State v. BryantState v. Bryant
{¶1} Appellant, Lewis Bryant, appeals his conviction and sentеnce entered in the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to two felony counts of trafficking in crack cocaine. On appeal, Appellant contends that 1) the trial court imposed sentences that are both contrary to law and not authorized by law when it ordered that his sentences for violations of
{¶2} In light of our conclusion under Appellant‘s second assignment of error that the misrepresentation of Appellant‘s еligibility for judicial release rendered the plea unknowing and unintelligent, and therefore unenforceable, Appellant‘s second assignment of error is sustained. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Appellant‘s plea, and remand the cause for further proceedings. Further, as our decision to sustain Appellant‘s second assignment of error is dispositive of Appellant‘s appeal, Appellant‘s first assignment of error has been rendered moot and we do not address it.
FACTS
{¶3} On November 4, 2010, Appellant pled guilty to one count of trafficking in crack cocaine, in violation of
{¶4} Appellant was sentenced the same day he entered his pleas, on November 4, 2010, and a sentencing entry was filed on March 7, 2011. It is from this sentencing entry that Appellant now brings his timely appeal, assigning the following errors for our review.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES THAT ARE BOTH CONTRARY TO LAW AND NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW WHEN IT ORDERED THAT LEWIS BRYANT‘S SENTENCES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
R.C. 2925.03 WERE PARTIALLY MANDATORY, AND THAT MR. BRYANT WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR JUDICIAL RELEASE AFTER SERVING THE MANDATORY PORTION OF THOSE SENTENCES.II. LEWIS BRYANT‘S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY.”
{¶5} As Appellant‘s second assignment of error is dispositive of Appellant‘s appeаl, we address it first, out of order. In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends that there was a mutual mistake regarding Appellant‘s eligibility for judicial release, resulting in Appellant‘s pleas not being knowing, intelligent or voluntary, and ultimately rendering Appellant‘s pleas void. The State candidly concedes that Appellant‘s pleas are invalid due to the “improper explanation of judicial release.” Based upon the following, we agree and therefore sustain Appellant‘s second assignment of error.
{¶6} A plea of guilty or no contest in a criminal case “must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996) ( Internal citations omitted).
{¶7} However, the failure to accurately explain nonconstitutional rights is reviewed under the substantial compliance standard. Id. “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990) (Internal citation omitted). Under
{¶8} Nevertheless, an “incorrect recitation of the law fails to meet the substantial-compliance standard. If a trial judge chooses to offer an expanded explanation of the law in a
{¶9} However, in addition to the demonstration that the court has not substantially complied with the requirements of
{¶10} Here, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of felony trafficking in crack cocaine. Count one was a second degree felony, in violation of
“Mandatory prison term” means any of the following:
(1) Subject to division (X)(2)4 of this section, the term in prison that must be imposed for the offenses or circumstances set forth in divisions (F)(1) to (8) or (F)(12) to (14) of
section 2929.13 and division (D) ofsection 2929.14 of the Revised Code . Except as provided in sections2925.02 ,2925.03 ,2925.04 ,2925.05 , and2925.11 of the Revised Code , unless the maximum or another specific term is required undersection 2929.14 or2929.142 of the Revised Code , a mandatory prison term described in this division may be any prison term authorized for the level of offense.
The pertinent provision of
(F) Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the court shall impose a prison term or terms under sections
2929.02 to2929.06 , section2929.14 6,section 2929.142 , or
section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and except as specifically provided insection 2929.20 or2967.191 of the Revised Code or when parole is authorized for the offense undersection 2967.13 of the Revised Code shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant tosection 2929.20 ,section 2967.193 , or any other provision of Chapter 2967, or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code for any of the following offenses:* * *
(5) A first, second, or third degree felony drug offense for which section * * *
2925.03 * * * of the Revised Code, * * * requires the imposition of a mandatory prison term[.](Emphasis added).
