*1
No. 1991. Appeals Maryland.
June 1992. *2 Curran, Jr., (J. Greer, Joseph Asst. Gen. Kreg Atty. Paul Gen., brief) Baltimore, for petitioner. on both Atty. Duden, brief) on Duden, (Henley III & both H. Richard Annapolis, respondent. *3 MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE,
Argued before McAULIFFE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW ORTH, Jr., KARWACKI, JJ., Judge E. and CHARLES (retired), Specially Assigned. Appeals the Court of CHASANOW, Judge. in the jury Mitchell Brown was convicted
Shirley County for Anne Arundel of distribution Circuit Court charges against to distribute cocaine. conspiracy investigation ongoing from an undercover Brown stemmed investigation that Annapolis. When drug activity Agent Ken- likely suspect, Special as a focused on Brown Administration con- Drug Enforcement neth Johnson arrange Reginald Gray informant paid tacted confidential so that Johnson to be introduced Brown Johnson Agent from Brown. Johnson testi- buy then cocaine could to meet at a Gray he and were Brown originally fied that fell plans through. those Annapolis, center but shopping unwilling directly to deal testified that Brown Gray Johnson, Gray, instead to deal with preferring Agent he knew. whom
On February 1988 Johnson and Gray drove to the Apartments Brooks Court in the Newton 20 area of Annap- olis. There the stopped two the car in apartment parking just past group lot of men standing near a parked benefit, car. For Johnson’s Gray identified among Brown the group getting before out of the car and approaching him. According Gray’s he testimony, and Brown had a brief conversation he which asked the price an ounce of cocaine replied and Brown it would cost then Gray returned to the car and $1350. advised Johnson of the substance of the exchange. At request, told Gray park Johnson to the car farther parking down the time, lot. At that same Johnson saw Brown talk to another individual then apartment who walked into 805B of Brooks Court.
Agent Johnson testified that approximately five minutes later approached a man Johnson’s car from the general direction of apartment 805B and identified himself to John- son as “Larry.” cocaine, He handed Johnson an ounce of stating that its price was Johnson gave Larry $1350. $1400 Brown, then watched as Larry walked over to made an him, exchange with and returned to Johnson to him give $50 change. Detective Todd Young the Anne Arundel Coun- ty Department Police saw this transaction from the vantage point of his car parked another section of the parking lot and corroborated most Johnson’s and Gray’s testimony.
Over defense counsel’s objection, Detective Young also testified he was involved in an undercover cocaine *4 purchase from 7, 1988, Brown which occurred on March three roughly drug weeks after the transaction here at issue. The granted continuing court objection pursuant to Maryland 4-323(b) Rule any testimony regarding 7, March 1988 incident on the grounds surprise, rele- vance, undue and failure of the prejudice, provide State to discovery. permitted The trial court the following ex- change Attorney between State’s and Detective Young regarding drug purchase: or did he hand the drugs you Now, did he hand the Q: drugs to the Cl informant]? [confidential to the Cl. No, drugs A: he handed to the Cl? say Mr. Brown Q: What did him a deal by time for to do the next A: He told the Cl himself. say anything then have occasion
Q: Did Mr. Brown you? said exactly, me that it’s not that—he
A: Yes. He told I don’t deal with okay, just “It’s not that you’re new.” anybody objected defense counsel
Following testimony, this in the second deal involvement evidence of Brown’s al- The trial court highly prejudicial. was irrelevant also admitted the record testimony this lowed cocaine, conviction for distribution resulting Brown’s Brown’s being neither was offered to show finding that crime, rather as evidence of to commit the but propensity “identity.” Appeals held that Special the Court appeal, On Young to Detective was discoverable Brown’s statement 4-263(b)(2) produced and should have been under Md.Rule Further, that court found request. to Brown’s response ground a sufficient violation was discovery it could not say, beyond a mistrial because granting doubt, convicted on that Brown would have been reasonable Young. minus his statement presented the evidence 523, 532-34, State, Md.App. Brown v. of the (1991). Noting holding dispositive that this
