STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, - vs - MICHAEL C. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. 2020-L-052
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
2020
2020-Ohio-4642
Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2019 CR 000021.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Vanessa R. Clapp, Lake County Public Defender, and Melissa A. Blake, Assistant Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant-Appellant).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Michael C. Brown, appeals the March 13, 2020 judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to eight years imprisonment following his plea of guilty, by way of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to one count of Sexual Battery. At issue is whether appellant‘s sentence is unsupported by the record. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶3} The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant-appellant to the maximum prison term of eight years, as the trial court‘s findings with respect to
R.C. 2929.11 andR.C. 2929.12 were unsupported by the record and thus, contrary to law.
{¶4} Pursuant to
{¶6} The trial court‘s sentencing entry states, “[t]he Court has also considered * * * the principles and purposes of sentencing under
{¶7} At the sentencing hearing, the court stated, in pertinent part:
{¶8} This Court has considered the record, the oral statements made, the victim impact, the pre-sentence report, my conference in chambers with counsel and probation, and the statements of the Defendant and the Defendant‘s counsel. The Court has also considered the overriding purposes of felony sentencing pursuant to
Revised Code 2929.11 which are to protect the public from future crime by this offender and others similarly minded, and to punish this offender using the minimum sanctions that the Court determines accomplish the purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on the state or local governmental resources. I have considered the need for incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and restitution. * * * I have reasonably calculated this sentence to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing and to be commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of this offender‘s conduct and its impact on society and the victim, and to be consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.
{¶9} Though appellant acknowledges that the sentencing entry indicates the trial court considered all three purposes of felony sentencing, he nevertheless argues that “it is clear from the trial court‘s own words during the sentencing hearing that it was guided by only two of the three purposes of felony sentencing; specifically omitting the purpose pertaining to promotion of effective rehabilitation of the offender.” We do not agree.
{¶11} Here, the trial court expressly stated it considered the purposes and principles of
{¶12} Additionally, appellant argues his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court improperly considered factors elevating the seriousness of the crime and ignored or discounted factors that made his behavior less serious and recidivism less likely. Specifically, he argues that the court may not consider an element of the offense to elevate the seriousness of the conduct.
{¶13} An element of
{¶14} In support of his argument, appellant cites Banas, supra, State v. Polizzi, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2018-L-062 and 2018-L-064, 2019-Ohio-2505, and State v. Schlecht, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2003-CA3, 2003-Ohio-5336. This court, however, has recently considered these three cases and rejected an almost identical argument made by the appellant in State v. Russell, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-138, 2020-Ohio-3243.
{¶15} In Russell, this court noted “a review of the ‘element of the offense’ cases indicates they were based on prior versions of the sentencing statutes which the Supreme Court of Ohio found unconstitutional in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, ¶ 36.” Id. at ¶ 77. Further, this court recognized, “the holding in Polizzi was that the trial court‘s consecutive sentence findings under
{¶17} Finally, appellant argues that the court failed to consider various mitigating factors, to wit: that he pleaded guilty in order to save the victim and her family the stress of a trial, and that he had minimal criminal history and no history of similar offenses. However, during the sentencing hearing, the court expressly considered appellant‘s criminal history, noting that although it was not a lengthy history, there were a “couple of significant ones” on his record. Furthermore, the trial court acknowledged during the sentencing hearing that appellant pleaded guilty by way of Alford. While appellant argues that he pleaded guilty in order to save others the stress of trial, this decision also benefited him, saving him from the stress of trial and the potential for additional or more serious indictments. The trial court “is not required to give any particular weight or consideration to any sentencing factor“; it must merely consider them. Russell, supra, at ¶ 85, citing State v. Holin, 174 Ohio App.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-6255, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.).
{¶18} It is clear from the record the court considered all the relevant factors. Accordingly, we do not find that the court failed to consider mitigating factors.
{¶20} The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J., concurs.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., concurs in judgment only.