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State v. Buggs
581 N.W.2d 329
Minn.
1998
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*1 fоr resentenc- court to the district the case propriety opinion on the express no

ing. We court imposed by the district any sentence

on remand. to district and remanded

Reversed resentencing.

BY THE COURT: A. Blatz Kathleen

/s/ A. Blatz

Kathleen

Chief Justice Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE BUGGS, Appellant.

Louis Cardona

No. C0-97-833. of Minnesota.

Supreme Court

July Aug.

Rehearing Denied

that the trial court committed' reversible er- admitting ror the victim’s statements assailant, identifying appellant as her in not limiting scope of the state’s evidence of victim, prior assault of the and in providing any guidance Ap- resolve a deadlock in its deliberations. pellant deprived further claims that he was right improper to a fair trial his juror in exclusion of a violation of his both juror’s equal protection rights and the *4 through pattern prosecutorial miscon- duct. We affirm.

Appellant Talley began and Kami met and dating they high when both school. relationship approximately Their lasted years. they years When were both 18 old they daughter, Buggs had a Ambreen Denise purchased together. and later a home In the however, spring of 1995 when their relation- founder, ship began Talley to and Ambreen Talley’s moved out to live with maternal grandmother, Napue. Rose 19, 1995, August appellant On learned that Talley dating Appellant was someone else. immediately Talley punched confronted repeatedly her in her head with closed fists. pled Appellant guilty fifth-degree to assault days jail, and was sentenced to 365 all but stayed, days placed probation and was years.- probation for two Part of his included Talley the condition that he not contact daughter. Despite their the no-contact order Russett, Steven P. Assist. Public De- however, appellant Talley to call continued fender, Paul, Appellant. St. for Talley occasionally bring would their se, Buggs, pro Louis Cardona Stillwater. daughter appellant appel- to with visit when jail Appel- lant was out of on work release. III, H. Humphrey, Hubert Minnesota At- completed jail January lant his sentence on General, Paul, torney St. Michael 0. Free- 9, 1996, Friday, February appel- On man, Hennepin County Attorney, Donna J. Products, Talley lant called at Electric Wire Wolfson, County Attorney, Assistant Minne- assembly plant Minneapolis where Tal- apolis, Respondent. mother, ley Talley’s a clerk. worked as Deb- Woods, orah testified that she listened in on through three-way this call conference and appellant money Talley heard demand that Talley “get and threaten would what’s OPINION coming” immediately to her. Woods notified STRINGER, Justice. probation department. appel- Because Following jury Hennepin County probation trial in Roy lant’s officer Elliot was not Court, there, Louck, District appellant spoke Louis Cardona Woods with Renee Buggs first-degree was probation spoke convicted murder fellow officer. Louck Talley. appeal, apрellant Talley, Kami On appellant claims confirmed that violated blood, “I I order, saying can’t breathe. can’t an arrest and and drafted no-contact McCarthy asked her who did this appellant. The order breathe.” order for detention her, replied she “Butch.” When he day. issued Talley replied again, “Buggs.” her asked 12,1996, appellant’s Monday, February On appellant’s nickname. Butch was the arrest and officer learned of probation appellant called warrant and detention paramedics arrived around 9:34 a.m. him him the situation and advise inform transported Talley hospital. him that Appellant told turn himself in. route, paramedics one of the asked While en Talley of the warrant because he was aware her, Talley who shot but she was unable him the weekend and left called over had respond. emergency in the room The doctor Appel- his back. message for him to watch Talley gunshot had determined that six sister, Buggs, about the his Lena lant told area, a wounds in her chest and abdominal told and she testified warrant thigh, a wound on her wound on her left have to be shot or that he would either hypovolemic left arm and she was suicide, but he was he would commit a.m., Talley approximately shock. At 10:10 jail. Buggs Lena also testified going back surgery taken into and аlmost immedi- Talley’s one week before approximately pro- ately into arrest. She was went cardiac upset her that he was murder told autopsy An nounced dead at 11:06a.m. deter- *5 to see Talley he was not able with because Talley’s the cause of death was mined that kept up, daughter, that “if she it their and multiple gunshot to her chest and wounds to make him kill her.” going she was The medical examiner testified abdomen. wounds, Talley eight gunshot most had Talley February a.m. on At 8:30 likely resulting from seven shots. One bullet Products. arrived to work at Electric Wire her entered her left arm and fractured radi- a.m., Talley’s supervi- 9:15 Sometime around us, thigh her left and the one bullet entered McLellan, sor, voices in heard raised William liver, lungs, struck her dia- other bullets upon investigation lunchroom area and kidney, phragm, spleen, left and colon. coming the voices he determined located off of the the women’s restroom a.m., day, approximately at 9:00 That same Talley’s two lunchroom. He heard voices— appellant Buggs Lena and told her called male. McLellan and that of an unidentified leaving town and he would con- that he was push open he was about to the door when things Some- tact her after “cooled down.” times, male Talley say “no” three heard appellant and two morning time later that bitch,” gunshot. say “You and then a voice Garcia, friends, Ramon Joaquin Bowers and immediately ran to turned and McLellan Antonio, for Minneapolis left and headed San building. employees from the evacuate his Ra- girlfriend former Texas where Bowers’ repeated gunfire. As he did so he heard Appellant his lived. and chel Contreras a.m., home about Minneapolis friends arrived at Contreras’ approximately At 9:18 day. learned Contreras dispatched to Electric 7:30 a.m. the next police officers were Talley morning had been speaking with some later Wire Products. After appellant suspect her L. was building, Sergeant killed people outside Carl appellant and confronted two other murder. Contreras McCarthy determined that he and [Talley] that “he made sure building he told her would to enter the officers have spend money, to his going was not to be able might hurt. At about because someone to some going not to be able screw a.m., she was McCarthy and the two officers 9:31 going not to be guy, and that she was steps floor other up the to the second walked During daughter, either.” steps to see McCarthy noticed on one of the able where gun in small, exchange, Contreras observed bag a hole in the paper red he apрellant’s pants that of McCarthy the officers the waistband of it. As bottom placed-on the couch. She out and they heard a later took the lunchroom area entered type gun automatic because an help from the knew was crying faint voice women’s asked to use gun clip. Appellant she saw a McCarthy and found Tal- restroom. entered he Mexico because go car to pool in a of Contreras’ ley lying on the floor on her back deliberation, days want to use a car with Minnesota After two jury did not plates. initially refused but appellant Contreras she guilty first-degree found murder eventually appellant 609.185(1) (1996) allowed and his friends § in violation of Minn.Stat. to drive her car to the border. he was mandatory sentenced to a term imprisonment. Appellant appeals of life his Force, Fugitive Minnesota Task (1) grounds: conviction on five the trial court organization up made of members from vari- by admitting committed reversible