169-70 court went appellate intermediate nevertheless appeal, the on retrial to address the judge on for benefit of Brown’s actions of the evidence admissibility ruled that the second sale. admitting evidence of his discretion judge trial abused transaction, probative because its value the March effect. prejudicial its outweighed *5 This certiorari to review each of these granted Court two relating to the holdings, as well as a third issue admissibili- sentencing. 590 A.2d ty hearsay evidence at (1991). at Trial Admissibility I. of Evidence erred in must first consider whether the trial court We in the admitting regarding evidence Brown’s involvement drug transaction. The admitted evidence showing entry consisted of “one sheet of [Brown’s] as as plea” to of cocaine well Detective guilty distribution statements and Young’s testimony physical about Brown’s transaction. In its for certio- during drug petition acts rari, alleges that: case, in drug
“In this evidence of Brown’s involvement standing that for he transaction other than which his in the participation trial was relevant establish Indeed, inasmuch as himself did instant offense. Brown make the actual of the cocaine to the under- delivery not officer, it that the imperative cover State show charged in the precise extent Brown’s involvement of his to deal drug unwillingness transaction. Evidence unfamiliar, persons with with whom he was as directly in the March Young evidenced his statement Officer to the effect that he did not deal drug transaction strangers, goes explain and reinforce ... participation the instant offense].” [Brown’s Special Appeals categorized all the evidence as judge “other crimes” evidence and indicated that the trial As to admitting had his discretion it. abused the result of his for the guilty plea Brown’s conviction as deal, categorized it as correctly second we believe was If only “other crimes” circumstantial evidence. Brown’s offered, resulting and the were the evi- conduct conviction admissible, since it would not fall within dence would be proffered. for which it was identity exception however, transaction, was admissible to a contested issue in the special it had relevance because character, criminal prove case, simply was not introduced *6 substantially outweighed its that probative had force and State, Harris v. 324 See prejudice. for unfair potential 490, (1991). 956 597 A.2d events that concluded Special Appeals
The Court of
“[t]he
a modus
7,
to establish
of March
1988 are insufficient
the events
when linked with
operandi
unique
appellant
little,
probative
17,
any,
if
and thus had
1988
February
State,
537,
at
584 A.2d
at
value.” Brown v.
Md.App.
85
in
absence of
offered
Had this evidence been
171.
use of
“runner”
statement,
agree that Brown’s
we would
“
and distinctive
as
‘so unusual
not
deliver cocaine was
”
crime as the
earmark the
signature’
be like
Faulkner, 314 Md.
630,
v.
accused. handiwork of
State,
(quoting McKnight
896,
(1989),
638,
552 A.2d
613,
551,
(1977),
quoting
in turn
604,
280 Md.
1972)).
190,
(2d
on Evidence
at 479
ed.
Were
McCormick
§
the “other crimes”
ground
admissibility,
the only
this
could not
admitted.1
evidence
be
that
agree
Special Appeals
the Court of
We
with
reversed, although
substantially
must be
conviction
“for
Special Appeals
different reasons. Since the Court
all of the
on retrial” indicated that
the direction of the court
inadmissible,
7,
feel
on March
1988 would be
we
events
in-
appellate
to correct
the intermediate
court’s
compelled
recently
admissibility of
other bad
1. This Court most
addressed
Brown’s statement is not confined to the sole of “other crimes” ry During evidence. the March transaction, drug Young: Brown told Detective “It’s not I you’re okay, just anybody not don’t deal with new.” A implication reasonable from Brown’s statement is that he conducts an he ongoing business which has direct and, contact with customers he customers only knows like the undercover in the instant case agent whom he does know, he deals indirectly through intermediary. an he conducted explanation ongoing how his busi *7 probative ness of he conducted that same was how business Moreover, during charged. 2V2 weeks earlier the sale here objectionable Brown’s statement would not be on the of ground hearsay, because it was an admission of a party This opponent. Court has stated that “an admission is a which, statement of facts in pertinent proof connection with Holland v. facts, tends to prove guilt____” other 2 671, 673, 864, (1966). See also Evidence, on (4th ed., 1992). McCormick Strong J. § of The Court saw the issue as only involving admissibility “other crimes” evidence. We disagree. simply The evidence was not that on another drugs—it occasion Brown also sold was that Brown made an admission about manner which he acts when drug on his His statement carrying business. related to not drug the March 7th sale—it also related to just and ex- plained February his actions on 1988. therefore,
