611 N.E.2d 367 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
On May 31, 1991, defendant-appellant, Freddie Bumbalough, was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, R.C.
A bench trial was held on October 21, 1991. Bumbalough moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that he was not brought to trial within the time prescribed by R.C.
"The trial court prejudiced the defendant-appellant by its failure to grant defendant's motion to dismiss based on the state's failure to supply a speedy trial."
Bumbalough having been charged with a first-degree misdemeanor, the state was required, in the absence of a waiver, to bring Bumbalough to trial within ninety days after his arrest. R.C.
R.C.
Under R.C.
On July 1, 1991, Bumbalough moved to suppress the results of the breath-alcohol concentration ("BAC") test conducted at the time of his arrest. A hearing on this motion was originally set for July 22, 1991. On that date, the hearing was continued by the court until September 3, 1991.
There is no question that the twenty-one days between July 1, and July 22, are attributable to Bumbalough's motion and extended the time in which he had to be brought to trial. While conceding this, Bumbalough contends that the time between July 22 and September 3 is not excludable. He asserts that the court never journalized an entry giving its reason for the continuance. In support of his position, he cites numerous cases for the proposition that a court speaks only through its journal entries. See, e.g., State v. Mincy (1982),
We agree that ideally a court should journalize its rationale for a continuance. In the absence of such an entry the court runs the risk that a continuance, which would otherwise be attributed to the accused, will not be so construed on appeal. But this does not mean that an unjournalized continuance may never be charged to a defendant. When the record indicates that the continuance was attributable to the defendant, then such delay will be assessed to him even in the absence of a court's journal entry. See State v. Benson (1985),
Under Crim.R. 47, a motion to the court must state with "particularity the grounds upon which it is made" and be supported by a "memorandum containing citations of authority." In his one page suppression motion Bumbalough *411
made a general accusation that the police had not complied with the administrative requirements in conducting his BAC test. Because his motion did not comply with Crim.R. 47, it was within the sound discretion of the court to continue the suppression hearing. See State v. Landrum (1990),
That the court continued the suppression hearing because of the generality of Bumbalough's original motion is evidenced by the court's requirement that he file a supplement to his motion. In the opening sentence of this supplement, filed on August 22, 1991, Bumbalough states:
"Pursuant to this Court's request, the Defendant herein files this Motion in Addendum to his original motion to suppress."
Only in this six page addendum does Bumbalough adequately address the merits of his motion.
In conclusion we find that the court's continuance of the suppression hearing from July 22, to September 3, is chargeable to the defendant. These forty-three days, plus the twenty-one days between the filing of the suppression motion and the first hearing, total sixty-four days which are due to Bumbalough's motion. In applying R.C.
Bumbalough's assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
QUILLIN, P.J., and COOK, J., concur. *412