error Tal- agen- ous local federal law enforcement ley’s Sergeant McCarthy statements to iden- cies, appellant tracked locations in several tifying appellant as her assailant under the Alexandria, eventually Mexico and Virgi- dying exception declaration hearsay to the nia, appellant stаying where was with his (2) rule; the trial court committed reversible sister, 20,1996, Buggs. April appel- Lori On by refusing error scope to limit the Alexandria, Virginia lant was arrested in relating appellant’s state’s prior evidence was later extradited to Minnesota and indict- (3) Talley; assault of trial court commit- first-degree ed for murder. ted reversible providing any error trial, strong At circumstantial evidence guidance they on how should presented link appellant Talley’s was (4) deadlock; resolve their Blilie, receptionist murder. Julie at Elec- deprived right of his through to a fair trial Products, tric briefly Wire testified that she improper exclusion of a in violation a man description possibly observed whose juror’s equal protection both his and the matched run the front office (5) rights; deprived bag with a red his hand around 9:15 a.m. right his to a fair through pattern trial day on the bag the murder. The red prosecutorial misconduct. We consider each by McCarthy steps observed on the was de- of these issues. to be a gift bag termined Hallmark with the Dying I. Declaration words “Filled with Love” written on the out- *6 side, which Blilie bag identified as the she The trial Talley’s court ruled that examination, Upon had observed earlier. Sergeant McCarthy statements to identifying crime scene technician and a forensic scien- appellant as hеr assailant were admissible gunshot tist found residue and a 9-millimeter dying under the declaration and residual ex Luger casing shell bag. fired inside the The ceptions hearsay to the rule. The admission gift bag fingerprints, was tested for and sev- of evidence rests within the sound discretion prints en latent developed. were Appellant’s court, of the trial and a determination that a right thumbprint was a print match for a statement require meets the foundational recovered on the gift bag, by outside of the ments of a hearsay exception will not be the letter “D.” No fingerprints other were found showing erroneous absent a clear recovered from the crime scene. abuse of discretion. Bergeron, State v. 452 presented Other evidence at trial further 918, (Minn.1990). N.W.2d 923 appellant linked to the shooting. police recovered from the Talley restroom where prosecution, a homicide “a state paper fragments was shot matching gift thé ment made a declarant believing while bag spent and six. casings stamped bullet imminent, that the declarant’s death was con Luger.” “FC 9 mm Although gun no cerning was the cause or circumstances of what recovered, it was determined that the mur- the declarant impending believed be weapon likely der most was a 9-millimeter exception death” is admissible as an pistol. Buggs 804(b)(2). semi-automatic Lena hearsay testified rule under Minn. R. Evid. that when appellant Talley she lived with Appellant argues and the record does not 1995, in early late 1994 and support Talley had a made the statements un gun. 9-millimeter A search Buggs’ of Lori impending der a belief of According death. house incident to ly, arrest appellant argues, revealed the trial court’s gun magazine case and a that contained prejudi decision to admit the statements was bullets, twelve 9-millimeter five of requires which cial error that the be stamped “FC 9 mm Luger.” granted a new trial. court laid out the foundational asked her at least twice who had done this to This dying appel- of a decla her and both she identified requirements for admission times Elias, 156, arrived, paramedics Talley in 205 Minn. 285 lant. When the ration (Minn.1939). breathe, in We noted that told them that she could not N.W. 475 dying oxygen. for a declaration to be admissi that she She taken order needed was ble, hospital than something emergency phy- more must be shown room where hypovolemic sician in. simply that the declarant is aware determined she was injuries approxi- or her and the shock. She seriousness of his died cardiac arrest 158, mately at possibility of death. Id. at 285 N.W. two hours after she had been shot. spoken 476. The statement “must have been This court has stated that the seriousness recovery hope without the shadow of a decedent’s wounds and the fact 159, impending death.” Id. at 285 N.W. at making decedent dies soon the declara after factor is the declar- Thus decisive tion are circumstantial evidence of the de- of mind which must be shown ant’s state in impending clarant’s belief Berger death. and cannot left to competent evidence on, 452 at N.W.2d 923. The declarant conjecture. Id. “Fear or even belief that times, Bergeron eight had been stabbed illness will end death will not avail of itself pool lying in a of blood. Id. His found dying to make a declaration. There must be lungs cavity and abdominal were filled with expectation’ hopeless ‘a settled that death is wounds, blood from the one of the stab hand, near at and what is said must have cord, spinal likely wounds severed his most spoken impending been of its hush paralyzing par him. Id. The officer and 159, 285 presence.” (quot Id. at N.W. scene amedic testified that the vic States, ing Shepard v. United U.S. breathing extremely tim’s labored and (citation (1933) L.Ed. 54 S.Ct. breathe,” kept saying that he “I can’t omitted)). paramedic that the victim start testified go into ed severe shock. Id. The one dis Later cases from this court reiterate tinguishing Bergeron fact between and the something more than the seriousness of present Bergeron case is that victim in injdries-and possibility the victim’s dying stated “I’m aren’t I?” to which the death must be shown in order to make a paramedic replied good.” “It look too declaration, doesn’t dying statement as a admissible case, Talley Id. In the instant never said “I and that the decisive factor is the declarant’s *7 dying,” am nor was she ever told that she Bergeron, state of 452 922- mind. N.W.2d at However, probably would die. this court (Minn.1990); Lubenow, 23 v. State 310 Elias, “[djespair recovery in noted that of 52, (Minn.1981); N.W.2d 56 and State v. Eu may gathered from the circum indeed be banks, 257, 262, 453, 277 152 Minn. N.W.2d support facts the inference. stances (1967). 456-57 The declarant’s of mind state unyielding is no ritual of words to be There may only through be shown not direct evi Minn, 159, spoken by dying.” at 285 205 dence, expressing such as statement (quoting Shepard, at 477 290 at N.W. U.S. dying, that declarant’s conviction he or she is (citations omitted)). 100, 22 54 S.Ct. See also may but it also be inferred from all of the Brown, 484-85, 209 Minn. at 296 N.W. at 586 Eubanks, surrounding circumstances. 277 Minn, (the may state of mind be shown declarant’s 262, 457; 152 at N.W.2d by circumstantial “where the facts evidence Brown, 478, 484-85, 582, Minn. 209 296 N.W. support such an inference to the re (1941). shown quired degree.”) establishing The trial court heard evidence wounds, Talley’s Talley eight was shot seven or The seriousness of to- times chest, abdomen, arm, breathing, thigh. gether and with her labored her liver, breath, ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍lungs, diaphragm, squirming struggling bullets struck her and for and her spleen, kidney, making of the state- left and colon. When Ser- death within two hours her, circumstances from geant McCarthy lying found she was on ments are sufficient blood, conclude that pool her back on the floor in a of which the trial court could identifying “squirming,” struggling Talley the statements and to breathe. He made 336 impending probative; only issue is a firm belief in her evidence is

