History
  • No items yet
midpage
State v. Brown
156 S.W.3d 722
Ark.
2004
Check Treatment

*1 STATE of Arkansas M. BROWN v. Jaye

and Michael C.Williams CR 03-914 156 S.W.3d 722 Court of Arkansas

Supreme 25, 2004 delivered March Opinion denied May [Rehearing 6, 2004.] *3 Beebe, Gen., Mike Gen., K. Att’y by: Ass’t Clayton Hodges, Att’y for appellant.

Dale for W. Finley, appellee. Robert L. The State of Arkansas appeals Brown, Justice.

an order contraband seized suppressing home of Brown and appellees Jaye Michael The Williams. State raises two on that the circuit points (1) court erred in appeal: that Article holding 15, of the Arkansas Constitution that advice requires to refuse consent be law given by enforcement officers before a consensual search be found to be may that the voluntary; (2) circuit court erred under the same constitutional holding provision that officers must disclose all information police known to them before consensual search be found to be We hold voluntary. that the circuit court concluded that a correctly home dweller must be advised of his or her to refuse in order to validate a consensual search under the reason, Arkansas Constitution. For that we affirm. about ten o’clock at that on facts are August

The District the Fifth Drug three agents morning, Judicial Casto, Ridenhour, Arm- and Shawn (Chris Johnny Task Force Brown and Williams residence of appellees strong) approached received from so because of information did in Russellville. They were involved and Williams sources Brown two anonymous trailer had become child inside the and that a small in drug activity the door to Upon reaching ill due to manufacturing. drug home, familiar chemical odor. smelled strong trailer they door, answered. and Brown knocked oh Ridenhour Agent had information told her that three agents agent or there was other there was marijuana someone growing possibly wanted to investi- at the residence and that use they illegal drug gate. She closed the to wait a minute. asked the

Brown agents Ridenhour a short while later. Agent door but then returned read: form to which sign her with consent-to-search presented *4 form. Brown and Officer Ridenhour the consent Jaye Jaye signed A Brown did circle “vehicle” “residence.” search not residence the ensued. agents Williams, that Michael who

At apparently point, appellee the had been bedroom. There was also emerged asleep, the child trailer home. observed Agent present Armstrong evidence of use. Ridenhour looked methamphetamine Agent saw bedroom and evidence of used manufacture precursors arrested, Brown and Williams were and methamphetamine. Ridenhour Agent and received a search warrant to

subsequently sought residence and seize evidence or contraband found. any executed, The search warrant was and evidence of methamphet- amine manufacture and as well as usage marijuana growth was seized. Brown statement that same possession signed day which said that Williams was methamphetamine manufacturing and that she told him to Williams also a statement and stop. signed admitted to the manufacture and use of He methamphetamine. said in his statement that he had been with Brown for about living four Brown and years. Williams were later with manufac- charged ture of of methamphetamine meth- marijuana possession with intent to deliver. amphetamine Brown and Williams filed motions to separate suppress seized, because, contended, evidence it was seized as they part an search. Williams an raised the issue of invalid illegal specifically search under Article of the Arkansas Constitution. A ensued before the circuit court. Brown at hearing testified that she told that the was wanted hearing agents permission search for She she said the consent marijuana. form because signed she she had to do so. thought She testified: I had no “Thought choice it.” but to added She that she did not that sign know she could “no” and not it. Williams also testified that say sign that announced were agents for they searching marijuana. Ridenhour testified at the that Agent did hearing agents

not tell Brown that she not was the consent form. required sign Agent testified that it not was Task Armstrong Drug Force policy to advise did have not to consent occupants they to search. Ridenhour Agent testified that he told Brown that the search would be for and “other marijuana use of He illegal drugs.” however, admitted, was not mentioned. methamphetamine He testified that did he not advise her that she could refuse to sign the form. 13, 2003, On the circuit court issued a letter opinion, June

which read: The facts this case represent concerns ArkansasSupreme Court had in the recent caseof Griffinv. Justices 788, 67 S.W.3d582.

In the caseOfficer present Ridenhour testifiedabout phone call ofa him childat advising defendants’residence sickbecause being drugs. drug task force went to the mobile home residence. OfficerRidenhour talked with defendantBrown and told her he *5 had infonnationthat there was the marijuana in residence thatit sick no mention a child being There was there. being was grown a written consent officers obtained The drugs. because residence. and entered the Brown defendant for search have cause a did not probable officers It is undisputed was obtained. time a consent to search at the warrant toway in this caseis a simply talk” used “knock and procedure in a obtaining enforcement officers on law placed the burden avoid warrant. search stating if were used deception purpose that

It would appear not be an then a consent obtained would search of a requested valid consent. informed and officers a “knock and talk” policy police

This Court feels that if to refuse challenge only survive a constitutional can consent is obtained. or is before explained consent in writing factors, this Court feels that consent the above upon Based valid; therefore, the case not motions obtained this was search both defendants should be by granted. filed suppress motions to order was entered that same two An day granting suppress.

