41 P. 1042 | Or. | 1895
Opinion by
In State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 300, (12 Pac. 441,) Thayer, J., in speaking of the effect produced upon persons called to acb as jurors by what they had read or heard of the merits of a case, said: “This depends much upon the credulity of the persons, and the tenacity with which they adhere to preconceived notions,” so that, if it were not for what was elsewhere said in the opinion, the inference would follow that if a person never believed anything he read or heard, or was incapable of retaining an opinion, he would be a competent juror, notwithstanding he had at one time formed or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the case. But further on in the opinion the learned justice said: “The point to be determined is whether there exists such a state of mind upon the part of the juror, in reference to the party challenging, that he cannot try the case impartially and without prejudice to the
When a crime has been committed, the local newspapers usually publish an account of it, and sometimes express opinions concerning the guilt or innocence of the person supposed to be the author of it; and the accounts being read by subscribers to these publications, produce upon their minds impressions which are in proportion to the confidence reposed in the newspaper giving them circulation. No person of average intelligence can read such an account in his local newspaper without being more or less influenced by its perusal. From his home paper and his associates with whom he discusses the history of a crime he forms an opinion which is predicated upon the assumption that the information obtained is true, and it may be safe to say that the person, who, after having read or heard an account of the commission of a crime in his neighborhood, has not formed an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the person accused of it, might
In McManus v. State, 36 Ala. 285, the evidence showed that the defendant had an altercation with the deceased, resulting in a fight, in which the defendant threw a piece of a brick at the deceased, hitting him on the head, from the effects of which he died. About half an hour after the blow had been given, and after the fight was entirely over, the defendant, with a pistol in his hand, went to the place where the deceased was, and said that “he had come to kill the damned old rascal ” meaning the deceased. An exception having been saved to the introduction of this statement in evidence, the court, in rendering its decision upon the question, said: “The circuit court did not err in admitting evidence against, the prisoner of his acts, declarations, and conduct, when he returned, a half-
In People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560, the trial court, in charging the jury, stated that “Testimony has been introduced before you tending to show that the defendant Vasquez, and others, were engaged in the robbery of one Snyder, at Tres Pinos; and while so engaged, and in the furtherance of the common purpose of Vasquez and his associates to accomplish this robbery, the deceased was slain by the defendant, or by some of the parties with whom he was then engaged in the robbery.” An exception to the instruction having been taken, it was contended that it was an expression of the opinion of the judge as to the effect of the evidence adduced at the trial, but the court, in rendering the opinion, say: “The instruction is not subject to that objection. It does not charge the jury with respect to the weight or effect of the evidence, nor as
It is also contended that the court erred in refusing to give at the request of the defendant the following instructions: 1. “To constitute murder in the first degree there must be some other proof of malice than the mere proof of killing, unless the killing was effected in the commission or attempt to commit a felony; and premeditation and deliberation when necessary to constitute murder in the first degree, and it is necessary, except the killing was effected in the commission or attempt to commit a felony, must be proven by poisoning, lying in wait, or some other proof that the design was formed and matured in cool blood, and not hastily upon the occasion, and if there is a reasonable doubt in your mind that the intent was so formed you cannot find murder in the first degree.” 2. “If you find from the evidence that the accused acted in the shooting from fear of great bodily injury to himself, and not from premeditated design to kill, then you cannot ¿find the defendant guilty of murder in any
In State v. Morey, 25 Or. 241, (35 Pac. 655, 36 Pac. 245,) it was held that an instruction similar to the eighth correctly interpreted the law. Prom the second, eighth, and tenth instructions above set out it clearly appears that the defendent’s first request has been substantially complied with. A part of the twenty-seventh instruction is as follows: “And if you find any evidence to the effect that the deceased made any demonstrations toward the defendant, from which the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe, acting as a reasonable and prudent man, that his life was in imminent danger, or that he was in danger of great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased, then the defendant would be justified in defending himself, and if necessary would have the right to take the life of the deceased to preserve his own life, or to prevent great bodily harm to himself.” This instruction substantially embraces the propositions of law contained in the second and third requests. The fourth request is fully covered by the thirty-first instruction given above.