State v. BullockState v. Bullock
Lead Opinion
Dеfendant was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual offense. The trial court consolidated the сases for judgment and sentenced him to life imprisonment. N.C.G.S. §§ 14-27.4, 14-1.1 (1986).
Defendant’s older son testified that, when he was between seven and nine years old, defendant had sexually assaulted him by performing fellatio on him and making him perform fellatio on defendant. The older son and a younger son testified that defendant had also sexually assaulted the younger son in the same manner when that child was four.
After the older son told his stepmother that defendant had been molesting him, defendant tоok him to a psychiatrist. The Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS) began an investigation of defendant for sexual abuse and arranged for the older son to be evaluated by Dr. Charles Schaffer, a pediatrician and child
DSS requested that Dr. Schaffer also evaluate the younger son. Dr. Schaffer testified that during the evaluation this boy indicated with anatomical dolls that defendаnt had placed his penis in the boy’s mouth while holding and patting his head. Dr. Schaffer diagnosed child sexual abuse and reсommended psychological treatment. DSS referred the younger son to Dr. Carolyn Schroeder, a child psychologist, to determine his psychological status and treatment needs. Dr. Schroeder testified that on one of the bоy’s visits to her he indicated with anatomical dolls that defendant had placed his penis in the boy’s mouth.
Defendant cоntends that the testimony of Dr. Schaffer and Dr. Schroeder should not have been admitted as substantive evidence. The testimony of both as to the children’s statements was hearsay because the statements were made by one othеr than the declarant at trial and were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, ie„ that defendant hаd sexually assaulted his sons. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1986). However, the trial court admitted the testimony as substantive evidence under Rule 803(4), which рrovides an exception to the hearsay rule for
[statements made for purposes of medical diagnоsis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasоnably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) (1986).
The statements and non-verbal conduct in question were clearly madе for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Both children talked about the abuse and demonstratеd what had happened, using anatomical dolls, as part of the diagnosis and treatment process. The statеments and demonstrations were, equally clearly, pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment. In the context of child sexual abuse or child rape, a victim’s statements to a physician as to an assailant’s identity are pеrtinent to diagnosis and treatment. State v. Aguallo,
Defendant argues that Dr. Schaffer’s testimony was not admissible because he had received little, if any, acadеmic training concerning abused children. The record establishes, however, that Dr. Schaffer had extensive expеrience and training in the area of child sexual abuse. He had been a pediatrician for twenty-six years and had regularly seen around 150 children per week. He had both taught and attended seminars on child sexual abuse. He was on the Advisory Board of the Child Medical Examiner’s Program, a state and federally funded program established to evaluаte whether children have been abused. On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the trial court properly qualified Dr. Schaffer as an expert in pediatrics and the diagnosis of child sexual abuse. See State v. Baker,
Defendant further contends thаt Dr. Schroeder’s testimony was not admissible under Rule 803(4) because she is a psychologist, not a medical doctor. We recently noted that statements made by a victim of child sexual abuse to a psychologist during the course of diagnosis and treatment are admissible under Rule 803(4). State v. Bright,
Finally, defendant contends that the trial judge erroneously failed to summarize the evidence or explain the application of the law to the evidence. This argument is without merit. A trial judge “shall not be required to state, summarize or recapitulate the evidence, or to explain the apрlication of the law to the evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1232 (1985).
For the reasons set forth, we find that the defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
No error.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
Were the Court deciding for the first time the issue of the admissibility of the testimony of Dr. Schаffer and Dr. Schroeder, I would hold this testimony admissible only for corroborative purposes for the reasons stated by then Chief Justice Billings, dissenting, in State v. Aguallo,