112 Kan. 814 | Kan. | 1923
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Gerald Brown was arrested for an alleged violation of the civil-rights law forbidding discrimination in certain cases on account of race. A motion to quash the information was sustained, and the state appeals.
The statute involved, so far as here important, reads: “if . . . the owner or owners, agents, trustees or managers in charge of any inn, hotel or boarding-house, or any place of entertainment or amusement for which a license is required by any of the municipal authorities of this state, . . . shall make any distinction on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, . . .” (Gen. Stat. 1915, § 3791.)
The information is somewhat indefinite in its allegations, but will be. assumed to be sufficient in that respect. It charges that the defendant “did . . . unlawfully make a distinction with one William Bradshaw, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, by refusing to serve him, the said William Bradshaw, lunch in his restaurant and lunch room, for which the said Gerald Brown is duly licensed under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Kansas to serve the general public meals and lunches.”
A boarding-house differs from an inn or hotel both in being less public in character and in arranging with its guests to provide for them during some more or less definite period. (8 C. J. 1132; 16 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 510, 511; 4 Words and Phrases, 3624.) The same considerations would obviously distinguish it from a restaurant or lunch room.
While in some cases a greater liberality of construction might be justified, the specific mention of inns, hotels and boarding-houses, without words extending their meaning, in the definition of a public offense, too strongly suggests the exclusion of restaurants to allow their inclusion by construction.
A restaurant keeper may of course have rooms for rent to his customers or may accept boarders by the week, thus making his establishment a hotel or a boarding-house, but the information does not allege that the defendant did so, and does not expressly or even by implication characterize his place as one of those named in the statute.
2. It might be suggested (although the contention has not been made) that the information is good by virtue of the allegation that the defendant was licensed to serve the general public meals and lunches. The statute prohibits racial discrimination by the owner of
The judgment is affirmed.