*1 spring from the overabundance of cucumbers because of an shows that Additionally, the evidence Sardinia 1990 season. Loves as a source of cucum- to eliminate the unilaterally chose it pur- than reduce the cucumbers quantity bers rather it with whom operations chased from other and shed growers dila- may While have been longer relationship. had a Sardinia their would not be the Loves that cucumbers tory notifying there is no seasons,6 fall 1990 and spring needed for the an or purpose was occasionedfor delay evidence this ac- we find this cause of Accordingly, methods. by improper merit. tion be without
Affirmed. C.J.,
Howell, concurs. in result J., only. concurs Shaw, BRYANT, STATE, Respondent/Petitioner Lee v. Michael Petitioner/Respondent.
(447 (2d) 852) Supreme Court again usage point We out that the did not establish or Loves custom industry operators that shed like themselves notified the cucumber should be year a certain time of the that their cucumbers would not be needed for growing operators the next and in thereof such shed could as season default growing it as usual next sume would be business for the season. *2 Anne Pearce of Asst. M. Appellate Defender Office of Columbia, Defense, petitioner/respondent. Appellate for Medlock, Gen. T. Travis Gen. Don- Atty. Deputy Atty. Chief Zelenka, Johnson, ald Asst. E. Atty. J. Gen. Wilbur Columbia; Wilson, Ralph Conway, and Sol. J. respon- for dent/petitioner. 6, 1994.
Heard April 18, 1994. July
Decided
Finney, Justice: was convicted of failure to Petitioner-Respondent (Bryant) stop light, resisting arrest, for blue assault and of a battery nature, high aggravated injury personal malicious *3 The Court of reversed the conviction for property. Appeals injury personal malicious to and affirmed the re- property — —, convictions. State v. 429 maining Bryant, S.C. S.E. (Ct. 1993). 816 the App. granted We both State’s and writs of certiorari.
STATE’S ISSUE While to arrest for failure to for a attempting stop a light, struggle blue ensued between the officer and police the Bryant. During struggle, Bryant course of the slammed the officer the car patrol causing damage excess of $200. moved for a directed verdict on the mali- offense of damage
cious to The trial court denied his personal property. motion. The of the trial Appeals Court reversed court’s re- fusal to direct a verdict of not on that guilty charge.
The State asserts that the Court of erred in Appeals that since there holding intent, was no evidence of the injury malicious to personal property charge should not have been submitted to the jury. disagree. We
The basic rule is that one cannot an be convicted of of fense unless his mental state was that the required by particular offense. William S. McAninch & W. Gaston
219 (2d Fairey, The Criminal Law at South Carolina 20 ed. of 1989). a Whether intent is of necessary statutory element the crime must be determined from the language of the statute in light construed of purpose design. its v. Guinyard State, (1973). 260 195 S.C. S.E. 392 The elements of willful, malicious mischief are unlawful and malicious damage to § the of property another. S.C. Code Ann. 16-11-510(Supp.
1993).Willful, unlawful and malicious are not synonyms each element must be v. Toney, established. State 409 (1881).Willful and intentional are synonymous. Black’s Law (6th 1990). Dictionary ed. Court
The of Appeals found that State failed to provide any evidence that Bryant intended to cause damage to the car he patrol when threw the officer against it. The only reasonable inference from the evidence that the to an damage car was harm. patrol unintended The doctrine of intent only transferred in the applies situation of the intended same harm inflicted on an unintended victim. McAninch, supra. The intent to assault and batter police officer cannot be transferred to the property damage since harm caused was different from the of harm type intended.
In on a motion for a ruling verdict, directed the trial judge with the Williams, concerned existence of evidence. State v. (1991). findWe there was no Bryant willfully evidence that harm to caused the vehicle as § required by Therefore, 16-11-510. it submit to the charge jury. affirm the Accordingly, we Court ruling on this Appeals’ issue.