appellant with probative whether the value of the evidence of Because the admission evidence death. substantially danger outweighed is of of trial within the sound discretion rests here, prejudice. unfair court and we find no abuse of discretion not err in we hold that the trial court did prejudice This court “to mean has defined ruling Talley’s statements met the foun- only advantage ‘the unfair that results from requirements dying of a declaration. dational capacity persuade by of the evidence ” Townsend, illegitimate II. Prior Assault means.’ State v. (Minn.1996) 292, (quoting 546 N.W.2d Appellant argues next that the trial Cermak, State v. 365 N.W.2d 247 n. reversible error in not limit court committed (Minn.1985)). Townsend, the defendant scope relating appel ing the of evidence charged attempted with murder and prior Talley. Evidence of a lant’s assault of murder. Id. at 295. The moved defendant assault, evidence,” in prior or “character is attempted to sever the murder and murder prove of a admissible to the character defen suppress relating trials all evidence dant in order to show that the defendant attempted murder in his murder trial. conformity with that acted character trial Id. The court denied defendant’s motion committing the offense with which he or she- and allowed state to introduce evidence However, charged. prior is evidence of' a murder, regarding attempted the defendant’s pur for assault admissible other including testimony from the victim in the motive, poses, including “proof opportuni case, attempted testimony murder from six intent, plan, ty, preparation, knowledge, iden appearance other witnesses as to the of the tity, or absence mistake or accident.” appearance crime scene and the the vic- 404(b). Minn. R. Evid. To evi admit the wounds, large photographs tim’s color dence the trial court must determine that the crime scene. Id. This court held that convincing there clear evidence that repetitious admission of extensive and evi- prior the defendant committed the act bad error, relating dence to the other crime was probative and that the value of the evidence nothing because it but “could do inflame the outweighs any potential prejudice. fоr unfair jury improperly.” Id. at 296. Mills, (Minn. State v. 562 N.W.2d 1997) Here, reviewing generally variety A defers to the state introduced a admitting prior relating August the trial court’s discretion in evidence only upon prior Talley, including bad acts and will reverse a show assault evi- ing of clear abuse of discretion. lifting weights Id. dence that assault, up” was “bulked at the time The trial court admitted this evidence as testimony Talley assaulted motive, intent, proof identity. Appel- four-year-old front daughter, of their testi- probation assaulting Talley lant was on mother, Woods, mony Talley’s Deborah facing prospect the unwelcome of re- Talley immediately called her after the turning jail proba- because she notified the *8 picked up assault and Woods and took tion office that he violated the no-contact hospital, testimony her to the from the emer- Appellant’s stop Talley order. desire to gency physician Talley room who treated testifying probation about his violation and assault, right testimony after the from the jail going avoid back to demonstrates a mo- police appellant officer who arrested and Additionally, tive to kill her. prior the as- police report, testimony wrote the from the clearly sault demonstrates the strained na- police Talley, officer whо interviewed relationship appellant ture of the between photographs Talley’s injuries. four Talley. “Character evidence which relationship’ Although may tends to show the ‘strained be- some of this evidence have cumulative, it, the majority tween accused and the victim is relevant been the of with the establishing exception testimony, only motive and intent and is of Woods’ took a Mills, portion excessively therefore at morning admissible.” N.W.2d of a and was not Here, question appel- explicit inflammatory. photo- there is no that or The four prior graphs overly lant the jury committed assault or that the shown to the were not quest morning was denied. In the of Febru- graphic, especially com- inflammatory or 11, ary jury requesting autopsy photographs. In ad- the sent note either the parison to dition, scope reports police the of the limit the written officers on the trial court did by excluding certain the scene the murder or the answer to the introduced the evidence questions McCarthy of whether the victim made to the included in hearsay statements report Talley the as- his as interviewing officer her after identified police hearsay any all statements her assailant and whether he told of the excluding as sault and by Talley concerning abuse and threаts officers at the scene of her made identification. Finally, beginning by appellant. opposed granting the The request, the defense either during testimony relating to again asking jury the that the be left to its collective specifically prior the trial court memory p.m., the assault as to the evidence. At 2:30 the they only use jury the jury instructed could a note to refusing sent the its purpose of show- the evidence for the limited request charging “try it to to resolve intent, motive, identity, or and that the ing so, yourselves, you these issues can do jury not convict on the could basis my answering questions you without the The trial court re- prior of the incident. rereading testimony.” peated jury to the at the these instructions jury point The sent another note at some trial. conclude that on the basis close of We p.m. February stating after 2:30 on that it facts, clearly not of these the trial court impasse, had reached an and that it would be admitting prior discretion in the' abuse its impossible to reach unanimous verdict assault evidence. testimony police without the of the officers Jury III. Instructions time, on the This scene. the defense re- quested jury that the court instruct appellant next contends that

The guilty a verdict of not does not need to be error not trial court committed reversible unanimous, jury and that either the court not providing any guidance to the as to how testimony jurors After testimo reread that the it should resolve deadlock. Instead, requested, it all it. ny, charged jury. The or that reread the trial court 3.04, response jury telling the standard the court sent a trial court read CRIMJIG “[ejontinue they try jury charge regarding unanimous verdicts them should work charged through your impasse.” jury The one The trial court also sent criminal eases.1 asking long jury you agree “All of must more note that afternoon how as follows: they that eve- upon your you have had to continue to deliberate verdict. Some they you ning, that while were still at an jurors on matters where were civil been impasse, introspective contemplation many of delibera “further permitted, after so hours tion, might helpful. The court verdict. of the issue” to return a so-called five-sixths they may re- responded by informing in criminal them are no fractional verdicts There evening. morning, The next on jury’s must be unani tire for the case. The verdict February jury guilty ver- returned mous.” dict. after- jury began deliberating Although Appellant argues that the trial court erred February noon of instructing jury continue deliberat- sketchy, appears long that not record is ing rereading CRIMJIG 3.04 to day, after deliberations commenced testimony jury, jury may have conclud- entire because requested that the they required to until ed that deliberate Sergeant McCarthy paramedic and the they unanimous If a trial re- reached a verdict. the scene be read back to them. Their *9 your views provides part: should not hesitate to reexamine 3.04 1. CRIMJIG change your opinion you if become con- and another, with You discuss the case one should you they that are erroneous but should vinced reaching agree- and deliberate with a view to ment, simply your opinion honest be- not surrender your you can do so without violence to if jurors disagree merely or in order cause other judgment. You should decide individual .the a to reach verdict. only you yourself, dis- case for but after have Practice, Assn., Judges Minn. Dist. Minnesota your jurors 10 fellow and cussed the case with (3d ed.1990). carefully You CRIMJIG 3.04 have considered their views. 338 jury agree, your impasse” would not lead the to jury a is unable to

