State v. BroussardState v. Broussard
The defendant, Gregory Garrett Broussard, was charged by bill of information with three counts of distribution of cocaine; a violation of
FACTS
In the months of August and September, 1987, Terry Langley, a narcotics officer with the Iberia Parish Sheriff’s Office, was participating in an undercover narcotics operation in New Iberia. A cоnfidential police informant advised Officer Langley that a certain McKinley Polk was selling cocaine. The informant introduced Officer Langley to Polk. When the subject of narcotics arose in a conversation, Polk advised Langley that an acquaintance possessed some cocaine which he would sell.
On August 25, 1987, Polk directed Langley to a house occupied by the defendant, Gregory Garrett Broussard. Polk, accompanied by Langley, knocked at the rear door of the residence and asked the defendant to sell one-half gram of cocaine. When the defendant asked Langley to identify himself Langley introduced himself as “Zeno”. The defendant entered his house and returned with a package which was handed to Polk who, in turn handed it to Langley. Langley then handed $65.00, the agreed to price, to Polk who paid the defendant. After the defendant admonished Polk for bringing strangers to his house, he shut the door. On two later occasions, Langley accompanied Polk to the defendant’s residence and purchased cocaine from the defendant. On these occasions, the defendant handed the package containing cocaine directly to Langley and accepted money from Langley.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
The defendant contends that his conviction should be reversed since one of the jurors was funсtionally illiterate and therefore not qualified to serve under La.C.Cr.P. art. 401.
Prior to voir dire, the Trial Judge addressed the jury pool and questioned the potential jurors, en masse, concerning the general qualifications set forth in La.C. Cr.P. art. 401 and specifically asked whether each juror could read, write and speak the English language. An individual who was eventually selected to serve on the jury did not respond that he was, in fact, illiterate. Apparеntly some time after the trial, the defense counsel learned of this juror’s illiteracy and moved for a new trial pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 851(4). The
On motion of the defendant, a new trial shall be granted whenever the defendant has discovered, since the verdict or judgment of guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in the proceedings that, notwithstanding the exercise of a reasonable diligеnce, was not discovered prior to the verdict or judgment. La.C.Cr.P. art. 851(4). An accused must have been prejudiced by a juror’s inability to read or write the English language before he will be granted a mistrial. State v. Nicholas,
In Nicholas, supra, and Murphy, supra, the defendants motioned for a new trial after it was learned that various jurors were illiterate. The motions were denied because the defendants had not bеen prejudiced by the jurors’ illiteracy since the written exhibits had been read to the jury and no written exhibits had been taken into the jury deliberation room. In this case, there were no written exhibits other than three “Request for Scientific Analysis” sheets required by the Acadiana Criminalis-tics Laboratory that was filled out by Terry Langley, the undercover officer who bought the cocaine. A small plastic packet containing cocaine was attached to each sheet. At the trial, Officer Langley identified his handwriting and testified as to what was written on the page. As in Nicholas, the illiterate juror heard this evidence when it was read at the trial. The defendant suffered no prejudice by this juror’s illiteracy. Hence, the Trial Judge committed no error in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
The defendant next contends that the State failed to prove each essential element of the crime beyond a reаsonable doubt, in conflict with Jackson v. Virginia,
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favоrable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant to have committed the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; State v. Edwards,
Evidence of the transfer of cocaine consisted of the testimony of the undercover agent, Terry Langley, who, on three occasions obtained the substance from the defendant. The State also presented evidence of the packages’ chain of custody and the scientific analysis which determined that the substances were cocaine.
The assessment of what weight to be given to conflicting evidence is the determination which rests on the sound discretion of the trier of fact, which in this case, was the jury. State v. Klar,
The defendant also argues that the evidence failed to establish that the cocaine had not been tampered with by Polk. This argument has no merit. Officer Langley testified that he kept the purchased items on his person until aftеr he had driven Polk home. When he was alone, Officer Langley locked the purchased items in his briefcase and, on the following day, turned them over to the crime lab. There is nothing in the record which supports or even suggests the defendant’s contention that Polk may have tampered with the cocaine in the brief period prior to his handing the item over to the undercover officer.
After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the рrosecution, there was more than sufficient evidence to indicate that the defendant sold cocaine to Officer Langley. The State has satisfied the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, supra.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
The defendant contends that the Trial Court failеd to comply with the sentencing guidelines of La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and that his sentence is excessive, in violation of
La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 lists guidelines that the Trial Court shall use in sentencing a convicted defendant with imprisonment, probation or suspension of sentence. Paragraph (C) requires the Trial Court to state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing a sentence. The sentencing Judge need not articulate every mitigating and aggravating circumstance; however, the record should reflect that the sentencing Judge considered the guidelines in particularizing the sentence. State v. Aucoin,
In his reasons for sentence, the Trial Judge found thаt the three factors of Article 894.1(A) necessitated the defendant’s incarceration; namely, that if placed on probation or given a suspended sentence the defendant was likely to commit another crimе, the defendant was in need of correctional treatment that could be best provided by an institution, and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the crime. The Court also concluded thаt the defendant’s prior history of arrest and convictions and his character and attitude did not indicate that he would respond well to probationary treatment. We find that the Trial Judge’s reasons for sentencing adequatеly complied with Article 894.1.
The defendant also argues that his sentence is excessive. A sentence imposed by the Trial Court which falls within the statutory limitations may still be unconstitutionally excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367
The defendant was sentenced to serve six and one-half years at hard labor on each count, to run concurrently. The range of the sentence to which the defendant could have been sentenced wаs not less than five years nor more than thirty years. The defendant’s sentence is at the lower end of this range and is supported by the record. It is not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the defendant’s actions. We dо not find this sentence to be an abuse of the Trial Court’s wide discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Although reviewing courts are obligated to follow the Jackson standard as mandated by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the author of this opinion has expressed opposition to this standard because it relegates the reviewing power of the appellate courts to nothing more than "second guessing" the triers of fact. See my conсurring and dissenting opinions in State v. Gatson,
. The author of this opinion is compelled to again state his position as to appellate review of sentences for excessiveness. Our state constitution does not provide for nor does it mandate judicial review of sentences which fall within the limits set by the respective criminal statutes. See, State v. Goodman,