The statement has relevancy, beyond any far improper suggestion that has a criminal propensity, Brown occasion, drugs or that since he dealt on another he is more likely charged. Perhaps to have done so the case an analogous might situation be a case where the defendant drugs to an charged selling agent undercover at a Tuesday, later, certain location on 2. Two on April weeks drugs second defendant sold Tuesday, April the second location. On at the same agent undercover said, only “I in this area drugs sell occasion the defendant admissible would not be The second sale Tuesdays.” on selling about sale, first the admission guilt of the but prove Likewise, Brown’s admissible. drugs Tuesdays might on be he operates manner in which is relevant to the 17, 1988. operated February on testimony about Young’s Obviously, Detective if to the jury make little sense Brown’s statement would the context explanation An offered in a vacuum. to make clear necessary made is which the statement was end, Detective statement. To that implications as as concerning Brown’s conduct well Young’s testimony during might March 1988 transaction his statements admitted. properly be probative
The value is Brown’s statement evidence with business, not he conducted his generally about how one-page A record drugs the fact that he sold on 7. to the March 7th showing guilty plea conviction offered, following Detective objection, sale was over Young’s the sale and Brown’s admission. testimony about “other unnecessary crimes” record of conviction sale, of the second of Brown’s admission Therefore, it have been admit- sale. should not ted. *8 admitting next whether the one-
We must address sale guilty plea record of Brown’s to the 7th page The jury might beyond was harmless a reasonable doubt. the to draw an inference that have misused conviction it was credible because Young’s testimony Detective more by plea conviction. guilty was corroborated plea—and Further, guilty Brown’s the sheet which revealed had judge showed that the ordered thus his conviction—also to undergo subjected and to be weekly urinalyses Brown to information, This which history” investigation. a “drug conviction, have indicated the may jury the beyond went the judge’s belief a that Brown was habitual user. conviction, The the of prejudicial therefore, effect of record outweighed probative value, its and its admission was not harmless a beyond reasons, reasonable doubt. For these must conviction be reversed. 4-263(b)(2) Scope
II. of Md.Rule petition certiorari, second issue raised which we erroneously hold was decided by Court of Specials Appeals, is whether the State compelled, response pretrial request, to disclose the admis sion Young that Brown made to Detective that “I just don’t deal with anybody new.” The resolution of this issue us further requires scope define the of discovery mandat 4-263(b)(2), ed by Maryland Rule which provides: “(b) Upon Request.—Upon Disclosure of request the de- fendant, the State’s Attorney shall:
[*] [*] [*] [*] He [*] 2) Statements all statements of Defendant.—As made to a by agent the defendant that the State trial, intends to at a hearing use or furnish to the defen- dant, (A) but not file so unless court orders: copy statement, each written (B) or recorded the substance of each oral reports all each copy oral statement.” 4-263
Present Rule was derived from former Md.Rule adopted significant without change language the required that addresses disclosure of a defendant’s statements. This Court has not had previously occasion to challenge 4-263(b)(2), address a discovery under but those interpreting eases language 741(b)(2) same former controlling. are
Although language 4-263(b)(2) the literal refers to “all statements agent made the defendant to a State hearing trial,” State intends to use at a we ex- have plained that scope required disclosure is defined the underlying policies of the Rule. In defining those *9 disclose, this Court must which State “statements” (b) read cannot be subsection explained most recently subsec- with isolation, read in conjunction should be but State, 303 Md. 650, 655, 496 A.2d (a). Bailey v. tion 4-263(a) pertinent (1985). Maryland provides Rule part: as shall be inspection in circuit court
“Discovery follows: the necessi- Request.—Without
(a) Disclosure Without to the shall furnish Attorney request, of a the State’s ty defendant:
[******] (A)
regarding:
or information
(2) Any relevant material
seizures,
taps or eaves-
wire
specific searches
by
made
(B)
acquisition of statements
dropping,
intends
use
that the State
agent
defendant to State
trial,
(C)
identification
at a hearing
pretrial
added.)
(Emphasis
for the State.”
defendant
witness
judicial interpreta
both
through
has indicated
This Court
scope
that the
rulemaking power
its
tion and
constitutional
(b)(2) is
4-263(a)(2)(B)and
under Rule
of the “statements”
Further,
consistently inter
the Court has
to be parallel.
in accordance with
scope
the “statements”
preted
rule.
of the disclosure
underlying policies
cert.
(1984),
State, 300 Md.
719, 481
White
(1985),
1062, 105 S.Ct.
denied, 470 U.S.
