State v. BrittonState v. Britton
HANDWORK, J.,
{¶ 1} Appellants, David A. Britton and Mark Lоeser, appeal from a judgment of the Maumee Municipal Court. The stipulated facts of this case are as follows.
{¶ 2} On September 4, 2005, appellants were passengers in a motor vehicle operated by a female friend when Sergeant Sanchez of the Ohio State Highway Patrol stoрped the friend‘s vehicle for an alleged traffic violation. It is undisputed that both
{¶ 3} Appellants filed a motion to dismiss the charges against them, arguing that as passengers in a privately ownеd motor vehicle being operated on a public highway, they were not in a “public place” for the purposes of
{¶ 4} The trial court disagreed. Ostensibly applying the common sense meaning of a “public place,” the lower court held:
{¶ 5} “What constitutes a public place can be defined differently depending upon the context within which the phrase is utilized. It is the court‘s belief that when utilized in reference to the intoxication of underage persons, a broader definition of ‘public place’ must be utilized. The definition utilized by this court in evaluating the statute is that those places that are not specifically private, i.e., a person‘s home, must be considered a public place. A group of underage persons traveling in the community upon public streets cannot be said to be in a private place for purposes of underage intoxication.”
{¶ 6} The trial court also relied on an opinion of the Attorney General of the state of Ohio, who determined that: “For the purposes of
{¶ 7} Based upon the foregoing, the municipal court denied appellants’ motions to dismiss. Thereafter, appellants each entered a plea of no contest, were found guilty, and were sentencеd. Their sentences were stayed pending the outcome of their appeals, which we consolidated. Appellants assert a single assignment of error:
{¶ 8} “The trial court erred in finding that passengers seated within a privately owned motor vehicle being operated upon a public highway cоnstitute a ‘public place’ for the purposes of
{¶ 9} The only issue in this cause requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. The interpretation оf a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. Columbus v. Breer, 152 Ohio App.3d 701, 2003-Ohio-2479, ¶ 12 (Citation omitted.). The paramount concern in construing a statute is to determine legislative intent. Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 245, 247. To determine the legislative intent, a court must look to the language of the statute. Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105. Words used in a statute are to be taken in their usual, normal, and сustomary meaning. State ex rel. Pennington v. Gundler (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, citing
{¶ 10} Generally, criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the accused. See State v. Jordan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492, citing
{¶ 11} A reading of
{¶ 12} A “public place” is defined as “[a] place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public, but a place which is in point of fact public rather than private, a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to the neighbоring public (e.g. a park or public beach).” Black‘s Law Dictionary (Abridged Sixth Ed. 1991) 857. “Private” means “[a]ffecting or belonging to private individuals as distinct from the public gеnerally.” Id. at 830. Applying these definitions to
{¶ 13} In reaching this decision, we do not find the 1988 Attorney General‘s opinion persuasive because it does not address the statute under consideration. Former
{¶ 14} Moreover, if the legislature wanted to extend the meaning of a public place to include privately rented or owned property, as they did in the two aforementioned sections of R. C. Chapter 4301, they would have done so. Miller v. Toledo, 110 Ohio St.3d 218, 2006-Ohio-4353, ¶ 24 (The canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that express inclusion of оne thing implies the exclusion of the other.). Accordingly, for only those prosecutions involving underage persons who are charged with knowingly being under the influence of beer or an intoxicating liquor in any public place, the interior of a motor vehicle being operated upon a public highway is not a “public place” within the meaning of
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Peter M. Handwork, J.
JUDGE
Mark L. Pietrykowski, P.J.
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Pаrties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.