State v. . BryanState v. . Bryan
The defendants moved in arrest of judgment -upon the general ground of insufficiency of the indictment, without specifying wherein such insufficiency appeared, and we are left to search for and find it, if, indeed, it exists at all. This is bad practice. The motion should point out with certаinty and definiteness the particular ground assigned for arrest. After a careful examination of the indictment, we think it is sufficient in form and substancе. There are some unnecessary words employed, but they in no wаy impair its efficiency; they are merely surplusage.
It is clear thаt an offence, under the statute, is charged. Section 93, of chаpter 32, of Battle’s Revisa!, embraces the buildings therein specified by name, and, in addition, “the houses or buildings mentioned in section 28 of this chаpter,” and also any “ other house or building not mentioned in the abоve recited section of this chapter.”
Now, it is manifest that the words “ other house or building,” in the last recited clause, embrace a jail, a jail-house or building. The term “jail” implies a house or building used for the pur *534 poses of a public prison, or where persons under аrrest are kept. A jail is embraced also by another clause of the ninety-third section of said chapter. It embraces “any оf the houses or buildings mentioned in section 28 of this chapter.” The twenty-eighth sectiоn also specifies certain houses and buildings by name, and then prоvides further, “ or any of the houses or buildings mentioned in the previous seсtions of this chapter.” Jail is mentioned, specified, in section 11, a previous section of that chapter. Jail is not mentioned by name in the twenty-eighth section; but it is mentioned by the reference to section 11. The term mentioned is used in the sense of referred to or noticed. This is apparent from the comprehensive purpose manifеsted in the twenty-eighth section, and the general purpose of the statute to protect houses and buildings from wilful injury, damage and defacement.
The testimony mentioned in the first and third exceptions was-reсeivedawithout objection. It was too late to object tо it, even if it were not strictly competent, in the argument 'to the jury. It was mаnifestly improper for counsel to undertake to impeach the state’s witness by reading to the jury a paper-writing purporting to сontain what that witness had sworn to at the preliminary examination of the defendants before the justice of the peace, that pmper not having been introduced as evidence. The cоurt properly excluded it.
The exception, on account of the comments of counsel upon witnesses and the defendants cannot, be sustained. It appears that the judge carefully cautioned the jury in this respect. If he had not done so, the record - develops no such comments as would entitle the defendants to a new trial. The manner of conducting the argument of counsel, thе language employed, the temper and tone allowed, must bе left largely to the discretion of the presiding judge. He sees what is dоne, and hears what is said. He is cognizant of all the surrounding circumstanсes,, and is a better judge of the latitude that ought to be allowed to counsel in the argument in any particular case. It is only in
*535
extreme cases of the abase of the privilege of counsel, and when this is not checked by the court, and the jury is not properly cautioned, that this court can interfere and grant a new trial.
State
v.
Suggs, ante,
527;
State
v.
Underwood,
No error. Affirmed.