In Court, through its rulemaking power, incor- porated the interpretation of (a)(2) subsection as set forth in by White adding language “made to a agent State the State intends use at a hearing or trial” in order to provide for the consistency of treatment of subsections (a)(2) (b)(2). and 12:21 Maryland 2017-18, Register (October 10, 1985); 13:9 Maryland Register 25, 1012 (April 1986). Thus, the language of both subsections makes clear that Rule 4-263 was not intended to authorize wide-open discovery all of a defendant’s statements. It does not authorize of admissions discovery or confessions made to one who is Rather, not a State agent. it provides for the discovery of statements which might possibly have been obtained. unlawfully State, v.
In
Jennings
303 Md.
(1985),2
“The
ofa
b,
production required
the automatic
§
§
dealing
circumstances
or information
‘material
by a
from the accused
obtained
statement was
which a
under
running of the time
triggered
agent’
defendant was
which the
Md.R. 736 b within
former
suppress.”
file a motion to
Thus,
Jennings
Court in
76-77,
at 297.
492 A.2d
Id.
contemplated
“statements”
scope
indicated that
*11
If the State was
parallel.
to be
two subsections
by the
informa-
material or
the “relevant
to disclose
compelled
not
under
of”
statement
the
acquisition
the
regarding
tion
...
required,
the State be
(a)(2)(b), neither would
subsection
of the
to
the “substance”
disclose
request,
defendant’s
upon
(b)(2).
under subsection
of the
background
to the
In
we looked both
Jennings,
Procedure
Federal Rule
Criminal
Rules and to
Maryland
that
then reasoned
16(a)(1)(A)3
guidance.
We
“[u]nder
Jennings’
FED.R.CRIM.P.
current
tracking
a state rule
not be
would
undercover
conversation with
officer]
[the
because their
this would be
At a minimum
discoverable.
and because
electronically recorded
was not
conversation
known to
time
not at
the
undercover officer]
[the
85,
The Court Jennings expressly, and implicitly by citing the federal corollary, emphasized that the underlying pur- pose (a)(2) of disclosure (b)(2) under subsections is to force the defendant to file a to suppress prior motion trial. See also Bailey, 496 A.2d at where the Court noted “that there is an interrelationship between a and b of rule the automatic §§ disclosure a is required by designed force the accused § to file any suppress motions to in advance of trial on the Admissions, merits.” statements, or confessions that might have been obtained unlawfully subject pretrial are to a suppress motion to 4-252(a)(4). under Md.Rule Under Rule allegation admission, 4-252 an statement, that an or confes- sion was obtained unlawfully must be raised pretrial motion it is In waived. limiting by rule required State disclosure statements made to State agents, and in excluding decision statements made agents to State during the crime, has, commission this Court as have courts, it federal made clear oral statements which *12 must be disclosed under 4-263 are those statements which might possibly have unlawfully suppres- been obtained and sible under 4-252. during Statements made the commission crime, agent, albeit to a State could possibly not have been unlawfully obtained and under need not Jennings be under disclosed 4-263. The statement made in the instant analogous case is to the in In statements Jennings. both cases the were statements made during drug deals to persons who were not known to State agents be and who trying were not to any elicit admissions or confessions. not slightest There is the suggestion before this Court Young’s that Officer drug involvement in the second trans- action for purpose was of inducing or deliberately Rather, eliciting Brown’s statement. Brown voluntarily involving inter- no under circumstances the statement made could Brown, therefore, did not and coercion. rogation or in violation acquired that his statement was not contend find rights. We can Fourth, Fifth, Amendment his Sixth a statement compel produce reason to the State no officer a an made to undercover voluntarily for the crime it after transaction because occurred merely Brown’s Consequently, charged. which the defendant was under statements, like are not discoverable Jennings’, required to (b)(2). The State was 4-263(a)(2)(B) and Rule nor the Brown’s admission substance of disclose neither the therefore, no dis- acquisition; circumstances behind its for sanction could be occurred which a covery violation imposed. disclosure under on required
As a final word err on the side Rule, note that the State should this we reasonably case exists disclosure where there any obtained. unlawfully the statement was possibility is if the statement This word of caution issued because court with may, the trial provided, discoverable and wasn’t discretion, discovery a sanction viola impose its (i) the trial 4-263(i). judge under authorizes tion Subsection discovery violating party permit to order the “to disclosed, previously testimony not strike matters relates, grant a reasonable which the undisclosed matter continuance, prohibit introducing from evidence party mistrial, disclosed, or enter other grant any matter Thus, the order under the circumstances.” appropriate failing possible repercussions consider the State should that the defendant had reasonable disclose argue suppression to a grounds subject pretrial motion. Sentencing Admissibility
