43 Mo. App. 443 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1891
This was a criminal information commenced before a justice of the peace, under section 1590 of the Revised Statutes, 1879 (R. S. 1889, sec. 3868), for speaking concerning a certain female certain false and slanderous words. The case was appealed to the circuit court, where the defendant was convicted,
The information was as follows :
“ State of Missouri,
*l Charles Buck.
Before Walter McQuie, Justice of the Peace, Upper Loutre township, Montgomery county, Missouri.
“Sol. Hughlett, prosecuting attorney for and within the county of Montgomery, in the state of Missouri, of his own knowledge, informs the court that one Charles Buck, on or about the twenty-ninth day of May, A. D. 1889, at the said county of Montgomery, did then and there falsely and maliciously charge and accuse Miss Linnie Evans, a female, of incest, fornication, adultery and whoredom, by falsely speaking of and concerning such female, Miss Linnie Evans, in the presence of Edward Morris, John Morris and Nathaniel Richards, and divers other good citizens and persons, the false and slanderous words, to-wit: ‘ She is in the family way, it shows itself; there will be an increase in Mr. Evans’ family. Linnie is in the family way ; I can and could see she was sticking out;’ meaning all the time to convey the impression and idea that Miss Linnie Evans was pregnant. They were spoken of and concerning Miss Linnie Evans, a female.
“Sol. Hughlett.
“ Sol. Hughlett, prosecuting attorney, makes oath and says the facts stated in the foregoing information are true according to his best information and belief.
“Sol. Hughlett,
“ County Attorney.
“Subscribed and sworn to.before me this fourteenth day of June, A. I). 1889. My term of office expires March 25, 1890.
“ Robert Shackleford,
“Notary Public in and for Montgomery County, Missouri.’
II. The second assignment of error is that the information is bad, in that it does not state that the person of whom the words were spoken was a single woman. The statute, under which the information was drawn, is as follows : “ Every person who shall falsely and maliciously charge or accuse any female of incest, fornication, adultery or whoredom, by falsely speaking
In this respect this information cannot be taken out of the principle which governs the case of State v. Hynes, 39 Mo. App. 569. There the information was under section 1528 of the Revised Statutes of 1879 for disturbing an assembly met for a lawful purpose, to-wit, to bury the body of a dead person, and the only act which the information charged was that the defendant did forbid the gate of the cemetery to be opened, held it shut with his hands and refused to allow the assembly to pass into the cemetery. We held that the introductory words of the information, which charged that the defendant did unlawfully, wilfully, maliciously and contemptuously disturb and disquiet the assembly by doing the act in question, had the effect of characterizing the act as unlawful, and negativing the conclusion that it could be innocent. In that case I was strongly disposed for a time to hold the indictment bad, but was. finally overborne by the opinion of my associates, and drew up the opinion of the court as it is published. The principle of that decision is that, where the act done- or the words spoken are capable of being understood either in an innocent or in a criminal sense, effect must be given to the general words of the indictment or information, which charge that it was done or spoken in a criminal sense.
Nor can we regard the argument a sound one, that the information in this case should be held bad, because it charges that the words were spoken with the intent to impute to the female named the commission of all the four offenses of incest, fornication, adultery and whoredom, so that he cannot tell which charge he is called upon to" meet. We proceeded upon a similar view in State v. Bach, 25 Mo. App. 554, but felt constrained to overrule it in the subsequent case of Slate v. Fare, 39 Mo. App. 110. The words charged in this information are capable of being used in all of the four senses there charged; and it seems sufficient to make the charge collectively, instead of drawing up the information in four different counts. It is difficult to see how the accused could be taken by surprise, or how his substantial rights could in any way be prejudiced by framing the information in this way.
We, therefore, find no substantial ground, on which we can say that the defendant has been deprived of his legal rights. The punishment assessed by the jury, nine months’ imprisonment in the county jail, seems a very severe one for the speaking of slanderous words.
The judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered.