State v. . Bryant
100 S.E. 430
N.C.
1919
Check Treatment
Walkek, J.,

after stating the case: We have stated above only those facts which the evidence tended to prove, and which are material to the case upon the-motion to nonsuit. We do not see how we’could well decide that there was no evidence of the prisoner’s guilt. It is true that the evidence was circumstantial, but sometimes, and not infrequently, such evidence is of the most convincing character. The prisoner was the last person who was seen with the deceased before the homicide was committed; she followed him, at his request, to the place named by him for their meeting, Burton’s crossroads, and, for some reason, not disclosed, they had quarreled, for he said to her, when he asked her to meet him at the crossroads, “We had just as well have a war here as to go to France and have it.” She followed him, and was not seen again until her body was found, in a thicket near the crossroads. The jury might have fairly and reasonably inferred that they had a difficulty of some kind, and that he was the aggressor, hut they took a milder view of the facts, and reduced the grade of the homicide to the second degree. There was ample evidence to prove that the deceased had been killed; that she did not commit suicide; and further, that she was murdered by the prisoner. And this is true, without considering the testimony as to his conduct, the missing money and ring, and what the prisoner said after the homicide had been committed.

The facts in S. v. Bridgers, 172 N. C., 879, if stronger to support a verdict of guilty in that case than those we have here, are very slightly stronger, and not enough so, to prevent that case, where the conviction was sustained, from being an authority in support of our present conclusion. It would unreasonably extend the discussion if we attempted any further statement or .analysis of the evidence. There is so plainly sufficient evidence for the jury that any further comment would add nothing to the force or strength of the evidence itself.

*707 • The objections to the testimony of Dr. Boyette, describing the situation, surroundings, and the appearance at the place of the homicide, and also the condition of the deceased’s person, were properly overruled. “The instantaneous conclusion of the mind as to appearance, condition, mental or physical state of persons, animals and things, derived from observation 'of a variety of facts presented to the senses at one and the same time, are, legally speaking, matters of fact, and are admissible in evidence.” S. v. Leak, 156 N. C., 648; Benn v. R. R., 170 N. C., 128; S. v. Spencer, 176 N. C., 709. This covers also several of the other exceptions.

The judge admitted evidence of a difficulty between deceased and defendant on 6 July preceding. Afterwards, having convinced himself that he had erred in this, he announced that he would order a mistrial. Defendant’s counsel insisted that the trial should go on, and that they would be perfectly content with his Honor instructing the jury to disregard this testimony. He did so; instructed them at the time, and again in his charge. If there was any error in this it was clearly not against the defendant. S. v. Johnson, 176 N. C., 722. The same may be said as to that part of the charge in which he told the jury they might consider evidence of defendant’s not fleeing, when he had an opportunity to do so, as a circumstance in his favor. 2 Wharton’s Evidence in Criminal Cases, p. 1498.

The judge’s charge on the question of the alibi was, it seems to us, not prejudicial to the defendant. He charged substantially that the prisoner relies upon an alibi, which means that he was not, and could not have been at the place of the homicide when it was committed, as he was elsewhere at that time. He is not required to satisfy you of the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt, but if the jury is satisfied from the evidence that he was not at the place when the homicide was committed, and at the time when the deceased met her death, then a verdict of not guilty should be returned, etc. But if the jury is not so satisfied, then it is for the jury to consider all the evidence and say whether or not they are satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner killed the deceased, etc. This instruction was not erroneous but followed our decisions. S. v. Jaynes, 78 N. C., 504; S. v. Beitz, 83 N. C., 634; S. v. Starnes, 94 N. C., 273; S. v. Freeman, 100 N. C., 429; S. v. Rochelle, 156 N. C., 641.

The question as to the voices heard by the witness, R. L. Garrison, and whether they were those of the prisoner and Susie Spicer, was for the jury to determine upon all the evidence relating thereto. The jury might well have found that they were the voices of those two persons, and that the prisoner was threatening the deceased, and using angry and abusive language addressed to her.

*708 The other exceptions to evidence have no merit, and require no discussion. The objections to the charge of the court and to the refusal to give instructions are entirely too general to be considered. McKinnon v. Morrison, 104 N. C., 354, and the cases cited in Anno. Edition. See, also, Hendricks v. Ireland, 162 N. C., 523; S. v. Herron, 175 N. C., 754, at p. 759. A general, or what has been called a “broadside attack” on the charge of the court will not do. The error must be specified, both as to the charge and the failure to give all of the instructions, when there is more than one, for if any of the instructions in the charge is correct (and that surely is the case here), or any of the requested instructions should not have been given, the exception fails. S. v. Ledford, 133 N. C., 714; Nance v. Telegraph Co., 177 N. C., 313, at p. 315; S. v. Evans, ib., 564, at p. 570.

We have carefully considered and reviewed this case, and have not been able to discover any error therein.

No error.