I.Jurisdiction this We first address whether court has jurisdiction Rule of hear this State to Arkansas pursuant Appellate appeal that do 3. The State contends we because Procedure —Criminal Article of the Arkansas Constitution appeal implicates and whether that section of our state constitution requires home dweller be advised of the to refuse to a consent with the State that this We being agree prior given. search-and-seizure issue raises involving appeal significant known as “knock and talk.” it is matter Accordingly, procedure which concerns the correct and uniform administration criminal which this court. See Ark. law review R. requires App. Pruitt, P. —Crim. also State v. 3(c). See 64 S.W.3d This has to review matter. jurisdiction II. Consensual Search It The State raises two issues to a consensual search. relating first contends that the Arkansas Constitution does not require officers must advise home dwellers that have the police they *6 466

to refuse consent to search. the claims that State our state Secondly, constitution does not officers to disclose all infor- require police mation known to them before a consensual search take may place. State, the the circuit the case at hand According judge decided to the evidence seized for both reasons. Because suppress we conclude that the circuit construed the correctly Arkan- judge sas Constitution to enforcement law officers to advise require search, home dwellers of their refuse to consent to a we need not address the second raised the by State. point

This case the second presents for this court to opportunity consider whether the known as “knock and talk” police procedure is 2, under Arkansas Constitution Article constitutionally permissible 15,.in State,

Section two v. 347 Ark. past years. Griffin 67 S.W.3d 582 a constitutional attack was mounted against case, under state our constitution. procedure We decided that however, on officers had ground an police begun illegal search of the car defendant’s and shed they approached before Hence, defendant’s front door to ask for consent to search. did not decide the opinion “knock-and-talk” validity Griffin Nevertheless, under our state procedure constitution. in three the “knock-and-talk” concurring opinions, was called procedure into under the state question constitution three of this by justices State, Brown, court. See v. (Corbin, supra J., concurring; J., Griffin Hannah, concurring; J., concurring). A brief of the “knock-and-talk” description is in procedure order. The has become fashionable as an procedure alternative a search warrant obtaining when officers do not have police sufficient cause to obtain a search warrant. What probable gener- occurs is that several law ally enforcement officers accost a home dweller on the of his or her home consent to doorstep request search that home. If an oral consent is the search given, proceeds. What is found officers then form the for police basis cause to obtain probable warrant and result in the seizure of It subsequent contraband. is the intimidation effect of officers on a multiple home dweller’s police appearing doorstep, armed, sometimes in uniform and consent to search requesting without the home dweller of advising his her to refuse consent that the constitutional presents problem.

This recently discussed the constitutional ramifications warrantless entries into homes: private A entry warrantless into home is un private presumptively Wisconsin, reasonableunder the Fourth Amendment. Welshv. 466

467 State, (2002); 67 S.W.3d 567 v. 347 Ark. (1984); U.S. Scott However, State, Ark. 829 S.W.2d v. Butler if law- be overcome unreasonableness may presumption of the homeowner obtained enforcement officer State, 530, search. See Holmes conduct a warrantless 11.1; Hillard Ark.R.Crim.P. (2002) (citing S.W.3d 321 Ark. 39, 900 S.W.2d 167 that the This court has established (1995)). *7 testimony clear and by positive State has a burden to heavy prove v. and Holmes freely voluntarily given. that consent to search was a State, 397, (1999); Ark. 993 S.W.2d 918 State, Norris v. 338 supra; 261, State, 219 A valid (1980). v. 268 Ark. 595 S.W.2d Scroggins and is consent to search must be voluntary, “[v]oluntariness all the circumstances.” Ohio of fact to be determined from question Bustamonte, 33, 40 Robinette, v. Schneckloth (1996) (quoting v. 519 U.S. must be and (1973)).Any unequivocal 412 U.S. 218 consent given State, State, v. Holmesv. Norris usually supra; supra not be implied. Gonzalez, 1996)). v. 71 F.3d 819 Cir. (11th U.S. (citing 661, 591, State, 669, 74 S.W.3d 595-96 We (2002). Stone v. 348 Ark. and that the State must clear by further observed prove positive the consent to enter and search was testimony unequivocal See id. specific. the court has further held that “knock-and-talk”

This the se of the Fourth Amendment is not violative procedure per State, 767, v. Ark. 67 United States Constitution. See Scott 347 Pendleton, v. 249 F.3d 279 (4th S.W.3d 567 (2002) (citing Rogers v. 239 F.3d Cir. 2001); 2001); Cir. United States 716 Jones, (5th (7th United States v. 170 F.3d 708 Cir. United States 1999); Johnson, Indeed, v. F.3d 684 Cir. the United States 1997)). 108 Jerez, (7th Bustamonte, 412 Court Schneckloth v. U.S. 218 (1973), Supreme while the Fourth Amendment the recognizing pri protects aof home dweller intrusions against vacy arbitrary by police officers, Fourth Amendment did not knowl held that require the of the to refuse consent as showing edge prerequisite consent. voluntary law, the constitution federal case federal

Despite this court has made it clear that the search-and- abundantly though 2, 15, Constitution seizure Article Arkansas language § Amendment, not of the Fourth we are similar to words very federal the Fourth Amendment bound by interpretation Picado, See, 349 Ark. when our own law. v. e.g.,Jegley interpreting 468

600, Sullivan, 647, 80 S.W.3d 332 State (2002); 74 Indeed, S.W.3d 215 v. State, we (2002); supra. Griffin, Griffin underscored this point: However, . . . we base our of this analysis case our own state upon constitution, statutes, cases, law as our expressed state that while we recognizing lack to extend the authority protections of the Fourth beyond Amendment of United holdings States Court, we do have Supreme authority impose greater restrictions on activities in our state based our state police upon own those the law than Court holds to be necessarybased Supreme upon Sullivan, federal constitutional standards. SeeArkansas v. 532 U.S. 769 Ark. at at S.W.3d 584.

It is true that in Stout Ark. S.W.2d vehicle, which involved of motor this court stated that we would Article in the same manner interpret as United States Court the Fourth Supreme interpreted Amendment. But the Stout case involved search of a motor vehicle, and noted we in Stout that it seemed especially appropriate *8 to follow Fourth Amendment because the interpretations, in interests and difficulty rules for and balancing search setting seizure of automobiles. The case before us the of a concerns home, which is different and which invokes altogether Arkansas’ and steadfast adherence the to of the longstanding home sanctity and unreasonable protection against intrusions. government 15, 2, Article of the Arkansas rel- Constitution reads in § evant part: The of the of this State to secure people be in their houses, and persons, papers effects unreasonable and against searches violated; seizures shallnot be and no warrant shallissue except upon cause, affirmation, probable by oath or and supported particularly the be describing to searched and the place or be person to thing seized.

Ark. Const. art. 15. This was as the provision adopted part § 1874 Arkansas Constitution and is almost identical to the Fourth State, Amendment. In we traced the of this supra, history Griffin constitutional and the behind it: reasoning provision castle, that a man’s home is his the principle and that even home, King unreasonably from prohibited upon that intruding

469 in culture of well-developed rough-and-ready was particularly frontier, Territory. In no less in the Arkansas and pronounced Constitution, admitted state of our newly 1836 people our in language: succinctly following this principle expressed in their persons, shall be secure 9. That people houses, searches from unreasonable and possessions papers warrants, seizures, officer be whereby that general any to search without evidence commanded suspectedplaces committed, not named fact or to seize any persons person by whose are not described supported offenses particularly evidence, not are andshall be dangerous liberty, granted. added). Id. (emphasis had Our Constitution

347 Ark. at S.W.3d at 585. that the with our 1868 Constitution same It was people provision. identical constitutional adopted language substantially present provision. dweller’s

This court home emphasized State, in Fouse v. Ark. 989 S.W.2d 146 at privacy nighttime homes, Fouse, citizens in their we said: “The privacy intrusions, is a of vast as secure nighttime importance Criminal but also Procedure], attested not our Rules only by [of at S.W.2d at our state and federal constitutions.” Ark. 353, 358-59, 820 S.W.2d 150-51 Garner v. (quoting 446, 449-50 (1991)). the same when we

We vein imposed proceeded for in their bedrooms unreason against greater protection persons Picado, and struck able interference Jegley supra, government down the state’s statute as unconstitutional when applied sodomy Picado, held that the adults in their homes. In we consenting *9 in is a the Arkansas Constitution funda privacy implicit a state interest to override mental which compelling requires of our citizens in it. This rich tradition of protecting privacy their our from federal common law in homes deviating justified in our homes. Picado with to constitutional protection respect Indeed, of home is zone legal privacy person’s principle our state constitution is as under sacrosanct as any right principle Picado, v. and law. v. case See supra; supra. Jegley Griffin has same to the instant case. Arkansas analysis clearly applies embraced a for in citizens their heightened protection privacy seizures, homes unreasonable searches and as evidenced against constitution, statutes, law, our state common and criminal rules. it is clear that this court deviate from federal