III. Evidence is trial final argument passing hearsay based on court erred sentence *13 case remanded this reliability. of dubious Because we have trial, error any possible need not review for a new we note, sentencing. however, We do that should Brown be subject to resentencing, any hearsay evidence admitted by the sentencing court must meet requirements of Mary- Code, land 298(d) (1987 Art. RepLVol., 1991 Cum. § Supp.):
“(d) Use hearsay evidence.—Notwithstanding any pro- vision of law to the contrary, any hearing relating to bail or sentencing arising out of any violation or alleged violation of any provision of this subheading, hearsay evidence shall be if admissible relevant to the issue and if the underlying circumstances upon which it is based and the reliability the source is information added.) demonstrated.” (Emphasis Accordingly, we must remand this case for a new trial. At the new trial, the State should be allowed to prove Brown’s admission and the circumstances surrounding the admission not but the record of conviction of the subse- quent distribution charge.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY TO A CONDUCT NEW TRIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.
ELDRIDGE, Judge, concurring and dissenting: I concur in grant both the of a new trial and in the first paragraph Part III of the majority’s opinion, relating to admissibility hearsay evidence at sentencing. I do agree, however, remainder of the majority’s opinion or portion with that of the judgment directing that trial new be conducted in accordance with the majority’s opinion.
97 I. of reversal Appeals’ of Special The for the Court basis that the holding court’s conviction was the the defendant’s 4-263(b)(2) failing Rule Maryland had State violated Detective made to the disclose defendant’s in the petition State’s presented The Young. question first follows: of was as for a writ certiorari concluding err in Did “1. the Court the to dis- requires discovery rule Maryland’s that the close, statements made request, upon defense the officer police undercover defendant to an is crime, crime where evidence commission of a defendant’s as ‘other crimes’ evidence offered trial?” II opinion. this in Part of its
The with issue majority deals in opinion forth in my dissenting set For reasons 72, 86-88, A.2d v. 302-303 Jennings (1985), disagree majority’s opinion I with Part II of the Furthermore, agreed even if I had case. from the Jennings, I would dissent holding Court’s holding in this case. expansion of the Jennings majority’s Special out for the Court of Judge Bishop pointed As (Brown State, Md.App. 523, 532, 584 below Appeals (1991)), made Jennings statements “[rnjoreover, ... concerned] on during the commission crime agents to State crimes. trial, during subsequent and not statements made limited “The case sub not fall within the judice does Md.Rule Jennings exclusion plain reading ... [ ]. of ‘all 4-263(b)(2) the disclosure statements’ requires Jennings ... excluded agents. made to State ... drug sale, any illegal verbal ‘obvious’ statements Jennings In effect a transaction. ... necessary acts negotiations purchase the statements were Further, formed the excluded verbal acts illegal drugs. To standing the defendant was trial. crime for which opportunity have the the accused will ensure prepare defense free from unfair we surprise, will strictly construe limitation Md.Rule 4- every upon 263(b)(2). Only those that pertain directly statements verbal acts effect necessary commission of the crime for which the defendant is are accused excluded 4-263(b)(2). from Appellant’s Md.Rule an statement was extraneous remark made at the conclusion of a sale of cocaine conducted almost three weeks the alleged after *15 transaction which the defendant was on trial. It was 4-263(b)(2), under discoverable Md.Rule and should have produced been in to the response request.” defendant’s
II. While the Court of ruled that the dis- covery violation was the “dispositive appeal,” inter- mediate court “for the the appellate direction of court on responded]” retrial ... to the defendant’s contention that 7,1988, the concerning drug evidence the March transaction was inadmissible “other crimes” The majority evidence. disagrees Special suggestion the Court of Appeals’ inadmissible, that all of this evidence is the majority feels “compelled appellate correct intermediate court’s instructions.” 87-88. Maj. at
The asserts that Brown’s statement majority during the 1988, 7, transaction “was it admissible because had case, special relevance to a contested issue in this was not character, simply prove introduced criminal and had probative substantially force that its outweighed potential for unfair at 86-87. In prejudice.” Maj. my view Special concluding that Appeals justified evidence of the March 7th transaction inadmissi- rule generally ble under the which excludes evidence of other crimes misconduct. acknowledged by majority opinion,
As this Court in State, Harris v. (1991), 597 A.2d 956 re- other generally affirmed that crimes “is evidence admis- i,e. 1) relevance, sible has special ... [unless]
99
case
contested issue
is
some
substantially relevant
character,
2)
criminal
simply
prove
is not
offered
its
outweighs
poten-
substantially
value that
probative
has
supra,
Harris v.
