State v. BrownState v. Brown
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey E. Brown, appeals the judgment of the Marion Municipal Court convicting him of failure to wear a safety belt pursuant to
{¶2} In November 2009, a law enforcement officer cited Brown for failure to wear a safety belt in violation of
{¶3} In December 2009, Brown, acting pro se, moved the trial court to dismiss the citation on the basis that
{¶5} It is from the judgment overruling his motion to dismiss that Brown appeals, presenting the following pro se assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING THE DEFENDANTS [SIC] MOTION TO DISMISS.
Assignment of Error No. II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS OPPOSING COUNSEL FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PROPER LEGAL FRAMEWORK FROM WHICH SUCH A DECISION COULD BE MADE. THAT [SIC] THE DECISION REACHED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNSUPPORTED AND CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
Assignment of Error No. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS IT FAILED TO CONDUCT A MEANINGFUL REVIEW.
{¶6} Due to the nature of Brown‘s arguments, we elect to discuss his second and third assignments of error together.
Assignment of Error No. I
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his motion to dismiss. Specifically, he argues
{¶8} Initially, we note that the State points out that Brown failed to provide transcripts of the proceedings to this Court and argues that, consequently, we cannot consider his arguments.
{¶9} “An enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.” State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, paragraph one of the syllabus. “That presumption of validity of such legislative enactment cannot be overcome unless it appear[s] that there is a clear conflict between the legislation in question and some particular provision or provisions of the Constitution.” Xenia v. Schmidt (1920), 101 Ohio St. 437, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶10} A statute may be challenged on constitutional grounds in two ways: (1) that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, or (2) that it is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶37, citing Belden v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, paragraph four of the syllabus. To mount a successful facial challenge, the party challenging the statute must demonstrate that there is no set of facts or circumstances under which the statute can be upheld. Id., citing United States v. Salerno (1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745. Where it is claimed that a statute is unconstitutional as applied, the challenger must present clear and convincing evidence of a presently existing set of facts that make the statute unconstitutional and void when applied to those facts. Id. at ¶38, citing Belden, 143 Ohio St. 329, at paragraph six of the syllabus.
{¶11} Here, Brown has argued that
{¶12} The
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
{¶13} Additionally,
All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety.
{¶15} Multiple courts in Ohio have examined
the wearing of a seat belt secures a driver in his seat making it easier for him to retain control of his motor vehicle and thus
reducing the chances that sudden emergencies on the road may cause him to lose control of his vehicle and collide with other vehicles.
Batsch, 44 Ohio App.3d at 82. See, also, State v. Krohn (Oct. 18, 1996), 11th Dist. No. 96-G-1970, 1996 WL 648735.
{¶16} We concur with the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Appellate districts and find that
{¶17} Accordingly, we overrule Brown‘s first assignment of error.
Assignments of Error Nos. II and III
{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his motion to dismiss because the State failed to demonstrate the constitutionality of
{¶19} In response to Brown‘s second and third assignments of error, the State again points out that Brown failed to provide transcripts of the proceedings to this Court, and that, consequently, we cannot consider these assignments of error. As stated in our analysis of Brown‘s first assignment of error, under
{¶20} Accordingly, we overrule Brown‘s second and third assignments of error.
{¶21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
/jnc
ROGERS, J., dissents.
{¶22} I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
{¶23}
{¶24} The term “liberty,” as used in
{¶26} I would find that the statute requiring use of safety belts similarly bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. I do not find that the possibilities that the use of safety belts could save taxpayer money by preventing long-term care of injured persons at taxpayer expense, or that it could possibly prevent collisions by making it easier for a driver to retain control of his vehicle in an emergency are substantial enough reasons to invoke a proper exercise of the state‘s police power at the expense of individual liberty.
{¶27} There is no constitutional mandate that the state accept responsibility for the health care of individuals injured by their own actions or inactions.
{¶28} As quoted in Betts, “‘[t]here is too much nonsensical regulation of purely personal affairs in to-day‘s government. Liberty is almost unknown. You are permitted to take it in homeopathic doses when administered by some commission or court, but what that measure of liberty may be you cannot tell until this court decides. It is high time we were going back to the Constitution, instead of going back on the Constitution.‘” 21 Ohio Misc. at 184, quoting Celina & Mercer Cty. Telephone Co. v. Union-Center Mut. Telephone Assn. (1921), 102 Ohio St. 487, 523 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Judge Riley in 1969 noted the above quote from 1921. What would our predecessors think of our United States today?
{¶29} Finally, I would note that the thoughtful and well-written Betts decision related to the statute mandating use of helmets by the operators of motorcycles, which was quickly repealed. Surely any danger of physical injury is much more obvious to motorcyclists than to drivers of automobiles who are surrounded by tons of metal and safety equipment, which today includes air bags. This leads me to the conclusion that, if helmets are not required for motorcyclists,