Though the more relevant is when should we do so? precedent, question Without slavish of federal would question, following precedent this render court’s a mirror of federal merely opinions image which would with it a certain of carry jurisprudence, abrogation our our own state constitution duty and follow our interpret Yet, own we to a state law. admit concern about too deviating much federal based on our state constitu- precedent solely tion. A balance must be struck between the two. proper Justice Souter, David he when served as on New justice Hampshire Court, it said best: Supreme ... It is the need of court for the every appellate participation

bar in the of to think and process trying sensibly comprehensively about the that the questions judicial has been power establishedto answer. Nowhere is the need than in the field of greater State law, constitutional where we are asked often so to confront ques- tions that have been decided already under National Constitu- tion. If we too much reliance on federal place we will precedent shadows; render the little, State rules a mere row of if we too place we will render State practice incoherent. 68, 82-83, State v. 129 N.H. Bradberry, A.2d 1389 (1986) (Souter, discussion, For a J., concurring specially). seeRobert general Brown, L.- State Law: The Expanded Rights Through United States App. Court ShowsState Courts The Supreme Prac. & Process Way, J. 505 (2002). This state’s constitutional and state law history preexisting of a home

regarding dweller in his or privacy rights her home combine to our decision to discard federal support precedent an of our state constitution adopt interpretation with compatible Gunwall, See, state law. State 106 Wash. 2d e.g., 720 P.2d 808 It would be redundant for us to retrace this state’s strong in homes, tradition favor of history in our protecting privacy which has been set already Picado, forth expansively Jegley it Suffice this supra. say State has and endorsed the adopted in a citizen’s home principle privacy clearly unmistakably since the time Arkansas was admitted to statehood. This court is what other cognizant states have done under their state constitutions assessing constitutionality *10 a search as to an alternative obtaining “knock-and-talk” procedure Ferrier, 2d 960 P.2d 927 In State v. Wash. warrant. the Court “knock-and-talk” analyzed the Washington Supreme in the to as found Washington under the privacy procedure Constitution, citizens under the to its as well as given protection so, that court and seizures. In doing warrantless searches against no a citizen is the fact that area is evident said: “Especially [i]n own For this than in his or her home. more entitled to his privacy reason, into the come intrusion the closer officers to dwelling 136 Wash. 2d at the constitutional protection.” greater The court (internal omitted). P.2d at 931 quotations supreme state review under concluded law supported preexisting amply and that in one’s home the state constitution was privacy “prima- Id., a local concern.” 960 P.2d at 931. rily next admitted that when The Court Washington Supreme the Fourth of consent under Amendment considering voluntary Constitution, concluded its court of had the United States appeals the federal law. But court that it was with emphasized lockstep home, there is a for the one’s heightened privacy right the citizens unlawful intrusion into for state against protection home, the to this an onerous burden government upon “places to act of our warrant need outside require- show compelling at held that Id. at 960 P.2d then ment.” 932. but that coercive to some “knock talk” was inherently degree, can “be officers who these coercive effects by requiring mitigated to the to warn home dwellers their conduct procedure at 933. consent a warrantless search.” Id. at 960 P.2d refuse to The court concluded: therefore, We, rule:

. . . that when adopt following police knock for the purpose obtaining officersconduct a and talk home, avoid the thereby necessity consent to search warrant, home, must, inform obtaining they entering prior lawfully whom thathe or person sought consentis she time, revoke, can they any refuse consentto searchandthat at the consentthat and canlimit of the consent they give, scope certain of the home. The failureto these provide warnings, areas home, thereafter. given vitiates prior entering any 118-19, P.2d at 934. The absence of warnings Id. at required infirm under the rendered Washington procedure constitutionally Constitution. *11 State, v.

In Graves 708 So. 2d 858 (Miss. 1997), Missis- Court held to same effect. on sippi Supreme focusing whether a occurred waiver in the “knock-and- knowledgeable context, talk” the court under held that Constitu- Mississippi tion, such a waiver is “defined as consent where defendant refuse, knows that he she has a to of his or cognizant right being Graves, her in the 708 So. 2d at 864. The rights premises.” remanded the case to the -trial court to determine whether a consent had been knowledgeable given. on, the New held Court that the

Early Jersey Supreme United States Court decision of v. Bustamonte, Schneckloth Supreme controlled state court decisions in their construction of supra, only 349, the Fourth Amendment. v. SeeState 68 Johnson, 346 A.2d N.J. 66 For the search-and-seizure of the purposes provision Constitution, New Schnecklothwas and not the state Jersey binding, of New was free to under standard state law. Jersey higher impose The New did Court so and Jersey Supreme its state interpreted constitution to a home dweller’s require to right knowledge refuse consent as an essential element of consent to any voluntary search.

