Dеfendant was indicted and convicted in Holt county for playing for money a game of chance callеd “craps.”
The sole point raised by defendant relates to the grand jury. It appears that there are two regular terms of the circuit court in Holt county, one beginning the third Monday in May and the other the fourth Monday in October of each year. The May, 1915, term was adjourned to the 18th day of October of that year when an adjourned term was held. The judge of the court had in the meantime ordеred a grand, jury summoned for the adjourned term. The jury was duly emрaneled, sworn and charged. It thereupon entered upon its duties. The court was then “adjourned to the court in course,” the jury continuing its investigations. At the opening of the regular term (one week afterwards) on the fourth Monday, the jury returned into court a number of indictments, that against this defendant being one of them. A trial was afterwards had and defendant convicted as above stated.
The pоint made by defendant is that when the court adjourned to “court in course” (the fourth Monday in October) it ipso facto dissolved the grand jury. Various sections of the statute were evidently enacted on the theory of cooperation by the court and grand jury. [See sections 5066, 5092, 5093, 5098, 5081, 5079, R. S. 1909.]
But while there can be no thought of a grand jury as a separate entity and withоut dependence on the existence of a court, yet it has separate functions to perform independent of the court. It pursues its own line of investigatiоn and controls its own sittings and adjournments. It may be in session while the court is in recess. We think that an adjournment of court fоr a number of days, or over to an adjourned term- would not necessarily affect the life or the functions of thе jury. [State v. Pate,
But the adjournment of the court for the tеrm involves different considerations. A grand jury is summoned to serve at a certain term of court, and during
But it has been ruled that a grand jury, like an officer, may have a de facto existence beyond its official term (People v. Morgan,
Wе feel that we are relieved from the necessity оf passing upon the question just stated from the fact that dеfendant has waived it by going to trial without making such suggestion by motion to quash or otherwise, until after the verdict was returned against him. [State v. Smallwood,
The foregoing considered we feel constrained to rule that the judgment should be affirmed.
