This is аn appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction for illegal possession of marihuana.
The defendant was a prisoner at Rocky Butte jail, working as a trusty in the Record Mаnagement Division of Multnomah County. On the afternoon of No *159 vember 9, 1967, the odor of burning marihuana was detеcted in the area where the! defendant had been working. When the Supervisor of the reсord division, Deputy Frank Clark, went to investigate, he found the defendant and said, “.Give me the stuff.” The defеndant denied knowledge of the whereabouts of any marihuana, and the inquiry was not pursued. As Deрuty. Clark began to walk, away, the defendant testified (on the motion to suppress) that he chаnged his mind and “decided to give it to him.” The substance given by him to the deputy was subsequently determined to bе marihuana. .
The defendant was placed in the custody of two sheriff’s deputies and removed to the Multnomah County Courthouse. He was there warned of his constitutional rights, as required' by
Miranda v.
Arizona,
Defendant’s first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in not suрpressing the marihuana which was obtained from the defendant without first warning him of his constitutional rights. He сontends that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was infringed because he was, in effect, compelled to testify against himself by surrendering the bag of marihuana. The Fifth Amendment privilege whiсh the defendant seeks to invoke does not prohibit
*160
all'forms of self-incrimination but rather, it protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, “* * * or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature,
*
* Schmerber v. California,
The defendant was incarcerated in Rocky Butte jail. It has long been the rule that “ [L] awful incarceration. brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the cоnsiderations underlying our penal system.”
Price v. Johnson,
Defendant’s second assignment of error is that thе illegality surrounding the seizure of the marihuana so influenced his subsequent oral and written statements as to render them involuntary and inadmissible. Our decision that the actions of the deputy were not improper obviates the need for a further discussion of this point. Defendant’s statements arе not inad
*161
missible on this ground. In addition, the failure of defense counsel to make an appropriate objection during the trial to the admission of the statements on the above grounds justifies a refusal to review it on appeal..
State v. Cameron,
Defendant’s final assignment of error is that his confession, made while in the custody of two deputy sheriffs at the Multnomah County Courthouse, was the involuntary product of a coercive atmosphere and should not have been admitted in evidence at his trial. The defendant was warned of his constitutional rights upon his arrival at the courthоuse. The adequacy of the warning is not disputed. He stated that he understood his rights and declined to answer any questions. At that point all questioning ceased. Approximately 15 or 20 minutes later, the defendant voluntarily confessed.
The defendant argues that this short stay in the office of his accusers was a subtle form of coercion which resulted in an involuntary confession. We do nоt agree. The statements were not the result of custodial interrogation. Thus they were not only voluntary but volunteered. There is no constitutional principle which renders such evidence inadmissible.
State v. Hill,
«* * * Volunteered statements not the result of any questioning or inducement аre admissible *162 even though the requirements of Miranda have not been fulfilled.”
There was complete absence of compulsion which would invalidate the reception of the statements .into evidence. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.