court believes jury to continue their delib- “may require the they deliberate required conclude were may repeat an instruc- give and or erations reached; until a unanimous verdict was fur- * * require or tion *. The court shall jury ther were to the with trial the notes sent jury require the to deliberate for threaten to necessarily knowledge, counsel’s albeit not length of time or for unrea- an unreasonablе approval. with their Kelley, State v. 517 sonable intervals.” (Minn.1994) Our decision in State v. Jones is more on (quoting A.B.A. 909 N.W.2d 4.4(b) Jones, § point. judge for Criminal Justice In the trial not read Standards did 15— (1986)). error in Minneso- is reversible 3.04, “[I]t charge jury but al- CRIMJIG did jury a unanimous ta to coerce towards most verbatim the “fractional verdict” court, therefore, in- A can neither verdict. Jones, charge used in the case at hand. decided, jury must nor form a that a case day N.W.2d at 907. After a of deliberation jury allow the to believe that ‘deadlock’ is jury indicating sent a note it had reached Jones, option.” not an available impasse, judge and the trial advised the (Minn.1996) (citations omit- N.W.2d jury continue an- deliberation. Id. After ted). day jury other sent another note indicat- Kelley Appellant’s reliance on State v. (11-1 ing split guilty) the exact number Kelley granted misplaced. While in we holding and the reason the one was out. a new trial because the trial court defendant Id. at 907-8. The trial court denied a mistri- provided virtually guidance on no how the request al and read CRIMJIG 3.04 to the deadlock, jury the facts are was to handle jury. day at Id. 908. After a third of delib- Kelley, quite different from those hand. jury guilty eration returned a verdict. Kelley, at 910. In the trial court N.W.2d Id. We held the combination of the trial initially jury. read CRIMJIG 3.04 to the Id. instructions, whole, court’s two taken as a jury subsequently at 907. The sеnt the trial adequate description to an “amounted of the indicating court two notes deadlock and the jury’s duty,” role and and did not coerce the split, requesting exact numerical advice. jury to reach unanimous verdict. Id. at notes, responded The trial court to those period 911-12. We further noted that the jury telling the to “continue deliberations” jury light deliberations was not excessive in “keep working,” consulting without or length complexity of the of the trial and counsel, notifying making a record of the “[njeither paraphrased in- initial communication. Id. at 907-8. We concluded keep structions nor the later instructions to the trial court’s communications were deliberating beyond went the discretion af- face, not coercive on their but have led a trial in management forded court of the jury they required to conclude trial.”2 Id. at 912. deliberate until a unanimous verdict was reached on each count. Id. at 909. so initially Given the trial court read concluding, particularly by we were troubled CRIMJIG 3.04 and the nature of noncoercive parte the ex nature of the communications notes, the trial court’s the fact that the de requested because the defense could have notes, fully fense was advised and that that the court reread 3.04 or some CRIMJIG jury!s deliberations werе not excessive other suitable course of action. Id. at 909- trial, light length complexity of the contrast, 10. In the notes sent the trial jury fully we conclude that the able to “try present stating case obligations discern the limits of its yourselves, you resolve these issues can do try through so” “continue Accordingly work not coerced to reach a verdict. part 2. While the Jones court did mention that court in Jones did not read 3.04 in the CRIMJIG instructions, finding its decision in no error was influenced initial a fact that this court noted reading the trial court’s of CRIMJIG 3.04 when pose creating did some risk of misunderstand- deadlock, not, jury reached a it did as the contrast, ing. present Id. In the trial court in the appellant suggests, require that a trial court must charge case read CRIMJIG 3.04 in the final always charge read that if a indicates dead- jury. Jones, lock. See 556 N.W.2d at 911. The trial

339 correctly.determined its The trial court trial court did not abuse hold the we prima the defendant did not make a charging jury. discretion challenge facie case that the was exercised on of a Potential Juror IV. Exclusion the basis of We have stated the “[a] race.. prima facie case of racial discrimination is jury the state exer During selection by showing that or established one more po peremptory challenge to remove cisеd a group per of a racial have members been is juror number 32. Juror number 32 tential emptorily jury excluded from the and that daughter but has an African-American white circumstances of an the case raise inference mistaken for a Native and is sometimes that the exclusion was based on race.” State opposed The defense the use American. Stewart, (Minn.1994) 559, v. 514 N.W.2d 563 juror arguing that number 32 was the strike added). 32, (emphasis Juror number as a expressed she concerns removed because woman, any Caucasian is not a member jury panel the lack of minorities on the about minority, despite composition racial are people how of color treated family. While is true Batson has general. The contended system defense been extended to white venire members who racially peremptory challenge was race,3 juror are struck on the basis of their deprived appellant and the motivated number 32 was not on the basis of excluded juror right equal protection. The their accepts if appel her race even one as true appropriate that it was an trial court ruled argument solely lant’s that she was excluded peremptory strike. people of her because beliefs color are unfairly system. pro treated Batson peremptory use of chal The status, potential juror’s tects the racial lenges persons to exclude from the sole political philoso her racial and beliefs prohibited by ly on the basis of race is phies. juror may While number 32 have Equal Clause of the United States Protection appeared to be an ideal from the de Kentucky, v. 476 Constitution. Batson U.S. perspective, the state could well have fense (1986). 79, 89, 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 106 S.Ct. perceived agenda her as someone with Supreme three-step pro a Court set out predisposed acquit who was the trial —as per a in Batson to determine whether cess ruling, per- in its what “[t]hat’s noted challenge by racially emptory was motivated empts Despite appellant’s urgings are for.” First, discriminatory intent. the defendant contrary, we do not believe Batson prima showing that must make a facie apply juror’s ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍to a should be extended challenge was exercised on the basis of race. Accordingly, philosophies. beliefs or we hold Second, 96, upon at such Id. 106 S.Ct. peremptory a that the use of strike violated prosecu showing, shifts to the burden juror’s potential nor the neither for the tor to articulate a race-neutral reason right equal protection. constitutional 97,106 challengе. Finally, at Id. S.Ct. V. Prosecutorial Misconduct