A fourth court has noted that appellate United though it, States Court has not “the better Supreme required practice a knock and talk would be for the conducting investigation officer to himself and advise the identify his occupant right deny State, v. 794 N.E.2d entry.” Ct. Hayes (Ind. App. 2003). added, The the court would procedure, minimize needless sup- motions, pression and hearings, appeals.

We are convinced that the courts in these states have reached the correct conclusion. As in the case of the State of Washington, our tradition in Arkansas is “rich right-to-privacy compel- Picado, v. 349 Ark. at ling.” at 80 S.W.3d Jegley 349-50. We have held that there is a fundamental in our homes privacy in the Arkansas Constitution and that implicit fundamental violation of that any review and a requires strict-scrutiny compel- state interest. ling The dissent cites a raft of cases where this court has adhered to the Schnecklothv. Bustamonte standard when interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Only cases, one of those v. 557 S.W.2d King Bustamontestandard when adopted Article interpreting 15, of the Arkansas Constitution with to a respect knowing from our holding King nowWe depart to search. consent for the extent it stands proposition case to the overrule refuse a her of his or be need not homeowner apprised to search that a valid consent as a to search prerequisite home. casesbased on overrules Court United States Supreme See, some e.g., with regularity. States Constitution

the United 8, 2004) U.S. 36 (March (interpreting v. Washington, Crawford of witnesses statements for out-of-court Clause the Confrontation Roberts, Lawrence (1980)); U.S. 56 Ohio and overruling the Fourteenth Texas, 123 Ct. 2472 (2003) (interpreting S. to liberty to homosexuals’ rights with Amendment regard *12 Hardwick, v. U.S. 186 (1986)); Ring v. 478 Bowers overruling Amendment Arizona, the Sixth 584 (2002) 536 U.S. (interpreting court, alone, determined had where trial sitting trial to jury right the in a death circumstances absence of aggravating presence Arizona,497 U.S. 639 (1990)); Payne Waltonv. caseand overruling v. Tennessee, Booth Maryland, 501 808 (1991) (overruling v. U.S. Gathers, 805 v. 490 U.S. and South Carolina 482 U.S. 496 (1987), that in the evidence and noting (1989), victim-impact regarding deci- of its constitutional twenty years, thirty-three previous past in in whole or had been overruled part). sions rule as a This court has said although general we will break with bound to follow precedent we are precedent, that a and so manifestly unjust the result is wrong when patently Ass’n, 344 v. unavoidable. SeeAka Hosp. break becomes Jefferson 627, Child 508 State (2001) (citing Support Ark. 42 S.W.3d Officeof 338, Mitchell, Parish 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); v. 330 Ark. Enforcement v. Aka, 1239, held Pitts, 215 we (1995)). Ark. 429 S.W.2d 244 for of that a viable fetus is a wrongful-death “person” purposes of the General did based on the statute and so expresspublic policy decision, we also alluded to Amendment In our Aka Assembly. in declaration that the with its policy of the ArkansasConstitution have life unborn child. We is to of every Arkansas protect of an statement other cases based on evolving public overruled v. See, Cadillac our General Assembly. e.g., policy Jackson 24, down Inc., (1999) (striking 337 Ark. 986 S.W.2d Cowboy, Turner, based on Ark. 385 S.W.2d 656 v. Carr on sellers of alcoholic beverages by of care duty placed high Shannon salesto intoxicated persons); Assembly regarding General Wilson, down 349 (1997) (striking S.W.2d based, relative to minors on General dramshop precedent part, enhanced We minors). conclude that Assembly’s protection Arkansas’ in favor of in one’s home strong public policy privacy warrants our today’s opinion overruling King supra. that the

We hold failure of Task Force Drug in this case to advise Brown she had agents Jaye right refuse consent to the violated her and the home, Michael Williams warrantless intrusions into the as against Article of the Arkansas guaranteed by Constitution. We affirm the of all evidence seized this case that suppression flowed from this unconstitutional search. do While we not hold that the Arkansas Constitution of a execution written consent requires form which contains statement that the home dweller has the consent, to refuse this would be the better undoubtedly for law enforcement to follow. practice Affirmed. dissent. C.J., JJ.,

Dickey, Imber, Glaze Justice, 4-3 divided Today, court dissenting. Tom Glaze, issues an that makes a radical in Arkansas opinion change search and seizure law. decision is law clearly contrary prior and the unwarranted and I change totally unnecessary. Initially, out the obvious mistakesthe point four-member has made in its Amendment, refusal to follow the Fourth itas all citizens protects *13 against unlawful searches.

First, the members seem to treat the majority’s so-called “knock and talk” brand as a new used law enforce- procedure by time, ment officers. Such a has been around for a procedure long consent to allows officers to a home dweller’s merely request situation, search his or her In this of the dwelling. officers type have some that an information be illegal activity may occurring home, inside the but the officers do not have sufficient evidence to obtain a search (probable cause) warrant. Our court has an officer’s to long recognized request home, the to search under limited

suspect’s circumstances. SeeArk. Rule Crim. 11.1. P. Rule 11.1 as follows: “An provides officer conduct searches and make may seizures without a search warrant or other color if consent is to the search authority given or seizure.” This court’s Rule 11.1 also makes it commentary clear that an officer consent to doesnot seeking suspects added.) to consent.(Emphasis to advisethem that they may have refuse 11.1, and instead Rule ignores The majority opinion completely the rule. in clear conflict with which is reaches a conclusion cited the King After dissenting opinion here, the majority as (1977), controlling 557 S.W.2d overrule, court than follow it. rather King court opted art. us: whether Ark. Const. the issue now before considered 2, very be the to refuse consent that advice of given requires § be a consensual search enforcement officers before lawby here, no; the the court held to be found voluntary. King, words, this court refuses In other simply says yes. majority follow precedent. fails to even so much as describe Since majority opinion There, was I will. King

the facts or analyze reasoning King, theft, erred in and he contended the trial court convicted evidence secured warrantless his motion to denying suppress under the federal He the search was unreasonable search. asserted The trial court and Ark. Const. art. 15. Fourth Amendment consent, to a valid ruled that the search was conducted pursuant that a search warrant should have and rejected King’s argument Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 been obtained. Schneckloth Citing court, the lower this court stating: equally upheld “[it] well settled that one of the established specifically exceptions is a search of both a warrant and cause probable requirements that is conducted to consent.” pursuant case, court dealt with whether

As in the present King that the consent was because failed to voluntarily given State prove stated nature of the confrontation. The of the coercive King that the voluntariness of consent is a rule question general circumstances, fact to be determined from totality the burden is on the State to consent was prove voluntarily Id. clear given by positive proof.

Here, the trial court was issue to consider is whether key that the officers’ search could have met constitu- correct ruling Brown, muster if had informed M. Michael C. tional only they Jaye that she had the to refuse consent Williams’ co-occupant, before consensual search would be valid under the Arkansas any decision, in the This court decided the issue Constitution. King *14 which reads as follows: if the was further that even argues

Appellant [King] shouldbe to a required prove knowing state voluntarilygiven, waiver and intelligent since Mrs. was not told her Griggs of to right search, However, refuse consent the search was invalid. a consent is not knowing intelligent our Federal required by Bustamonte, Constitution. In Schnecklothv. Court supra, [Supreme] said:

There is a vast difference between those that a rights protect fair criminal trial and the under the rights guaranteed Fourth Amendment. either in the Nothing behind a purpose requiring ‘knowing’ waiver of trial ‘intelligent’ or in the rights, of such a practical application that it requirement suggests ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee unrea- against sonable searches and seizures.

Rather, of to refuse consent knowledge right a factor to only be considered in determining voluntariness of consent and the state is not required demonstrate such as a knowledge prerequi- site to Watson, a establishing consent. United voluntary Statesv. U.S. 411 (1976); Bustamonte, so, and Schnecklothv. Even supra. appellant[King] sinceeachstate has urges power imposehigher standardson searchesand seizuresunderits own lawsor constitutionthan Constitution, are by our Federal required we should impose greater standard than articulatedin Schneckloth.In our view the Schneckloth standard required in consenttosearchis proof underthe adequate terms of 2, 15, ourconstitution.Art. Ark. Const. (1874). it Although appears § Mrs. Griggs was not verbally informed of her to refuse right consent, she a consent to signed search her and a waiver of premises her to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. She her, the consent and acknowledged waiver form was read to she understood and it. signed 262 Ark. at 346-47 added). (emphasis

King, see, As one can this court in readily considered the King whether, under art. question officers must advise home dweller of his or her to refuse consent before the officers can search the legally home. This court person’s answered “no,” awith question and went resounding into considerable detail as to why suspect’s consent is knowledge only refuse to be considered in the voluntariness of a determining factor consent. The decision had been law since and the good King it, overrules majority opinion for the glibly reason that apparently case’s stands in the holding outcome the way majority desires to reach.

477 cases, however, remain consistent with For recent King. Our searches, that, the issue of consent this court has noted on example, in manner consistent with federal law. Arkansas law a we interpret cases, a host of Arkansas That federal law is followed stating to search is not to refuse consent knowledge person’s v. the voluntariness of consent. See Latta to prove requirement that, 488, State, stated in Ark. 88 S.W.3d 833 (2002) (court 350 where consent is and voluntarily given, most situations freely has been as a consensual “knock and talk” procedure upheld valid means to consent to search a house); encounter and a request 767, State, (court v. 347 Ark. 57 S.W.3d 567 (2002) Scott primarily decisions, to federal court noting every looked appellate federal has consideredthe has concludedthat the court which question appellate is not violative the ”knockand talk” consensual perse procedure This court’s in Latta FourthAmendment) added).1 holdings (emphasis set forth in states and Scott follow the rationale Other merely King. come the same conclusion.2 also have to recently Arkansas case law has adhered to repeatedly predictably Bustamonte, rule set forth in Schnecklothv. 412 U.S. 218 general that “voluntariness of is a of fact to be consent” question circumstances, determined from all the and while the subject’s taken of a consentis factor to be into knowledge account, refuse is not to demonstrate such prosecution required as a sole consent.To knowledge this prerequisite establishing voluntary effect, State, 420, Latta, Scott, see Martin v. 328 Ark. supra; supra; State, 311, 944 S.W.2d 512 Duncanv. 304 Ark. 802 (1997); S.W.2d State, 917 v. Ark. (1991); 268 595 S.W.2d 219 Scroggins State, v. Ark. 580 McGuire 265 S.W.2d 198 (1980); (1979); State, v. Reeves 528 S.W.2d 924 (1975). King, supra; 1 following In of this the Scottcourt cited the federal cases: United statement, support (8th 1994); (4th 2001); Rogers v. F.3d v. F.3d Severe, Pendleton, States 29 444 Cir. 249 Cir. United Jones, 239 F.3d 716 (5th 2001); (7th 1999); States Cir. UnitedStates 170 F.3d 708 Cir. v. Johnson, (7th 1997); (9th United States Cormier, 108 F.3d 684 Cir. United States v. 220 F.3d 1003 v. Jerez, 2000) (the gain Cir. use of the “knock and talk” access to a motel room was procedure in the absence of reasonable and did not result in a seizure of the permissible, suspicion, search). (3rd defendant or his v.Kim, violate See also United States 27 F.3d 947 Cir. 1994); (11th 1991). United States v. 923 F.2d cir. Tobin, 1506 2 following: For Scott court Iowa State v. 628 Reiner, example, reported (Iowa 2001); (2001); N.W.2d 460 Md. 121, 782 A.2d Scott Maryland (1997). North Carolina in v.Smith, 779; State 346 N.C. 488 S.W.2d210 347 Ark. At Scott, (La. 1992); seealso v.Green, Land, State 598 So.2d 624 State v. P.2d 131, 806 Ct.App. Or.App. of this court’s adherence to the light longstanding general rule on consensual searches set out in the Arkansas foregoing is, cases, federal to be asked has this court question why decided to a new rule in Arkansas precipitously adopt regarding consensual searches? The offers no majority opinion convincing *16 reason this court should well-settled Arkansas case why jettison and law its own Rule 11.1 on consensual search and seizure. Instead, court, reason, a without substi majority compelling now, 2, 15, tutes a new Ark. Const. art. and for the interpretation § time, first a resident to be advised his or her requires right refuse consentbefore a consensual search can be valid. that, The after it majority opinion merely provides today, will no look to the Fourth Amendment Arkansas longer protect Instead, citizens consensual searches. claims regarding majority it wishes to Arkansas residents grant greater protection by the Arkansas Constitution and a new applying giving interpreta- 2, 15, tion to article which is the same thread-bare argument put § before this court and in the case in 1977. In other rejected King words, even if the a consent to resident/suspect voluntarily gives search, the search will be invalid unless the officers says magic words, “You have the to refuse to consent to this search.” right The court offers no evidence that the majority Fourth Amend- ment has failed to Arkansas residents from searches. Nor protect illegal does the court show that Arkansaslaw enforcement officersare majority or searches under the Fourth Amendment abusing misusing performed which Arkansas courts have analysis, over recognized applied past officers, decades. If there are such abuses Arkansas law enforcement by this court should reveal them. To our courts have the Fourth my knowledge, Amend- applied searches, and,

ment in consensual while that not be analysis analysismay the Fourth Amendment mandates that perfect, Arkansas courts must consider the of the circumstances when officers totality obtain a consent to enter his or her subject’s residence. an officer to Requiring advise the that he or she has a to refuse consent to a search suspect in no assures that future searches way will questions concerning illegal be abated. For our court’s review of whether an officer example, informed the resident that he or she had the to refuse consent will continue to on of the officer or resident. depend credibility threshold Did the remains: officer admoni- question give required resident, and, tion have the to refuse to to the if the (you consent) did, officer does the court then consider all other circum- surrounding stances that bear on the of the search? validity