prejudice____”
tial for unfair
Moreover,
we
Md. at
597 A.2d
961.
“conclude[d]
approach
the ‘exclusionary’
that continued adherence to
[to
494-495,
324 Md. at
appropriate,”
is
other crimes evidence]
so-
we stated in Harris
Finally,
at 959.
“[t]he
as
exclusionary
helpful
are
exceptions
called
rule]
[to
often
areas where evidence has most
classifications
those
other bad
though
even
it discloses
been found admissible
497-498,
...,”
In somewhat that the evidence concern- with the Court 7, 1988, the the incident does fall within ing operandi modus identity exception subset 87). at Yet is (maj. explanation rule no offered other crimes except of this special to demonstrate the relevance evidence ongoing of how he conducted his explanation that "Brown’s of how he conducted the same probative business was charged.” earlier the sale here business 2V2 weeks 88). reasoning seems to be of the (Maj. part This operandi exception modus or underlying identity v. See State of other crimes. precluding rule Faulkner, 896, 630, 638-640, 552 A.2d 899-901 (1989). Furthermore, “special asserted only relevance” trial, Special in the by Appeals, the State at Court, was that the evidence fell within the identity exception. Faulkner, State v.
This Court in
supra,
Md. at 637-
640, 552
899-900,
A.2d at
discussed in detail the identity
exception to the rule excluding other crimes evidence. The
Court set forth ten subsets of the exception, one of which
was “that a peculiar
operandi
modus
used by the defen-
dant on another occasion was used
by
perpetrator of the
crime on
638,
trial.”
The majority’s rationale suggesting the admissibility this other crimes evidence is unclear. If the is majority saying that the modus operandi or identity exception to the rule precluding other crimes evidence can be demon strated ways, several such as by the evidence of the common pattern offered in Faulkner, State v. supra, a description of how the defendant usually conducts busi ness similar to case, that offered in this I would not disagree But, in principle.1 if the majority actually agrees 1. I note that the evidence requirements offered here falls short of the operandi. opinion modus The Faulkner requirements set forth the operandi for the identity modus subset exception as follows (314 638, quoting Md. at McKnight A.2d at 280 Md 604, 613, (1977), McCormick, quoting . 375 A.2d C. Evidence (2d 1972): § at 479 ed. "In order to operandi, establish modus the other crimes must be ' nearly "so identical in method as to earmark them as the handi- *17 accused____ work of the The device [used commit the crime] be must so unusual signature.””’ and distinctive as to be like a Faulkner, In the defendant had committed three armed robberies of stores,
Safeway mask, Friday nights, using all on gloves a distinctive time, bag jumping time, each on the check-out stand each demanding large denomination bills. The facts of the instant case. does this evidence the Court of exception, I cannot operandi modus fall within If the special relevance. this has comprehend how it inconsist- internally is opinion literally, is taken majority’s involving cases prior our as as inconsistent with ent well exceptions to and the crimes evidence precluding rule other Faulkner, v. supra; State rule. See Harris v. State, supra, v. Ross 896; Md. 552 A.2d supra, 664, 350 A.2d 680. reasons, affirm simply I would For foregoing Special Appeals. Court judgment A.2d 933 Jay S. ROSS M. Inas ROSS. Term, 31, Sept. 1992. No. Appeals Maryland. 19, 1992.
June testimony and the defendant’s involving of one other transaction new, anybody be can distin- deal with that he does not statement concerning statement case guished The mere from Faulkner. not sufficient to show modus does business is the defendant how Despite meaning of Faulkner. operandi within the 7, 1988, does about how the defendant Young Detective on Young business, with Detective fact dealt face face the defendant he negate about how day. his admission His actions seem on that usually his business. conducts