Defendant appeals from his conviction on a charge of robbery. The appeal is predicated on two alleged errors in the admission of evidence: (1) The admission of a statement madе to a treating doctor, and (2) the admission of testimony of a crime committed in Canada. We affirm.
In view of the issues raised, a detailed discussion of the evidence of defendant’s guilt is unnecessary. The robbery occurred at approximately 11:15 a.m. The victim, Wally Smith, who had been hit on the head with a gun, was bleeding profusely from three separate cuts. An ambulance was called and the victim taken to the hospital. There he told Doctor J. E. Mabie that “he had been struck by a gun by two men.” Doctor Mabie was permitted to testify to this conversation over defendant’s objection.
Police officers from Ontario, Canadа, were permitted to testify that defendant and a companion were apprehended by Ontario police 10 days after the robbery in Lincoln, after a chase following a bank robbery. Two guns and a diаmond ring, taken in the Lincoln robbery, were recovered from them. One of the guns was found in defendant’s pocket. The diamond ring was found in a car registered in defendant’s name, together with a ticket showing the purchase of gas in Lincoln the day before the robbery herein.
The victim, Wally Smith, died of heart trouble before the trial. He was taken to the hospital as soon as an ambulance arrived. The statement complained of was made when the doctor asked him what had happened. The State argues the statement, while hearsay, comes well within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule as herеtofore enunciated by this court.
It is often difficult to determine whether or not state
*99
ments are to be regarded as res gestae. The rule followed in this state is set out in Reizenstein v. State (1958),
“In Hamilton v. Huebner,
“The evidence in this case brings the statements of the deceased clearly within the rule as delineated by these decisions. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat herein the evidence which makes this clear.”
There can be little question the victim, who had bled profusely, was still in somе state of shock when he arrived at the hospital. The statement, which was made within 35 minutes of the burglary, related to the condition causing the shock. Under the circumstances the statement bore the stamp оf reliability. It was not a statement the victim would be apt to falsify but was a more or less spontaneous utterance. As we said in State v. Juarez (1971),
“A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition is generally admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, whether it be treated as part of the res gestae or as a spontaneous declaration or excited utterance.” In Juarez the statements were made by the victim within 1% to 2 hours after the assault.
As we said in Juarez,
supra:
“Determination of admissibility generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, VI Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.), § 1757, p. 166; Roberts v. United States,
In the recent case of State v. Brown (December 1972),
Here, the statement was made while the exciting influence of the shock still held sway. It was made in rеsponse to the treating doctor’s inquiry as to what *101 had happened. It was a spontaneous response as to the cause of the injury. Under the circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in pеrmitting its admission.
Defendant’s second assignment of error concerns the testimony of some Canadian officers about a pursuit and gunfight after a bank robbery. This occurred 10 days after the Lincoln robbery. The driver of thаt getaway car was identified as the defendant. Donald Cotham, who confessed to the Lincoln robbery, was also present in the car. The officers testified that after apprehending the two men they recovered two pistols, one of which the defendant had fired, and that the serial numbers matched those of the guns stolen from Wally Smith. Another Canadian officer testified that after the two men had been apрrehended he found a bag of coins, a jeweler’s evaluation slip describing a gold ring valued at $1,000, a diamond ring, and another square stone ring in the defendant’s car. These were items that had been taken in the robbery of Wally’s gunshop.
As a general rule, evidence of other crimes than that with which the accused is charged is not admissible in a criminal prosecution. State v. Hoffmeyer (1972),
This situation is- analogous to Peery v. State (1958),
In State v. Riley (1967),
In State v. Sharp (1969),
In United States v. Cochran, No. 72-1322, the Eighth Circuit Court of Apрeals, in an opinion filed March 9, 1972, said: “Well established rules have developed concerning the admission of evidence of other criminal conduct. Although this evidence is generally inadmissible since it suggests that the defendant has a propensity to commit crime, the trial court can in its discretion admit relevant evidence of other criminal acts and reversal is only commanded when ‘it is clear that the questioned evidence has no bearing upon any of the issues involved.’ ”
In State v. Meadows (1972),
The evidence of the Canadian officers was clearly relevant. Proof of the Canadian crime was purely incidental to the proof of possession and the use of the fruits of the Lincoln robbery. Even if the trial judge could have limited some of the testimony of the Canadian officers, his failure to do so, at most, would be harmless error. Defendant took the stand to testify in his own defense, and on cross-examination testified that he had been convicted of probably 10 or 15 felonies. The jury was properly cautioned that this evidence could only be considered on credibility and not as establishing the truth or falsity of the charges against the defendant.
We find no prejudicial error. The judgment herein is affirmed.
Affirmed.