Also, that the has it is more than majority just passing strange 2, Ark. art. since decided to construe Const. differently, now § is identical to the constitutional virtually Arkansas’ provision 2, Because article 15 is almost identical to Fourth Amendment.3 § Amendment, in the Fourth our court in found past language the same Fourth decisions has reasonably adopted justifiably Amendment used the United States Court analysis Supreme when search and seizure the federal courts considering appellate this decisions art. issues. As court’s consequence, interpreting 15 have become of that constitutional SeeNelson part provision. § v. Timberline Inc., Int’l, 332 Ark. 964 S.W.2d 357 (1998) (when construed, a constitutional statute has been and that provision construction suchconstructionshould consistently manyyears, followedfor McLemore, not be added); Morris changed)(emphasis 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993) (the a statute becomes interpretation given of the statute itself). art. 15 a different part giving court, than this court has done in interpretation past years, once overlooks or its own again, ignores precedent. *17 it is to mention the case of

Finally, especially noteworthy State, 552, There, v. Stout 320 Ark. 898 457 S.W.2d this (1995). 2, the similar of art. 15 and the Fourth emphasized wording § Amendment, that, held in search and seizure specifically conflicts, the court will construe our Constitution in a manner consistent with the Court’s The Supreme interpretation. majority Stout that a case involved motor attempts sidestep by stating vehicle and not residence as in the case now us. before The court fails to cite case law for such an majority any interpretation. short, In the cases cited above in this have construed art. opinion 2, 15 to cover both motor vehicles and homes. §

3 U. S. Const. amend 4 reads as follows: people persons, Unreasonable searches and seizures.The of the be secure in their right papers,

houses, effects, seizures,shall violated, unreasonable searches and not be and no against upon probable supported by warrants particularly issue, cause, shall but oath or affirmation, and place persons searched, to be and the or to be seized. describing things Ark. following: Const. Art. 15 2, § provides State people The persons, of this papers houses, to be secure in their and effects unreasonable except searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue against upon probable supported by particularly place cause, affirmation, oath or to be describing person searched and the to be seized. thing Picado, the case of cites majority opinion Jegley 600, for the that a (2000), Ark. 80 S.W.3d 332 legal principle as home is a zone of and it is as sacrosanct privacy any right person’s and case law. It also cites under our state constitution or principle 788, State, 347 Ark. 67 S.W.3d 582 (2002); Griffin, Griffin however, and is and talk” consensual search case was not “knock case, too, here. The is brief not relevant clearly Jegley inapposite. terms, the Arkansas was civil case sodomy challenged Jegley statute, Ark. Ann. 5-14-122 which this 1997), Code (Repl. court held unconstitutional as a matter of law. While this court discussed Arkansas citizens’ such a is Jegley privacy, also the Constitution of the United States. Our recognized by are unreason- courts have held that such intrusions presumptively able under the Fourth Amendment. this Fourth Clearly, country’s Amendment was citizens from warrantless adopted protect home, and, in order citizens into entry private protect against such warrantless intrusions to do so is unreasonable presumptively under the Fourth Amendment. The State has the burden to prove Scott, a warrantless into a home is reasonable. Under entry supra, consent, when a warrantless into the home is made with entry Id. does not violate Fourth Amendment. entry with to the it Finally, respect majority’s overruling King, to note relies on cases wherein this important majority cases based on an statement of court “overruled other evolving course, our General this court has Of publicpolicy Assembly.” held that the determination of this state’s repeatedly public policy “lies almost in the domain.” See Bonds v. exclusively legislative Carter, 348 Ark. 75 S.W.3d 192 v. Atlantic (2002); Cas. Jordan Ins., Lester, 40 S.W.3d 254 State v. 343 Ark. (2001); Indeed, in Millerv. Ark. S.W.3d that “the 994 S.W.2d 476 this court stated public policy of Arkansas is declared Flere, however, not its State General Assembly, *18 courts.” declare, takes it itself to majority upon fiat, that it knows better than the essentially, judicial what General our should be. Assembly public policy conclusion, because the trial court (with majority’s has Arkansas’ consent-to- aid) misinterpreted misapplied law, I and remand the trial would reverse this case for to consider the voluntariness of Brown’s consent from the totality circumstances. this dissent. C.J., J., join

Dickey, Imber,

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Brown
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Mar 25, 2004
Citation: 156 S.W.3d 722
Docket Number: CR 03-914
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.