the trial court must determine whether there at purposeful been discrimination. Id. has prosecutor A not seek con Gaitan, 98, 1712; v. 536 106 S.Ct. obligation cost and has the victions “ (Minn.1995). 11, prosecutor If a 15 N.W.2d rights of accused as well guard ‘to discriminatory racially intent or motive had rights public.’” as to enforce the striking juror, a defendant is automati (Minn. Salitros, N.W.2d 817 State v. 499 cally trial harmless 1993) to new because entitled I ABA (quoting Standards Criminal impact analysis “inappropriate in the Justice, error is Function 3-1.1 and The Prosecution ed.1979)). by petit jury (2 ease of a convicted Commentary defendant at 3.7 But even prosecutorial present, if there was racial discrimination the selec the de misconduct new-, McRae, jury.”. 494 to a trial where tion of that State v. fendant is not entitled (Minn.1992). certainty that the miscon- say can 260 we N.W.2d Knox, So,2d 803, (3d (La. 1992); Cir.1989). 3. State v. F.2d Forte, Virgin Islands Government of *11 that questions police officers beyond a reasonable asked was harmless duct hearsay: Ashby, 27-28 in the admission of v. 567 N.W.2d have resulted doubt. State (Minn.1997). actually “If verdict ren any Q: you able to obtain informa- Were error, surely unattributable to dered was employees you spoke with? tion from these beyond harmless a reasonable the error is They A: Yes. stated that— Juarez, 28; Id. at doubt.” attorney]: Objection, Your [Defense (Minn.1997). 286, 292 N.W.2d hearsay. Honor. It calls for matter, highly- we note the As a threshold testimony trial. The charged context of this spanned presented almost two

and evidence to finish both sides weeks and from start Q: you get information did What every their case. Almost vigorously tried dispatch, sir? at times ruling motion and was contested and attorney]: Objection, Your [Defense high. Against backdrop, emotions ran Honor. appellant categories sets forth several hearsay On neither occasion admitted. prosecutorial misconduct. prosecutor Obviously it was not error for the briefly appellant’s We first address only questions designed that were to ask prose- claims that do not rise to the level of elicit evidence from the officers as to what cutorial misconduct: they they actions took based on information police reports. Offering the contents of (cid:127) — hearsay. received and did not call for prosecutor attempted police to offer a Next, appellant’s sev we address report and the contents of a recorded dis- although eral claims of that tech misconduct patch call an effort to rebut the de- nically rising inappropriate to the level of McCarthy suggestion Sgt. fense’s fa- conduct, clearly sufficiently prejudi are not idеntification, Talley’s and that bricated warrant cial as to reversal: only suspect reason became —Attempts to introduce evidence the trial police was because were told co-work- Appellant couH ruled inadmissible. con- Talley ex-boy- ers had abusive prosecutor elicit tends that tried to friend. On both occasions the defense Talley’s employer implemented had objection.4 hearsay Appellant ar- made security prior measures for her after the gues improper prosecu- that it was for the repeatedly assault incident over sustained tor to offer evidence or to ask inadmissible defense, relevancy objections by the legally objectionable questions. The state Talley to elicit made to tried statements police reports contends both the others about abuse and threats. message clearly the recorded were admis- prosecutor persist While it is error for a they sible not because were offered for improper in asking questions ruled or elicit their truth but rather to show that it was inadmissible, unlikely Sergeant McCarthy Har- fabricated evidence ruled State v. ris, (Minn.1994), Talley’s identification. the trial 521 N.W.2d our While police report, court did not admit the careful review of the record leаds us to the dispatch ruled that the contents of the inappropriate conclusion that conduct recording surely admissible under not here was inadvertent and theory. state’s We conclude that it was contribute to the verdict. attempt not error to to offer the two items —Asking appellant to comment prosecutor

if the believed there was le- credibility another witness. On cross- evidentiary argument gitimate for their ad- appellant, prosecu- examination of the mission. tor asked about Rachel Contrer- events, —Attempts appel- account of the when to introduce inadmissible evi- as’ occasions, why prosecutor two lant denied that Contreras asked him dence. On point hearsay objection by improper, 4. At the trial court that it was one after a found defense, intentionally prosecutor personally the de- directed her done in order to force attorney. object. While this comments to the defense fense *12 just go through the courts to counsel to rehabilitate the did not he defendant’s daughter, prose credibility. the get Additionally, visitation his Id. at 708. the Agard if Rachel testified to that prosecutor cutor asked: “So court -noted that the [cjourt jury, then Ra and insinuating fact before made the comments fabrication mistaken, true, lying summation, or sir?” is either during chel for the first time a fact Appellant question that the contends troubling, the court found because the re- improper cred argumentative and because marks occurred too late for the defense ibility are within the sole determinations attorney respond. to even Id. at n. province jury. The state contends 709, 711. attempt high legitimate

that it was a to prosecutor’s We hold that the re credibility namely, light a serious issues— prejudicial marks did not amount to error testimony appellant of and that the Contr because in addition to the defense’s to failure error, reconciled. The eras could not be object preserve appeal, that issue the appellant any, was harmless because the opportunity defense to had rehabilitate simply claim that he not reiterated his did appellant respond the on re-direct and to to any depth in at all. speak with Contreras in closing argument, clearly the remarks —Asking jury to draw adverse the infer lessening possibility the that the remarks ences exercise his con of However, given contributed to the verdict. rights. prosecutor The asked stitutional implications the constitutional that such com questions on of several cross-examination raises, mentary prosecutors we cаution that opportunity appellant highlighted that his dwelling presence extensive on a defendant’s all see all the to hear the evidence and may during the trial result in reversible er Later, reports. closing arguments, in the cases, in especially ror future where there prosecutor argued appellant that took ad support are no facts in evidence to an infer vantage opportunity of his to observe the fabrication, opportunity ence of or there is no presentation full the in the court of case to rehabilitate the defendant. room then took the witness stand and —Attempts proof. to the burden story exonerating himself.5 concocted a shift cross-examining appellant, pros- When Appellant argues although .that the defense object, receipts ecutor asked him if he had plain not it was error that car, right, to substantiate his claims that he sold his violated his Sixth Amendment be present during stopped morning that he at an ATM the trial and confront the wit him,- murder, stopped buy against citing Agard Talley’s v. Por that he nesses (2d tuondo, Cir.1997), Texas, way pur- or that gas 117 F.3d 707-08 on the he gift in principle improper bag for the it is chased the November. objec- overruled the argue gained that the defendant a tactical trial court defendant’s prosеcutor attempting tion that advantage through the exercise of or his appellant, proof It but rights.6 her constitutional should be shift burden during interrogation and in the final Agard only noted that addresses com prosecutor closing jury charge it instructed that the defen- ments made cross-examination, addition, proof. arguments, during dant had no burden objection by the the trial court sustained an to the because constitutional issues raised “incumbent,” prosecutor’s the word present “either are not or are of use of remarks incum- upon prosecutor’s question: in the “it’s less concern when made cross-exami nation”, upon you as a witness who takes the opportunity of defense bent due Washington, closing argument, an intermediate court in In the defense's counsel em- as well as phasized every right commentary improper. had to be agreed is have However, that such present vance, Court, in ad- trial review Supreme evidence Michigan and the defendant, just every and that like other Minnesota, appellate intermediate courts of see adverse should be drawn from no conclusions Grilli, (Minn.Ct.App. 369 N.W.2d rights. appellant’s exercise of those denied, 30, 1985), 1985), (Minn. Aug. rev. New opposite. Jersey, and Texas hold Agard highest *13 borhood all the citizens [and affected] produce 360,

