State v. BrownState v. Brown
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Donnell
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} We are again called upon to revisit our 1999 decision in State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699, and to clarify whether pursuant to-its holding and
{¶ 2} Because
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} On April 4, 2005, defendant-appellee and cross-appellant, Jakeena Brown, and Kevin Johnson, her live-in boyfriend, got into an argument. After Johnson damaged Brown’s truck by ripping the temporary tag off and feeding it to the dog, damaging the bumper, and breaking a window, Brown stabbed Johnson once in the abdomen with a serrated steak knife.
{¶ 4} The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Brown on two counts of felonious assault and one count of domestic violence, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the two counts of felonious assault, the corresponding lesser included offenses of aggravated assault, and the single count of domestic violence. The jury acquitted Brown of two counts of felonious assault, but found her guilty of both counts of aggravated assault as well as the domestic-violence count.
{¶ 6} Brown appealed the convictions to the Eighth District Court of Appeals arguing, inter alia, that her aggravated-assault convictions were allied offenses of similar import that the trial court should have merged into a single conviction and sentence. State v. Brown, Cuyahoga App. No. 87651, 2006-Ohio-6267, 2006 WL 3446238. The court found that the allied-offense analysis applies only to eases in which the defendant’s conduct could be construed as constituting two or more offenses. Brown committed only one act of aggravated assault. Thus, her conviction on two counts violated double jeopardy. Id. at ¶ 50-51. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment with regard to the aggravated-assault convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to vacate both the finding of guilt and the sentence for one of the aggravated-assault convictions. Id. at ¶ 51.
{¶ 7} We accepted jurisdiction over propositions of law I and II of the state’s appeal and proposition VI of Brown’s cross-appeal on the constitutionality of the domestic-violence statute, held Brown’s proposition for State v. Carswell, Warren App. No. CA2005-04-047, 2005-Ohio-6547, 2005 WL 3358882, and stayed the briefing schedule. State v. Brown, 114 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2007-Ohio-2632, 867 N.E.2d 843. On July 25, 2007, we announced our decision in Carswell, upholding the constitutionality of
Arguments of the Parties
{¶ 8} The state asserts that pursuant to the test set forth in State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699, Brown’s two convictions for aggravated assault do not constitute allied offenses of similar import because an abstract comparison of the alternate theories of aggravated assault set forth in
{¶ 9} In contrast, Brown argues that by placing several means of committing aggravated assault into a single Revised Code section, the legislature demonstrated its intent that those alternate means constitute allied offenses of similar import, even though they may not technically satisfy the elemental Ranee test. Brown further contends that the state’s attempt to distinguish merger from dismissal of one of the counts amounts to a distinction without a difference because, with either method, the end result is a single conviction and sentence.
Allied Offenses of Similar Import and Legislative Intent
{¶ 10} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, citing North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656. These double-jeopardy protections apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 786, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707; State v. Tolbert (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 89, 90, 573 N.E.2d 617. Additionally, Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides, “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”
{¶ 11} The facts of this case involve the third double-jeopardy prohibition — the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense. However, the Double Jeopardy Clause only prevents a sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d at 635, 710 N.E.2d 699, quoting Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, and citing State v. Moss (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 515, 518, 23 O.O.3d 447, 433 N.E.2d 181.
{¶ 12} The United States Supreme Court has held that the test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double-jeopardy purposes is “whether each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not.” Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d at 634-635, 710 N.E.2d 699, citing Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306. In Ranee, we found that the two-step test set forth in
{¶ 13}
{¶ 15} “(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar Mnd committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.”
{¶ 16} The legislative history of
{¶ 17} This court has recognized that
{¶ 18} In applying the multiple-count statute, this court has long followed a two-tiered test to determine whether two offenses constitute allied offenses of similar import. State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 14, citing Newark v. Vazirani (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 81, 549 N.E.2d 520, syllabus. See also State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 526 N.E.2d 816; State v. Mughni (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67, 514 N.E.2d 870; State v. Talley (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 152, 153-154, 18 OBR 210, 480 N.E.2d 439; State v. Mitchell (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 416, 418, 6 OBR 463, 453 N.E.2d 593; State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 128, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345.
{¶ 19} “ ‘In the first step, the elements of the two crimes are compared. If the elements of the offenses correspond to such a degree that the commission of one crime will result in the commission of the other, the crimes are allied offenses of similar import and the court must then proceed to the second step. In the second step, the defendant’s conduct is reviewed to determine whether the defendant can be convicted of both offenses. If the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses.’” (Emphasis sic.) Cabrales at ¶ 14, quoting Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d at 117, 526 N.E.2d 816.
