*1 however, state law. Section does three
conflict with federal law. There are of Maine STATE ways may preempt which federal law state law: M. BROOKS. Steven law, First, enacting Con- federal gress may explicitly the extent to define Maine. Supreme Judicial Court preempt
which it intends to state law. 18, 1994. on Briefs Jan. Submitted Second, express the absence of April Decided preemptive language, Congress may indi- occupy field of cate an intent an entire
regulation, in which case the States must regulatory activity in that area to
leave all Finally, if Con- Federal Government. displaced regulation
gress has not state
entirely, preempt it nonetheless state law actual-
law to the extent the state
ly conflicts with federal law. a con- Such compliance
flict arises when with both impossible, and local law is or when
state
the state law stands as an obstacle
accomplishment of the full and execution objectives Congress.
purposes and
Rozanski,
(quoting Michigan
Canners & Freezers U.S. 2522). now, Congress
104 S.Ct. at Until has expressly impliedly preempted nor
neither by regulation of firearms states. In ad-
dition, regulation preemption of firearms expressed the state in section 2011 does Housing
not conflict with the Act to the
extent that the “state law stands as an obsta- accomplishment
cle to the and execution of objectives purposes
the full of Con-
gress.” unpersuaded that Id. We are Con-
gress preempt right to intended to the state’s
provide regulation for the of fire- uniform
arms. entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Su- judgment declaring
perior Court to enter a provision in lease ban- the Plaintiffs’
ning possession of firearms on the leased
premises is invalid. concurring.
All *2 the
operate[d] a motor vehicle while under intoxicating liquor drugs, of or or influence liquor drugs, in a combination of and viola- MRSA, 1312-B and of Title 29 tion Section test, to the refuse to submit a chemical did having previously been said defendant Title 29 MRSA convicted a violation of of § 1312-B. added.) (Emphasis had fact been Brooks previously of on December convicted OUI January inci- stemming from a dent.
Following the transfer of the case Court, Superior Brooks see M.R.Crim.P. plea guilty entered a on June Mills, Atty., Craig guilty plea, Tur- entering Janet T. Dist. E. Prior to the Brooks ner, Auburn, Atty., colloquy the with engaged Asst. Dist. State. a with the court and question it prosecutor on the of whether Sanders, Falls, for David M. Livermore previous date conviction or the was the defendant. previous had occur date of the offense that to offense for the within six recent C.J., ROBERTS, WATHEN, Before triggered. Brooks enhanced sentence to be GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS,* fully particulars of his aware of DANA, JJ. RUDMAN legal significance to the record and its prosecution.1 entering his subsequent After CLIFFORD, Justice. sentenced, being ar- plea Brooks but before subject gued he not should to appeals judg- a Steven M. Brooks from (Andros- punishment provision of enhanced Superior ment entered in the Court C.J.) previous 1312-B his had because Delahanty, County, following his coggin adequately alleged complaint. in the not been plea guilty operating a motor vehicle rejected im- The court his contention and (OUI), the influence 29 M.R.S.A. under posed mandatory pursu- a minimum sentence (Pamph.1994). Brooks contends 1312-B (2)(C) days in ant to section 1312-B of seven him that the court should not have sentenced $600, jail, one-year a fine of and a license punishment provi- to the enhanced appeal, filed suspension. Brooks this persons previous sion for with OUI convic- sentencing stayed execution of the sen- previous tion not because his conviction was pending appeal. outcome of the tence sufficiently pleaded in the Find- error, ing no affirm. we 1312-B(2)(C) 29 M.R.S.A. as follows: charged operating Brooks was under 21,1992, having of a one being person after In the case the influence on October C. previous operating conviction of under involved in an auto accident Livermore intoxicating liquor drugs, or influence of or Brooks refused to submit to test Falls. liquor drugs, or or with his alcohol level. The com- a combination determine blood level, having against blood-alcohol plaint him the District Court an excessive filed (Livermore Falls) previous