to evidence. of the state of Minnesota.” 547 N.W.2d (Minn.1996). Appellant 364 We noted that the remarks —Improper Closing Argument. family “simply prosecutor committed mis- about the of the victim de- claims that the murder,” by closing arguments attempt- in scribed the result of the conduct inevitable victim, ing generate sympathy jury’s for the and were not made to inflame the to by commenting improperly passions. on the effect Id. We conclude that while the community Talley’s family on her and com- remarks about the on the death had effects munity, appellant’s problematic attacking potentially char- here were divert- ing jury’s away him a for the attention role of acter when she called “coward” from its committing determining appellant guilty Tal- or not suicide after he shot whether is ley. guilty, not reversal is not warranted because up only portion a the comments made small prosecution, In a homicide the state closing simply argument of the described life, may offer information about the victim’s the result of the inevitable murder. attempt it but not use as an to influence jury’s prejudice the on the basis of decision Finally, prosecu we hold passion. Hodgson, or v. 512 N.W.2d State appellant to a tor’s references as “coward” (Minn.1994) (allowing play 97 the state to thought process with a “twisted” im tape playing a 45-second video of the victim comments, prоper but the remarks do not person). basketball to show victim as a See They require a new trial. were isolated com Graham, also State v. 207 N.W.2d given ments of the mass evidence (“The (Minn.1985) just victim was not bones lengthy they surely trial not to contribute flesh, and sinews covered with was im but Ives, jury’s- verdict. See v. spark prosecution bued with of life. The (Minn.1997) (it N.W.2d 713-15 was mis leeway spark has some to show that prosecutor argue conduct for the to the de present being long the victim as a human as punk[ ]” fendant was “would-be attempt as it is not ‘an to evoke undue any li[fe]”, “pathetic little but the comments were ”) sympathy ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍jury’s passions.’ or inflame the prejudicial require so as to a new trial appear prosecutor’s It does not at beyond because the comments were harmless tempt present Talley thoughtful, to aas doubt). a reasonable friendly, hard-working and the individual child, four-year-old showing mother of a or now We turn the last two claims Talley’s picture before and after her death prosecutorial of misconduct which we con goes beyond pale giving the victim “a First, clude are of far more nature: serious life,” spark of nor was its matter-of-fact na during testimony Lori defense witness likely jury’s passions. ture to inflame the Buggs, jurors several overheard one object We also note thаt the defense did not prosecutors whisper ly to co-counsel: “She’s any portion closing referencing of the day jurors ing.” The next one of the advised Talley’s background, suggesting that the de jurors the court about comment. Four regard proble fense did not the comments as remark, actually heard the and all two but constituting matic and event a waiver eventually learned about it. The trial court Ture, objection. of the State v. 353 N.W.2d extensively questioned ju and counsel each (Minn.1984). 502, 516 individually, comprising ap ror the voir dire Appellant objects proximately pages transcript. also Each references community Talley juror in which lived and stated the comments would not Lewis, ability fairly indepen- worked. State v. we did not find affect his or her dently Buggs’ testimony. your way trying Lori Ac- that that’s evaluate ease and defense’s cordingly, way you the trial denied that’s the want to come across to a mistrial, concluding that motion for a jury, your prej- that’s business.” We find no misconduct was unintentional and prosecutors’ udice because of the properly. had acted displays, particularly light amateur jury’s expressed impatience with their con- know, every prosecutor should As duct, lightly but we do not take conduct that improper express personal opinion participants demeans other in the trial and credibility about the of witness. State the court. Ture, 353 N.W.2d at 516. The misconduct very possibly here could have been the basis none While claims either sin- very a mistrial for the extensive and but gly aggregate denied his questioning the court and counsel of each right to a fair trial or contributed to the juror’s response and each that his or verdict, prosecutor’s comments about a *14 credibility ability her to assess the of the credibility repeated expres- witness’s by witness was not affected the remark —in disgust sions of with the defense’s case and fact, jurors negative a reaction some had rulings the court’s raise such troubling con- prosecution toward the because of it —we professional they cerns of misconduct that well the remark was could conclude suffi should be called to the attention of the Law- prejudicial ciently require as to a new trial. yers Responsibility Professional Board. inquiry The court’s resolves the issue howev vigorous prosecution certainly While need er, coupled with the instruction to the prosecution, not be lifeless where it has the jury ignore the comment further insulated potential distracting the from its any possible prejudice, the we role, proper undermining integrity the of the the trial court not abuse its conclude did legal profеssion, offending dignity the denying broad discretion in defendant’s mo court, disregarded. the it cannot be tion for a mistrial. Despite strong our distaste for such con- The second claim of misconduct of a however, duct we conclude that the following more serious nature arose the was not denied a fair trial. jurors questioning of the about the counsel’s Affirmed. prosecu comment. The trial court drew the prosecutors’ body

tors’ attention to the use of PAGE, (dissenting). Justice language, only by jurors not observed the because, respectfully I I dissent. do so personnel spectators, in but the agree I with court in other while the all expressions disgust nature of facial when respects, I believe the court’s conclusion against prosecution, the trial court ruled the peremptory juror the state’s strike of 32 did pros questions or the defense asked that the prima not constitute a facie case of racial apparently thought inappropriate. ecution Kentucky,1 discrimination under Batson jurors of the One informed the court that progeny and its is error. jurors prosecu several were alienated the 32, juror striking prosecutor Prior to tors’ conduct. The trial court ruled that the intentional, juror questions, not asked the a short series of conduct was offensive permitted point noted that he it to the where each of which was rooted issues of race.2 juror prosecutor questions it became a distraction because “I decided The asked no only peo- 1. 476 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 69 looked around and there were a few room, (1986). ple you of color in the and I think said something like the 1950's Minnesota or some- afternoon, Q. Good ma'am. thing. you any perception Do have or infor- happens kind of mation in terms of how that A. Hello. from, Q. who controls that or where that comes go something you I want to back to talked makeup group? your impres- that kind of of a about with Mr. Lucas kind of Well, looking you found out A. the division—I sions when came in at that first kind of zip gave you gathering was incorrect. I that we had when we first called that the code I all know, jurors together. you just recently didn't realize. I had moved and I You indicated code, system, given you wrong zip looking so I was in the some concern about the had the minority, prima racial asking & member those race. After 32 unrelated has not of racial discrimination juror facie case excused prosecutor questions, been made out. response to defen- In explanation. without rejec- prosecutor’s objection that dant’s con- single America’s most “Race out principles set juror 32 violated tion of confounding prob- founding problem, but Batson, argued that Batson prosecutor know people seem to of race is that few lem prosecu- with the apply. agreeing In part, what makes race race is.”4 what stated, “I think it is not tor, trial court many causes confounding problem and what cauea- challenge. The woman was Batson is, is the view people to not know what race sion.”3 problems of problems of race are the that the minority. They are not. the racial relationship juror 32’s Ignoring us, belong all of no problems of race lives with and man she African-American from, no our ancestors come matter where the fact that in real- daughter and interracial Thus, color of our skin. excluded, matter of her what not because ity, juror 32 was an issue in this concluding that race is not justice system, but race and beliefs about of a juror 32 is not a member case because concerns about prosecutor’s because is an minority, point. misses the Race be- racial race, summarily concludes that the court woman, issue. is not juror as a Caucasian cause you like this would sit as a case

