150 Minn. 431 | Minn. | 1921
Defendant was convicted of the crime of buying and receiving stolen property, and appealed from an order denying a new trial. R. does-not question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury.
“Bring all the tires you can. Will take them. I am working on the merchandise and will let you know later about that, but I want the other stuff right away. Wire me if you will come so I won’t be off hunting.”
Mullaney was not a dealer in tires. His last occupation, so far as the record shows, was working in a pool-room. R. lived at Hastings and defendant at South St. Paul. Defendant knew him. His request for more tires was competent evidence, for it tended to show defendant’s guilty knowledge in connection with the purchase from Wasser and Mullaney of the tires they had stolen.
In this letter Wasser wrote that he had bought a tire from defendant; that when he bought it defendant told him it was one of the tires he and Mullaney had sold him; that defendant had the serial number on the tire destroyed and the word “second” burned over it so as to protect himself if Engel should see the tire on the Wasser car; that he wished he had never seen defendant, for, if he had not, he would not .be in trouble. The letter ended with a request that the tire be taken off the car as defendant would remember it as it would be good evidence against the writer. Engel, referred to in the letter, was proprietor of a garage at Hastings and the tires had been stolen from him. The tire referred to in the letter was brought into court and received in evidence. It appeared that the word “second” had been burned in on the side. Wasser testified that this was done in South St. Paul at defendant’s direction when he bought the tire from him.
The admission of the letter presents the only doubtful question in the case. Defendant’s counsel sought to bring out by cross-examination of Wasser that he was filled with hatred of defendant and was anxious to “get” him or have him convicted. The cross-examination would naturally lead the jury to infer that there were expressions in the letter indicating such a desire. Such was not the fact. Of course the letter was not admissible as independent evidence of defendant’s guilt, but, under the circumstances, we think it was admissible to clear up the jury’s possible misapprehension of the facts. When the significance of a former statement of a witness has been distorted by a fragmentary or inaccurate repetition of it, the entire conversation or writing may be
We are satisfied that defendant had a fair trial and that his conviction should be sustained. The order denying a new trial is, therefore, affirmed.