suspension one for failure alleged he at least * 1312-B(2)(C) provision because participated initial of 29 M.R.S.A. Justice Collins in the confer- Justice, and, he on order of ence while was while under the influence the date Justice, to continue his was authorized previous Chief participation leading to his arrest OUI oc- capacity this case in his years prior more than six to the instant curred Active Retired Justice. case, notwithstanding the of the conviction. date appeal. pursued argument has not on Brooks argued Superior Court that 1. Brooks before subject to not be the enhanced should alleged in the comply duty with the to and must be to submit complete testing chemical to determine at trial. drug
level of blood-alcohol concentration 6-year period, under section 1312 1991).3 previous convic Failure $500, the fine than be less the court precludes from *3 period sentence must include a of incarcer- in sec mandatory minimum days ation of not less than the court 7 1312-B(2)(C). Id. suspend the or shall defendant’s license permit operate, a motor right operate however, in unpersuaded, that areWe right to a apply vehicle and for and obtain sentence of this Brooks’s circumstances period year, license for a which of one complaint vacated. Unlike the must be penalties may not suspended. affirmatively complaint case B(2)(B) contrast, By provides section previous is alleges It Brooks’s conviction. 1312— mandatory 48 penalties for of only prior that is the date of conviction jail, 90-day a license hours fine and a $300 not set out. suspension person for a who refuses a blood- 7(c) in- provides that “[t]he M.R.Crim.P. test, previous but who alcohol has no plain, a or the information shall be dictment within a six-year period. convictions Brooks of the concise and definite written statement conviction, not seek to does vacate his but constituting the offense essential facts contends that he not have been sen- should 7(c) purpose is to charged.” The of rule 1312-B(2)(C) pursuant tenced section be- “simplify pleading.” criminal M.R.Crim.P. complaint alleged only had cause that he 7(c) complex re- reporter’s notes. “‘The previous speci- a OUI conviction and failed to pleading of common quirements law criminal
fy
past
conviction
that the
was within the
six
7(c)
designed to
obsolete. Rule
is
are now
years.2
by eliminating unneces-
simplify indictments
Maine’s
confers on an
constitution
con-
sary phraseology
requiring
plain,
a
right “[t]o
accused the
demand the nature
cise,
essential
and definite statement of the
Const,
and cause of the accusation.” Me.
art.
”
constituting
charged.’
Id.
the offense
facts
757(1)
1, §
(Supp.1994)
6. 15 M.R.S.A.
Holtzoff,
&
Federal
(quoting 4 W. Barron A.
provides that when a
be en-
sentence will
(1951)).
Procedure
1913
Practice &
conviction,
prior
prior
on a
hanced based
specially “alleged
part
must be
as
conviction
plead-
the modern
of criminal
Under
rules
complaint,
of a count
information or
charging
inter-
ing, “a
instrument must be
ancillary charging
or
in-
indictment”
must
in a common-sense manner and
preted
“may
be filed
the court at
strument
overly
subjected
arbitrary
not be
prior to the imposition
time
of the sen-
applied
as
at com-
technical tests such were
Thus,
prior
tence.” Id.
conviction is an
958,
Snow,
961
State v.
464 A.2d
mon law.”
Landry
element of
essential
(Me.1983).
charging
suffi-
A
“
State,
315,
v.
575 A.2d
concise,
317
plain,
‘if it contains such
cient
facts con-
imposed pursuant
allegations
a sentence is
to a
of the essential
When
definite
adequately ap-
statutory provision
stituting
for an
the offense
shall
sentence,
of
and normal
prise
maximum
or that lim-
a defendant
reasonable
increased
enabling him
act
sentencing
intelligence
charged,
discretion of
its the
and,
upon
himself
conviction
requiring mandatory
minimum nonsus-
to defend
judgment
as the
acquittal, to make use
pendable sentence
a second or subse-
offense,
plea
jeopardy,
should
quent
prior
or offenses
former
offense
basis
in Keith
not vacated because
Brooks
his sentence was
3. The sentence
was
2. Because
contends that
apparent
imposed
face,
that it
it was not
illegal
that issue in
on its
can raise
mandatory
948,
minimum sentence
Chattley,
appeal.
v.
A.2d
direct
State
650
1312-B(2)(C).
In this
M.R.S.A.
out in 29
set
case, however,
Hudson,
(Me.1994) (citing
State v.
949
it is clear from the record
1984)).
(Me.