phone that's when I realized book and court, just City we do have a defendant of color? county of Minne- where it's not *15 so well, these, pro- a of the reason I wanted to be apolis. of and some A. I the It's all feel— suburbs, outlying somebody spective jurors juror the who doesn’t are from there would be so counly, I am sure. of the and so it is reflective have that fear base. city. just of the you Q. reflective It Q. isn’t in this And would treat defendant change kind of did that information differently And a on the fact that he is case based you you or not? maybe felt when saw that how person? person of color and not a white day, yes. A. That know when I saw that assem- A. No. I didn't you about Q. some concerns Do have going person bly to be a of room that it was treating people system general of color fair- case, anything I didn't know about color. ly? so I— Yes, about it. I have concerns A. expec- your your Q. or And is it kind of belief all, explain you Q. that at that Can verbalize your making that the defen- tation of decision thinking? you what are to me your into decision dant’s race should not enter If I kind of falls back on the media. A. It all the facts the case? about of committed, news, if there is a crime watch the by that I would be affected A. No. I don’t feel just my opinion now. I will be and this is race. it, person they have as about if the that honest likely possible you Q. do feel that it's or And black, picture suspect their is flashed on a is higher you the state to a that would hold Caucasian, person screen. If the is entire proof the fact that the burden of because of my family you picture, rarely see a and so do defendant is a black man? parts outlying live in the and friends that A. No. them, state, get and I this sense of fear from I moment, May I have a Your MS. HANNON: promoted by the [sic] it ahs been think that Honor? media. THE COURT: Yes. you played Q. see that out in the And how do you, ma'am. Your MS. HANNON: Thank Honor, Hennepin County in terms here in courtroom Deponty. excuse Ms. the state would happens of what in these cases? it, any experience I am have with A. I don't say, judge to "I was 3. The trial court went on that, my feeling you sorry, know, I—that was is but wondering they going to ask assembly jurors reflected room of if that they questions at all. I could see her as someone my acquaintances just what I have known in inquiring, may even but have stricken without looking place. people when I was to rent essentially questions only go race their issues, Q. Were different? willing expand it to but I am not Caucasian, I Because I am A. It’s different. living primarily in a mi- caucasion who people they ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍things hear from Caucasian * * nority family people. around black wouldn’t talk about you being given Q. And are talked to in Haney López, The Social Construction Ian F. you expect juror can to be a case where Illusion, African-American, Fabrica- Race: Some Observations how do the defendant Choice, tion, L.L.Rev. 5- 29 Harv. C. R.-C. you facing we are as [sic] beliefs about what (1994). here, society how how do those beliefs affect diffi- form the basis for the conclusion that her race are difficult and'raise Issues of impermissibly Resolution of these issues exclusion was questions. cult race based and easily taking is, minimum, will not come questions at a sufficient to make out a bring will not about resolution. easy road prima Beyond ju case under Batson. facie resolution, we must first have the To achieve color, people ror 32’s association it is they ability recognize issues of race when played clear issues of race a role in her so, us. To do we must look come before that, during exclusion. The record shows experi- of our own beyond the limited box dire, juror expressed voir concerns about case, being ence. In this that means able jury panel the lack of minorities on the as impact per- understand the racial see and general people well as the treatment of prosecutors to from service mitting exclude by judicial system color only and that the jurors nothing more than prospective who do juror questions prosecutor asked makeup raсial express concerns about the McRae,8 concerned In race. State v. a Hen jury panel justice system’s our treat- nepin County prosecutor peremptorily re people recognize ment of of color. Once we prospective juror moved African-American us, we must issues of race are before expressed who concern about the treatment played race an then determine whether has people judicial of color system. so, doing impermissible role. we must be objection, Based on defendant’s the trial analysis. Finally, if we con- critical our evidently prima found that a facie ease played impermissible clude that race has Batson under had been established.9 In re role, courageous acting must be we case, butting prima prosecutor facie court, resulting bias. As a our eradicate the juror thought claimed that because the to eradicate racial bias from our commitment unfair, system impart she could not be judicial system ground must itself in concrete ial.10 The trial court concluded that “there common sense actions whenever and under was an basis the prosecutor’s articulable guise that bias manifests itself. whatever challenge”11 permitted to be If we are root out racial bias from the *16 Presumably, struck. what the trial court judicial system, obligation as have an we by meant the term basis” “articulable was do both the United and Minne- under States prosecutor’s response that the was race-neu Constitutions, and, sota as we have said we nonpretextual. appeal, tral and On we disal Report would in the Final of the Task Force strike, stating: lowed the System,5 Bias in on Racial the Judicial we [Ojn have, juror in ques- the record we the simple must do more than ask the surface appears simply tion to have answered the question juror of whether 32 was excluded prosecutor’s questions prosecu- the race; deeper because of her we must look —which jurors potential tor had not asked of other go played on to ask whether race point way large at that the that a same impermissible City in role her exclusion. —in fair-minded, percentage of reasonable Wilson,6 Minneapolis v. State we held of people black and fair-minded reasonable Act, Rights that under the Minnesota Human people any of have an- other race would against person is racial discrimination for- questions. swered the To allow the strik- person’s “whether it is on bidden based ing juror of this on of person’s the basis those people raсe or the association with Thus, although juror prosecutor answers effect would allow a of color.”7 32 is Cauca- sian, fair-minded, people her association with of color black to strike reasonable Supreme explicit 5. See Minnesota Court Task Force on 9. While the court did not make an trial System, Report, finding, finding implied by Racial Bias in the Judicial Final is the such fact (hereinafter May analyze challenge 32-38 "Task Force Re- the trial court went on to port”). prongs under the second and third of the Batson See id. at test. 256. 1981). (Minn. 6. 310 N.W.2d 485 Id. 10. added). (emphasis Id. at 487 (Minn.1992). 8. 494 N.W.2d 253-58 Id. jury panel expressed Findings who