BRYANT’S ISSUES officer testified in the he police case-in-chief that ob- served his vehicle Bryant operating high speed. at rate of *4 The officer testified that he pur- turned on his blue and light sued for one that Bryant approximately Bryant mile. testified he did not see the until light shortly blue before he reached his home. pertain
Both of issues to the following colloquy which during Bryant. occurred cross-examination of You were see perfectly you
[Solicitor]: sober didn’t car in that the police parked Baptist Jamestown Church lot and parking you go had to it? right 220 in the There wasn’t no Jamestown
[Bryant]: policeman lot. parking that, be the truth about telling He couldn’t
[Solicitor]: could he?
[Bryant]: Who? think it came you The officer. Where do police [Solicitor]: from? He I didn’t see no
[Bryant]: lying police must be because If he to stop— car at no Jamestown Church. want I the Your Honor. believe Objection, Counsel]: [Defense the witness the officer. pitting against police solicitor No, I don’t think This is the denomination Court: so. is entitled to some latitude. of cross-examination. She do think he came from? you Where [Solicitor]: from____ I he [Bryant]: don’t know where come that the trial court im Bryant On contended appeal, the to pit Bryant’s testimony allowed solicitor properly that of the officer. The Court of police Appeals the wit argument preserved held that this was not because question objected ness answered the before defense counsel was made after the objection and no motion to strike attempted pit overruled. We While the solicitor disagree. the officer’s earlier in Bryant’s testimony against testimony cross-examination, no actual occurred until pitting At that time question began understood the to answer. to the the circum objected pitting. defense counsel Under stances, sufficiently we find that counsel preserved argu Further, that it ment for review. we find would have been fu testimony tile to move to strike which the trial court had al Ross, 56, ruled was State v. 272 249 ready proper.1 Cf. (1978) (once S.E. the court rules on an objection, objection counsel need not after each repeat question). merits, that Appeals On Court of found suffered no from the because it did prejudice pitting not continue as State v. 295 S.C. 369 S.E. Sapps, (1988) where that defendant was repeatedly pitted Appeals Wingo, 1The cites State v. Court (Ct. 1991) However, App. support ruling. Wingo for its the court held as improper testimony preserved that the was not for review since no motion to objection Wingo distinguishable strike was made after the was sustained. objection from the instant case because the here was overruled. *5 at v. Bryant, witnesses. State the State’s We agree. this was error. argues 818-19. Bryant a witness to cross-examine for the solicitor “It is improper of an- veracity him attack the as to force to in such a manner is un- if the accused error is reversible witness. This other Sapps, supra. v. thereby.” State fairly prejudiced the officer’s testi- Here, questioning pitted the improper in a critical issue this was Bryant. Credibility mony against two witnesses only the officer were as and Bryant case find that entire incident. We present during Ac- cross-examination. unfairly prejudiced this issue. we reverse on cordingly, in part. Affirmed in reversed part; C.J., Toal, J., concur. Chandler, Acting Asso- Acting Moore, J., and W. Jr., Chart.es Whetstone, in Justice, dissenting separate opinion. ciate Moore, Justice: in appeal affirmance of State’s majority’s
I concur in the remaining Bryant’s from the reversal of this case but dissent convictions. verac- not attack a defendant’s may
I that a Solicitor agree that of a testimony against the defendant’s ity by pitting is reversible error witness; improper questioning such State’s trial a fair and as impartial is of deprived the defendant when (1988). Brown, 374 S.E. v. a result. State I that the ef- context, however, agree cannot When viewed toas egregious was so inquiry isolated fect of Solicitor’s in this case. The trial impartial of a fair deprive and did questioning moved on with his immediately Solicitor any advantage. to unfair use comment not attempt conviction, even strong supporting evidence Where there the error is question, credibility when the defendant’s on the mer- correct clearly the convictionwas harmless where reasonably could fair, and no other verdict its, the trial was State, 302 v. on the evidence. have been returned Thrift (1990). Ap- I with the Court agree 397 S.E. affirm. this issue and would conclusionon peals’ Justice, Jr., Acting Associate Charles W. Whetstone, concurs.