State v. BroussardState v. Broussard
Jerry Paul Broussard was chаrged by bill of information with simple burglary in violation of
Thirteen months later, on February 20, 1981, pursuant to
On July 22, 1981, a hearing was held on the motion to quash at the beginning of the resumed habitual offender hearing. It was stipulated by the parties that all prior felony convictions were in Acadia Parish (same parish as the present proceeding) and that the current district attorney for Acadia Parish is the same district attorney who was in office at the time of defendant‘s prior fеlony convictions. After argument, the matter was taken under advisement. On October 15, 1981, the trial judge denied the motion to quash. On defendant‘s application, we granted a writ under our supervisory jurisdiction to review the correctness of that ruling.2
If, at any time, either after conviсtion or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted оf a felony under the laws of this state, or has been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States; or any forеign government or country of a crime, which, if committed in this state would be a felony, the district attorney of the parish in which subsequent conviction was had may file an information accusing the person of a previous conviction....
Although the above statute does not imрose a specific prescriptive period in which the district attorney must file an habitual offender information, we have held thаt it does not allow an indefinite time for filing the information once the necessary information is available. State v. Wilson, 360 So.2d 166 (La.1978); State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d 752 (La.1975). Rather, the district attornеy must file an habitual offender bill within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a defendant has a prior felony reсord. State v. Wilson, supra; State v. Bell, 324 So.2d 451 (La.1975). The same considerations which underlie the constitutional right to a speedy trial compel a conclusion that upon сonviction a defendant is entitled to know the full consequences of
In the instant case, the district attorney filed the habitual offender information thirteen months after sentence and about three months prior to the date defendant was eligible for parole. The necessary information with regard to the prior fеlony convictions was available to the district attorney at the time of the original sentencing on January 29, 1980, in that the convictions were obtained in the same parish during his tenure in office. Nonetheless, the district attorney delayed filing the information not only until after defendant had pled guilty to the offense charged as a result of a plea bargain and had been sentenced in conformity therewith but also after defendant had served thirteen months of his original sentence and was anticipating release on parole within a fеw months. The state offers no justification for its delay in instituting the habitual offender proceedings and we can conceive of none. Once having filed the information, the state apparently attempted to complete the enhancement procеedings by May 27, 1981, two days before the date that defendant was eligible for parole; however, a recess was granted prior to completion of the hearing based on defendant‘s contention that the lack of notice of the hearing had prevented him frоm retaining counsel who could prepare his defense. As a result thereof, the proceedings were not completed before defendant had been released on parole. Under these circumstances, we do not consider that the district attоrney acted reasonably in delaying the institution of the habitual offender proceedings. Accordingly, we must reverse the ruling of the trial judgе denying the motion to quash.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the ruling of the trial judge denying defendant‘s motion to quash the habitual offender information is reversed and set aside. Defendant‘s motion to quash is granted. The case is remanded to the district court.