{¶ 20} In Ranee, we clarified the two-tiered test for allied offenses of similar import, specifying that courts should assess the elements of the offenses in the statutory abstract in accordance with Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Whalen v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 684, 709-711, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d at 637, 710 N.E.2d 699. In Whalen, Justice Rehnquist favored a comparison of the statutes in the abstract over a comparison of the crimes as charged: “[BJecause the Blockburger test is simply an attempt to determine legislative intent, it seems more natural to apply it to the language as drafted by the legislature than to the wording of a particular indictment.” Whalen at 711, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
{¶ 21} In Cabrales, we acknowledged that Ranee has “produced inconsistent, unreasonable, and, at times, absurd results.” Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, at ¶ 20. As examples of such results, we cited State v. Hendrickson, Montgomery App. No. 19045, 2003-Ohio-611, 2003 WL 264339, and State v. Waldron (Sept. 1, 2000), Ashtabula App. No. 99-A-0031, 2000 WL 1257520, both holding that involuntary manslaughter and aggravated vehicular homicide are not allied offenses of similar import when there is only one victim. Thus, in Cóbrales, we once again clarified the two-tiered test, holding: “In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import under
{¶ 22} Here, the jury convicted Brown of one count of aggravated assault in violation of
{¶ 23}
{¶ 24} “No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly:
{¶ 25} “(1) Cause serious physical harm to another * * *;
{¶ 26} “(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance * * *.”
{¶27}
{¶ 28} “(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
{¶ 29} “(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
{¶ 30} “(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity;
{¶ 31} “(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
{¶ 32} “(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.”
{¶ 33} In contrast, “physical harm to persons” includes “any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.”
{¶ 34} The only elements shared by these two alternate theories of aggravated assault are those of mens rea and physical harm. But while the offenses share the element of physical harm, they vary in the degree of harm required.
{¶ 35} The state would have us end our analysis here, declare that aggravated assault in violation of
{¶ 36} In determining whether two offenses constitute allied offenses of similar import, we have previously considered the societal interests protected by the relevant statutes. In State v. Mitchell (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 416, 6 OBR 463, 453 N.E.2d 593, we considered the offenses of theft and aggravated burglary. We acknowledged that the offenses had some common elements, in that aggravated burglary may involve the purpose to commit a theft offense. Id. at 419, 6 OBR 463, 453 N.E.2d 593. We noted, however, that completion of the theft offense was not necessary to commit aggravated burglary and that the purpose to commit any felony would satisfy the requisite intent. Id. We then proceeded to consider the societal interests protected by the relevant statutes. Id. We acknowledged that the theft statute seeks to prohibit the nonconsensual taking of property by any means, while the focus of the aggravated-burglary statute seeks to minimize the risk of harm to persons. Id. We therefore concluded that the General Assembly intended to distinguish the offenses of aggravated burglary and theft and permit separate punishments for their commission. Id.
{¶ 37} While our two-tiered test for determining whether offenses constitute allied offenses of similar import is helpful in construing legislative intent, it is not necessary to resort to that test when the legislature’s intent is clear from the language of the statute. A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that “[a] court must look to the language and purpose of the statute in order to determine
{¶ 38} R.C. Chapter 2903 defines four assault offenses: (1) felonious assault, (2) aggravated assault, (3) assault, and (4) negligent assault.
{¶ 39}
{¶ 40} In light of this statutory language, we conclude that the General Assembly did not intend violations of
Merger
{¶ 41} Because Brown’s convictions arise from a single act and animus, pursuant to
{¶ 42} In State v. Botta (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 196, 201, 56 O.O.2d 119, 271 N.E.2d 776, we acknowledged that
{¶ 43} Regarding the doctrine of merger, we have previously stated: “An accused may be tried for both [allied offenses of similar import] but may be convicted and sentenced for only one. The choice is given to the prosecution to pursue one offense or the other, and it is plainly the intent of the General Assembly that the election may be of either offense.” Maumee v. Geiger (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 238, 244, 74 O.O.2d 380, 344 N.E.2d 133. See also Legislative Service Commission Summary of Am.Sub.H.B. 511, supra, at 69 (stating that pursuant to
{¶ 44} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit for different reasons, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment accordingly.
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, and Cupp, JJ., concur. Pfeifer and Lanzinger, JJ., concur in judgment only.Notes
. In response to House Resolution No. 81 of the 106th General Assembly, the Ohio Legislative Service Commission appointed the Technical Committee, consisting of members of the bench and bar from throughout the state, to draft a comprehensive substantive revision of the criminal laws of this state. Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Proposed Ohio Criminal Code (Mar.1971) at iii and vii. The committee’s work led to the Legislative Service Commission’s preparation of what eventually became H.B. 511, 109th General Assembly, which, as amended, constituted the first comprehensive revision of Ohio’s substantive criminal law since 1815. Id. at vii; Legislative Service Commission, Summary of Am.Sub.H.B. 511, The New Ohio Criminal Code (June 1973), introduction.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 45} I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the aggravated-assault violations of
{¶ 46} This court clarified in Cóbrales that “[i]n determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import under
{¶ 47} “(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
{¶ 48} “(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 49} The court of appeals in Brown’s case refused to engage in an analysis of allied offenses under
{¶ 50} I agree with the court of appeals that the problem of allied offenses is obviated when the defendant’s conduct involves a single act with a single animus, and the offenses charged are different forms of the same crime. In this situation, Brown’s conduct — stabbing Johnson once — could not be construed to constitute two or more offenses. The state indicted her on two separate counts that specified alternative means of committing the alleged act of aggravated assault (knowingly causing serious physical harm to Johnson,
{¶ 51} Brown could be convicted and sentenced on a single offense. I would adopt the reasoning of the court of appeals and therefore concur in judgment only.
Pfeifer, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.