case. And, as a result of this delay, Burckhardt was forced to fly from Las Vegas to San Antonio on at least seven occasions, he lost work and substantial income, he was ultimately forced to rely on unemployment benefits, and he became anxious and concerned. Because these essential findings are supported by the record and in accordance with the applicable law, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the findings it did, in concluding that Burckhardt had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, or in dismissing the charge with prejudice. We therefore overrule the State’s point of error and affirm the trial court’s order.