787
mandatory minimum
court was
sentence under
”
(quoting
complaint
v.
is to secure an enhanced mandato
the occasion arise’
State
Carter,
(Me.1982)).
sentence,
ry
A.2d
and such a
sentence
imposed only
if
can be
complaint alleges
that Brooks
six
of the new
occurred within
offense.
previously been convicted of OUI and
had
Warner,
See State
to section 1312-B of Title
which
refers
1967) (conviction upheld for reckless homi
Al
provision.
contains
enhancement
consisting
of motor
cide
reckless
rely
though a
document cannot
on a
causing
person
vehicle
death of another
statutory reference alone to establish the
year,
though
death resulted within one
offense,
offense or an element of the
did not
that death occurred
indictment
(Me.1984),
Huntley, 473 A.2d
its
year).
one
are convinced that a
We
body
in
complaint
citation in the
and normal intelli
defendant
reasonable
*4
determining
dictment is relevant in
whether
gence
if he were con
would understand that
intelli
defendant of reasonable and normal
alleged
the com
victed
offense as
gence
adequately
will be
informed of the act
Brooks,
subject
against
plaint
he would be
charged to enable him to defend himself.
mandatory sentencing pursuant
the enhanced
Coleman,
397, 399
See State v.
452 A.2d
to section
(Me.1982);
Martin,
State v.
387 A.2d
(Me.1978).
593
entry
The
is:
Coleman,
pointed
In
we
that a
out
statuto
Judgment affirmed.
ry
in the
aid the
reference
indictment could
defendant,
elimination,
by process
in de
WATHEN,
ROBERTS,
C.J.,
RUDMAN
burglary
which
termining with
class of
DANA, JJ.,
COLLINS, A.R.J.,
Martin,
charged.
was
Brooks could refer prosecution any crime alleged” in a complaint, in the determine tioned based on relationship of his sentence must be enhanced that temporal the date between 757(1) provides prior new conviction. prior of his Section OUI conviction and the date “alleged prior en- conviction must be that his sentence had to be that offense and complaint, information only logical part reason of a count hanced. In this ancillary eharg- ... in the in an alleging prior [or] or indictment circumstances, charge Martin that filed with the those ing instrument be [that] necessarily im- influence imposition of under the prior operated at time was Thus, vehicle he prior conviction is his motor plied sentence.” it was Landry here. the case essential element of is not operating. Such State, improp- 575 A.2d enhanced sentence Because the sen- erly imposed as a imposed pursuant to a When a sentence is 1312-B(2)(C), I for an to section statutory provision tence sentence, remand for lim- sentence and maximum or that vacate the increased would sentencing court resentencing. its the discretion of a requiring mandatory minimum nonsus-
pendable a second or subse- sentence for offense,
quent offense or offenses alleged in the
must at trial.
1991).1 previous convic Failure to precludes the court from mandatory minimum sec Donna BURBANK *5 1312-B(2)(C). Keith, attempt distinguish where H.D. HOSPITAL GOODALL complaint did not convic- tion, Travelers Insurance Co. complaint in ground on the “interpreted in a common- case should of Maine. Supreme Judicial Court subjected ... not ... sense manner and arbitrary overly technical tests such as on Briefs March 1995. Submitted law,” applied were at common Car- April Decided ter, (Me.1982), does not satis- only fy statutory mandate. It is pleaded and six is subjected that a defendant provided in
mandatory minimum sentence 1312-B(2)(C). require that To alleged specifi-
basis for the enhancement be complaint
cally subjecting the is not
arbitrary overly technical test. specific requirements of 1312-
Nor can the
B(2)(C) complaint into neces- be read
sary implication. See State v. intendment or
Martin, In
Martin, addressing not an enhance- we were The uniform traffic
ment of a sentence. complaint Martin as the
ticket and identified vehicle, forth motor set
owner of a certain of the offense
the date and location operating him the offense of
charged intoxicating liquor. the influence of
under complaint also referred
The traffic ticket and gov- then the section
to 29 M.R.S.A. that, in held
erning criminal OUI. Id. We Keith, in 29 M.R.S.A. present sentence it was unlike the 1. In A.2d at 1021. apparent that the sentence from the record imposed