State v. BrooksState v. Brooks
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Swanstrom
Effective July 1, 1984, the Idaho Legislature amended
On March 8,1984, William J. Brooks pled not guilty tо a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. On October 4 Brоoks filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a deprivation of his right to a speеdy trial. The motion was denied and Brooks pled guilty on condition that he bе allowed to withdraw his plea if a reviewing court later reversed thе decision on his motion.
The court, unless good cause to the cоntrary is shown, must order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases:
3. If a defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from the date that the defendant enters a plea of not guilty with the court.
The Legislature expressly provided that the new section 3 would take effect on July 1, 1984 and apply only to misdemeanor complaints filed after that date.
Clearly, Brooks is not aided by thе statute. Nevertheless, Brooks seeks the benefit of the statute by attempting to make it applicable to cases pending on its effective date. His legal strategy rests upon the equal protectiоn provisions contained in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. He asserts that the statutе creates two classes of misdemeanor defendants who receive different treatment; one charged before July 1, 1984, and one charged after July 1, 1984. Since the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right aрplicable to the states by incorporation to the fourteеnth amendment, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967), Brooks argues that the state bears the heavy burden of showing a compelling state interest to justify the classification between misdemeanor defendants. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983). He urges us to review
The district court found that the statute, and resultant classifiсation, were supported by compelling state interests and denied the motion to dismiss. We could affirm on that basis, but we do not believe that thе classification here triggers the strict scrutiny standard. Strict scrutiny is used where fundamental rights are affected.1 Lelie*728feld, supra. Prior to the 1984 statutory amendment, misdemeаnor defendants in Idaho were constitutionally guaranteed a speedy trial. State v. Conrad, 104 Idaho 799, 663 P.2d 1101 (1983) (Bistline, J., concurring); State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 655 P.2d 434 (1982). This protection has been enhanced, not diminished by
We believe, as did the courts below that
Notes
. See People v. Velasquez, 666 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1983) (statute must “infringe” upon fundamen*728tal right to trigger strict scrutiny); White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont.1983) (strict scrutiny test used whеre statute “affects” fundamental rights); Ritchie v. Board of Parole, 35 Or.App. 711, 583 P.2d 1 (1978) (strict scrutiny triggered where statute “impinges” upon a fundamental right), modified, 37 Or.App. 385, 587 P.2d 1036 (1978).
. Brooks has made no showing here that his сonstitutional right to a speedy trial has been infringed by the delay between the filing of the complaint and the scheduled trial date. State v. Conrad, supra; State v. Carter, supra. This means that even if we were to declare the amendment unconstitutional Brooks would be entitled to no relief.