49 Vt. 437 | Vt. | 1877
The opinion of the court was delivered by
I. The respondent was tried on the complaint of a town grand juror for violation of the statute regulating the sale
The justice’s judgment of acquittal, so long as it remained in force, concluded the state as well as the respondent in regard to all offences therein put in issue. It matters not whether, the acquittal resulted from the failure of the prosecuting attorney to produce proper testimony to connect the respondent with the offences testified to by the witnesses, or from the failure of the triers to give due force and weight to the evidence produoed.
It was also error for the court to receive the evidence of the counsel who conducted the prosecution, as to what he understood were the grounds on which the respondent was acquitted. The grounds of the acquittal were immaterial; the understanding of the counsel of those grounds,- more- so. The judgment of acquittal, when given in evidénce in another proceeding, though between the same parties, could not be avoided or impeached. As the
II. The other three offences of which the jury found the respondent guilty, might have been put in issue under the complaint on which h© was acquitted, but they were not. The judgment of acquittal therefore does not conclude or bar the state from prosecuting respondent for these offences. The form of the complaint is prescribed by the statute ; and it does not specifically set forth the date of the alleged sales, furnishing, or giving away of intoxicating liquor, nor the names of the persons to whom they were made. The respondent can ascertain these only by requiring the prosecution to furnish him a specification. Where this is furnished, it shows what offences were included in the judgment. When no specification is required nor furnished, the offences for which the respondent' was tried can only be shown by parol; and a prior judgment will be conclusive of only such offences as were therein put in issue by the evidence. By the statute (Gen. Sts. c. 94, ss. 37, 38, 39), a plea of guilty by the respondent bars a subsequent prosecution of only such offences as are specified in the complaint, or by the respondent in his plea. Hence, we think the County Court correctly refused to hold that the judgment of acquittal barred all offences committed prior to the day on which the complaint in that prosecution was exhibited, and which were not in issue in that prosecution.
III. The prior conviction of the respondent and his partner Griswold, for a violation of the same statute, was a conviction of both and each, as all crimes are several, though committed by two persons acting jointly or in partnership. Hence, the record of that conviction was conclusive evidence of a former conviction of the respondent for the same offence, and determines that the three offences of which the jury have properly found the respondent