{¶12} Former
(A) As used in this section, “eligible offender” means any person serving a stated prison term of ten years or less when either of the following applies:
(1) The stated prison term does not include a mandatory prison term.
(2) The stated prison term includes a mandatory prison term, and the person has served the mandatory prison term.
Former
(C)(3) If the stated prison term is five years or more but not more than ten years, the eligible offender may file the motion not earlier than five years after the eligible offender is delivered to a state correctional institution or, if the prison term includes a mandatory prison term or terms, not earlier than five years after the expiration of all mandatory prison terms. (Emphasis added).
Thus, under this version of the statute, because Appellant was sentenced to a six year mandatory term of imprisonment, as well as a four year mandatory term of imрrisonment, he does not meet the definition of an eligible offender. Even characterizing Appellant‘s sentences as the parties stiplulated during the plea hearing, as five years of mandatory time, with an
{¶13} We note however, that
(A) As used in this section:
(1)(a) Except as provided in division (A)(1)(b) of this section, “eligible offender” means any person who, on or after April 7, 2009, is serving a stated prison term that includes one or more nonmandatory prison terms.
The current statute further provides in section (C)(3) as follows:
If the aggregated nonmandatory prison term or terms is five years, the eligible offender may file the motion not earlier than four years after the eligible offender is delivered to a state correctional institution or, if the prison term includes a mandatory prison term or terms, not earlier than four years
after the expirаtion of all mandatory prison terms. (Emphasis added).
We recognize that the trial court could not have applied the current version of the judicial release statute, which was not even effective at the time Appellant was sentenced. However, even characterizing Appellant‘s sentences as stipulated in the plea agreement, as five years mandatory and five years nonmandatory, Appellant would not have been eligible for judicial release for nine years, which is four years longer than what was represented to him during his plea negotiations.
{¶14} In State v. Johnson, 182 Ohio App.3d 628, 2009-Ohio-1871, 914 N.E.2d 429 (4th Dist. 2009), ¶ 16, we concluded that we could “not allow a plea agreement to stand when it was obtained on the basis of a misrepresentation to the accused that he would be released from prison earlier than what the law permits.” In reaching this conclusion, we determined that such a misunderstanding could not “form the basis of a valid plea agreement.” Id. at ¶ 17. As a result, we reversed Johnson‘s conviction and sentence, vacated the plea agreement and remanded the matter. Id.
{¶15} This Court was faced with a similar fact pattern in State v. Persons, 4th Dist. No. 02CA6, 2003-Ohio-4213, (Aug. 1, 2003). Much like the facts sub judice, Persons was incorrectly advised as to his eligibility for
When an erroneous understanding of the applicablе law induces a defendant‘s guilty plea, the plea generally is not entered knowingly and intelligently. See State v. Engle (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527-28, 660 N.E.2d 450; State v. Cook, Putnam App. No. 12-01-15, 2002-Ohio-2846; State v. Bush, Union App. No. 14-2000-44, 2002-Ohio-6146. Id. at ¶ 12.
In Persons, we ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause appellant was misinformed as to a material term of the plea agreement,” he “did not enter his guilty pleas knowingly or intelligently,” Id. at ¶ 16. As a result, we held Person‘s guilty pleas were void. Id.
{¶16} We conclude that the facts sub judice require the same result as Johnson and Persons. All parties involved herein were misinformed as to Appellant‘s eligibility for judicial release, which hardly constitutes substantial compliance with
{¶17} In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that Appellant‘s pleas were entered into knowingly or intelligently and as such, Appellant‘s guilty pleas are void. Accordingly, Appellant‘s second assignment of error is sustained, the decision of the trial court is reversed, Appellant‘s guilty plеas are vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶18} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court imposed sentences that are both contrary to law and not authorized by law when it ordered that his sentences for violation of
JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE VACATED AND REMANDED and that the Appellant recover of Appellee costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into exеcution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continuеd by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Exceptions.
Harsha, J. and Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commеnces from the date of filing with the clerk.