person any doubt Moreover, one of [sic] “the reasons the system” is perfect. prose- n n n n [*] [*] theAs refuse norities, cutor cause defendant can is—and her compensate juror basically gave for to find prosecutor put was by basically letting being black she defendant striking the African Ameri- system is defendant’s he also a believed she it, guilty “‘[S]he unfair black being would simply be- this thought person. to mi- might black over guy 2) Jury of the racial 3) People trust of the criminal exclusion from distrust. # n pools of color have composition rarely n jury service fosters that justice system are [*] of a representative general [*] community. n dis- expressly type “Batson this 5) up forbids generally off.’” made of Juries are white into reasoning to enter seleс- of people. middle class Without broad ”12 process. tion range experiences group of that a social McRae, provide, juries that, of diverse individuals can ruling our is clear Given color, often person prima ill-equipped of are evaluate the juror had 32 been a presented peo- facts in cases that facie case under Batson would have been involve ple of and the state would not have been color. made out juror “solely of able to exclude because 6) among understanding Lack of whites color people treated beliefs are opening prej- creates an for unconscious system.” More unfairly would have evaluating udice racial bias when the state have been required; been would concerning people the facts of a ease required grounds to articulate race-neutral color. peremptory for its strike. Juror 32 should 7) differently simply juries petit people she need be treated because Grand and Applying McRae color whole truly Caucasian. to the facts reflect the communi- us, prosecutor’s ty jury’s record before strike is to verdict reflect the juror 32 is invalid.13 community’s judgment.14 irony degree I court’s find some recognized Even the that although trial court рeremptory juror holding that the strike of eaucasion, experi- her diverse permissible 32 was based her belief that ence, living with an African-American man judicial system our treats African-Americans child, having an interracial would have all, people unfairly. color and other After *17 brought experiences a range of social give nothing she more than voice to jury represented.15 generally are raised in concerns this court its Task Force decision, By Report. permits this the court report That contains over find- ings sys- jury in the state to from service detailing judicial racial bias exclude “fair- * * * minded, report Findings respect person tem. from the reasonable from with * * * juries jury panel expressed any state: who doubt added). (emphasis Report, supra, 12. Id. at 257 14. Task at 36. Force case, 13. the trial court In this concluded that responding challenge, 15. In to the defense prima facie case had not been out and made trial court stated: proceed further therefore did not analysis. with the Batson result, As record contains no more, you agree I couldn’t answers otherwise, explanation, race-neutral for the juror try get made her seem like an ideal prosecutor's juror strike of Because trial representative possible jury this to be as as оf a generally instance is court in the first in a better * * pool from the we have to choose from *. position facts and to evaluate the circumstances unfortunate, It's because she does add or strikes, surrounding peremptory the exercise more, minority representation would add if not proceedings usually remand for further will be times, panel, on the who remedy. at least someone lives and appropriate may the however, There be community, when the record is such that the re- works the black and understands viewing properly validity court can decide got impression and I from her. the strike. I believe this is one those cases. system’ perfect.”16 ginning post-Civil is Based on the rec- in the ‘the War reconstruction us, era, prevent conclusion that this court’s African-Americans ord before from serv by juries properly ing, excluded the trial the inadequacies 32 was ju- prospective remedy provided. court is error. Whether Others have also detailed not, person peremptory challenge’s ror is a of color or on the issues use as a tool “to case, by matters. raised race Permit- eliminate the black faces appearing for new ting prospective jurors jury duty” to be excluded from and its effectiveness “an in as personal exрerience credibly their service because efficient final racial filter.”21 out we in .our Task Force bears what said Batson, Sitting years here some 12 after it sense, Report, makes no but does make a cannot be said that its promise to eradicate mockery bring of our efforts to about racial jury racial bias from the process selection this, In I fairness. do not mean to saying accomplished. Sadly, has been it has not. question call into this court’s commitment to While Batson has made racial bias in the judi- racial eradicate bias Minnesota’s detect, process selection harder to must, however, system. cial move be- We not, before,22 as I have said the same as yond rhetoric. minimum, making go away. At a we refer the should issue of the continued use of respects, problem appears In some peremptory challenge to the Criminal struggling stay be more one of this court review, debate, Rules Committee and rec- within what some consider to be the unwork ommendation. analytical able and ineffective structure for challenging prosecutor’s race-based use of

peremptory challenges set forth the Court ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍as v. Elem.18 Batson17 modified Purkett

We should not feel limited Batson and its

progeny. Batson establishes the floor for

challenging peremptory race based strikes. ceiling.

It does not set the We set

higher to ensure that racial standards bias re jurors.19 not infect CHARGES OF UNPROFESSIONAL

does the selectiоn of To 97-29, Attorney decision, day’s CONDUCT AGAINST as well as the Court’s decision Purkett, at Law the State of Minnesota. demonstrates to me that it is time seriously for this court to consider Justice No. C3-97-2379. Marshall’s admonition in his concurrence in goal ending Batson that “the racial Supreme Court Minnesota. peremptories inject discrimination that into * n n July jury-selection process can ac complished only by eliminating peremptory concurrence,

challenges entirely.”20 In that eloquently

Justice Marshall details the his peremptory challenge,

torical use of the be *18 McRae, preme may apply stringent 16. at 494 N.W.2d 257. Court a "more stan- dard of review” as a of state law under matter Batson, 102-03, generally 17. See 476 U.S. at 106 equivalent the state constitution's federal J., (Marshall, concurring); S.Ct. 1712 Eric L. clause). equal protection constitution's Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amend- 102-03, Batson, 20. 476 S.Ct. 1712. U.S. 106 ment, (1996); 106 Yale LJ. 93 see also State v. Gaitan, 11, (1995) (Page, 536 N.W.2d 18-20 J. dissenting). Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges 21. B. Morris Judge’s Perspective, Should Be Abolished: A Trial 765, 1769, 18. 514 U.S. 115 S.Ct. 131 L.Ed.2d (1997). L.Rev. 829 U. Chi. (1995). Russell, County Perry, generally Hennepin v. 561 N.W.2d See 477 N.W.2d (Minn.1991) (Minn. J., 1997) (noting (Page, concurring). that the Minnesota Su- notes courts Connecti- cut, D.C., Vermont, Massachusetts, Maine, prejudicial closing argument explain why your finger- misconduct stand to witness bag; prosecutor isn’t that true?” We similar state- print is on the where made implicit in describing error that ments the murder affected hold that how nonprejudicial prosecutor’s questions family the friends and of the victim as well as light of the trial court’s security and harmless how “shattered sense thorough instructions that community safety neigh- clear and in a Paul Saint * * * duty proof no had burden

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Buggs
Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date Published: Jul 16, 1998
Citation: 581 N.W.2d 329
Docket Number: C0-97-833
Court Abbreviation: Minn.
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