202 Mo. 106 | Mo. | 1907
On the 27th of September, 1905, the prosecuting attorney of Iron county filed an information, duly verified, charging the defendant John Brooks with murder in the first degree of John Clemonds, and in the same information charging Ameleck Brooks with being present, aiding, assisting and procuring John Brooks in commission of said murder. The defendants were duly arraigned and put upon their trial at the April term, 1906, of the Iron County Circuit Court, and were both convicted of murder in the first degree. In due time they filed their motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, which were overruled, and they apipeal to this court.
The evidence on behalf of the State tended to show that defendants were and are brothers, and, on the day of the homicide, resided in the town of Graniteville, in Iron county. A railroad runs east and west through the town of Graniteville, and the main street crosses this railroad track at right angles. On the south side of the railroad track and on the west side of this main street, was situated Ker win’s saloon on the date of the homicide herein described. This saloon was a few feet west of the street and about thirty feet south of the railroad track, and the building was about forty-five feet in length from east to west. Between this saloon and the railroad track was situated a rack for tying horses. The saloon had two windows opening to the north, a front door on the east, and a back door on the west end. On the east side of this main street and also south of the railroad track, was another saloon known as Steffen’s. On the 12th of August, 1905, between seven and eight o’clock in the evening, Ameleck Brooks was in Steffen’s saloon, and saw one Gus Mead sitting on the ground near the railroad track northwest of Ker
On the part of the defendants the testimony tended to prove that Ameleck Brooks felt indignant at something Gus Mead had said about him and concluded he would chastise him; accordingly, he began striking Mead and when Mead resisted, Ameleck called for his uncle and his brother to aid him; that John Brooks then took Mead’s gun from him and stood guard while Ameleck finished his fight with Mead. In the course of their engagement, Mead denied the statements attributed to him and said that the deceased had made said statements, whereupon Ameleck called1 to the deceased to come out and own up if he was the man, and say who did it. Defendant John Brqoks testified in his own behalf that about seven thirty o’clock on the evening of the homicide, he saw the deceased coming around the corner of Kerwin’s saloon with a revolver in his right hand. “When he came around he was pointing it directly at me and I told him to stop, and he kept on coming, and I told him to put the revolver up, and just then he raised the revolver on him and fired.” He was between fifteen and twenty feet of Ameleck when he fired, and then turned right around towards me with it; Ameleck holloed “Oh! brother, come here, I am killed.” “I had the shotgun that I took away from Gus Mead, and I seen he was going to kill me and I raised the gun and fired at him.” On cross-examination, the defendant, John Brooks, stated that Ameleck was standing near Gus Mead when Clemonds, the deceased, shot him. The fight between Mead and Ameleck had ended; that de
In rebuttal the State proved that prior to this trouble Ameleck Brooks had been convicted of manslaughter by the circuit court of Iron county and had served a term in the State penitentiary. Other facts necessary to the understanding of the opinion will be noted in the consideration of the propositions advanced by the defendants for the reversal of the cause.
' I. The first assignment of error is founded upon the alleged misconduct and disqualification of one of the jurors, Charles Lashley, and it is alleged in the motion for new trial that he had formed and expressed his opinion of the guilt of the defendants prior to
II. Among other instructions the.court gave the following:
“5. You are further instructed that the defendants, in law, are presumed to be innocent, and that it devolves upon the State to prove, by evidence, to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants committed the crime, as charged in the information, and explained in these instructions, and if, upon a view of the whole case, you have a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendants, or of that of either of them, you will give them, or either of them of whose guilt you have a reasonable doubt, the benefit of such reasonable doubt, and acquit them, or either of them, of whose guilt you have a reasonable doubt. But a reasonable doubt of the guilt of defendants, or either of them, to authorize an acquittal of them, or of either of them, on the ground of such reasonable doubt of guilt must be a substantial doubt of the guilt of the defendants, or of the defendant as to whose guilt you have such reasonable doubt, formed by you on a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances proven in the case, and not a mere possibility of the innocence of the defendants, or of that of either of them.”
Counsel for the defendants assail this instruction as unintelligible. We do not think that the instruction is obnoxious to this criticism. It gives the defendants and each of them the presumption of innocence, and requires the State to prove the guilt of defendants and each of them beyond a reasonable doubt, but advises the jurors in effect that they might convict one and acquit the other if they had a reasonable doubt as to one
III. The defendant Ameleck Brooks testified in his own behalf, and at the close of the evidence on behalf of the defendants, the State offered in evidence the record of the circuit court of Iron county, in the case of the State of Missouri v. Ameleck Brooks, whereby it appeared that on the 28th day of April, 1900, the said defendant had been sentenced to the penitentiary of this State for a term of three years for manslaughter in the fourth degree. To the admission of this record in evidence, the defendants at the time objected on the ground that it could not be introduced to affect the credibility of the witness. The prosecuting attorney at the time stated that he offered the record of conviction for the sole purpose of affecting the credibility of the defendant Ameleck Brooks. The court admitted the record and the defendants excepted to the ruling of the court. This action of the court is now assigned as reversible error. It should be remarked in this connection that in the eighth instruction the court advised the jury that they were to consider the record of conviction of Ameleck Brooks solely as affecting the credibility of said defendant. Section 4680', Revised Statutes 1899, provides: “Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense is, notwithstanding, a competent witness; but the conviction may be proved to affect his credibility, either by the record or by his own cross-examination, upon .which he must answer any
IY. It is next insisted that the remarks of counsel for the State, in his argument to the jury, were utterly unwarranted and should work a reversal of the judgment. As to this assignment it may be said that there was a sharp1 issue made as to whether the counsel made the remarks attributed to him. But, whatever the fact, it must b'e held that the propriety or impropriety of his remarks are not before us for review. It is clear that the bill of exceptions does not shpw that the remarks were made, and that the defendants objected to them at the time, and that their objections were overruled by the court, and that defendants saved their exceptions at the time. It has been so often ruled that matters of this kind cannot be shown by affidavits that it is unnecessary to cite authorities on that proposition. [State v. McCarver, 194 Mo. l. c. 740; State v. Meals, 184 Mo. l. c. 260.]
We have examined all the errors assigned by the defendants, and in our opinion they furnish no ground for reversal and we have been unable to discover any other substantial error in the record.
The case was one peculiarly for the determination of the jury. If the jury had believed the testimony on
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, and the sentence which the law pronounces is directed to be carried into execution.