¶ 1. March 14,2008. Defendant appeals his convictions for sexually assaulting his stepdaughter, J.L., and enabling her consumption of alcohol. He asserts that the district court erred by permitting the State to introduce hearsay statements as prior consistent statements and violated his confrontation rights by permitting the *604 complaining witness to write down her accusation instead of giving oral testimony. Defendant further asserts that the court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence against him was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
¶ 2. On March 27, 2006, defendant was charged with sexual assault of his stepdaughter, J.L., pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 3252(c),
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and with enabling the consumption of alcohol by J.L., pursuant to 7 V.S.A. § 658(a)(2). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to prohibit the State from introducing J.L.’s prior corroborating statements about the sexual assault through testimony of her boyfriend. Specifically, defendant argued that the proffered statements did not meet the criteria for prior consistent statements set forth in Vermont Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) and
State v. Roy,
¶ 3. At trial, the State called J.L. as its first witness. The court, over the defendant’s objection, allowed J.L. to provide a written response to the State’s question about which part of defendant’s body was touching her when she awoke to find defendant on top of her. When J.L. was unable to read what she wrote for the jury, the court further permitted the state’s attorney to ask her: “Ryan’s penis was in my vulva, is that what you wrote, yes or no?” J.L. responded, ‘Yes.” The State next called J.L.’s boyfriend to the stand. He testified without objection by the defendant that, in October or November of 2004, J.L. told him that defendant had gotten her drunk and raped her. Following the defense’s presentation of evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of sexual assault and enabling the consumption of alcohol by a minor.
¶ 4. After trial, defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and new trial contending that: (1) the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see V.R.Cr.P. 29(c) (allowing the court to set aside a guilty verdict if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction), and (2) the court erroneously admitted the hearsay testimony of J.L.’s boyfriend, see V.R.Cr.P. 33 (requiring a new trial when the interests of justice so demand). The court denied the motion, finding that J.L.’s testimony alone was adequate to rebut defendant’s claim of insufficiency. The court further ruled that the testimony of J.L.’s boyfriend satisfied the requirements for prior consistent statements under V.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). This appeal followed.
¶ 5. Defendant now claims that the trial court committed reversible error with regard to three rulings. He argues that the court erred by: (1) permitting the State to introduce J.L.’s statements to her boyfriend as prior consistent statements, (2) violating his confrontation rights by permitting J.L. to provide a written accusation rather than oral testimony, and (3) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal where the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 6. Defendant’s first argument — that J.L.’s prior statements to her boyfriend did not corroborate her in-court testimony and were not made before her
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supposed motive to falsify arose — was not preserved at trial and, therefore, will not be addressed on the merits. We have, on numerous occasions, stressed that we will not decide issues that have not been properly preserved for appeal. See, e.g.,
In re White,
¶ 7. Vermont Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires a “timely objection or motion to strike” to preserve a claim of error on a ruling admitting evidence. Under the 2004 amendments, a “definitive” ruling on admissibility obviates the need for a renewed objection at trial. See Reporter’s Notes, V.R.E. 103 (noting the intention to restore uniformity of practice in state and federal courts following the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 103). Where a court makes only a preliminary ruling, however, our precedent in
State v. Koveos
controls. In
Koveos,
we held that the defendant had an obligation to object to deposition testimony at trial where the trial court had made only a preliminary ruling denying the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony.
¶ 8. Defendant’s second claim of error is not supported by the record. He asserts that the trial judge violated his confrontation rights by allowing the State to read J.L.’s written testimony to the jury in lieu of oral testimony. We have long recognized that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution provide a criminal defendant with “ ‘the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.’ ”
State v. Roberts,
¶ 9. The circumstances here are similar to those in
Maryland v. Craig,
where the
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Supreme Court upheld a Maryland statute that permitted testimony by alleged child abuse victims by one-way, closed circuit television because the defendant was able to view the witness’s testimony by video monitor and conduct contemporaneous cross-examination.
¶ 10. Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Defendant claims that the evidence presented by the State contained significant inconsistencies which made it impossible for a reasonable trier of fact to be convinced of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On review of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we must determine “whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and excluding modifying evidence, the state has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Goodhue,
Affirmed.
Notes
The original docket entry cited a violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(3), which was the statutory provision alleging the same conduct prior to the 2006 amendments.