The opinion of the court was delivered by
B. F. Briggs was convicted "of obtaining money from Henry Mattox by means of false and fraudulent pretenses. In the information it was charged, in substance, that Briggs represented that he was a loan agent, engaged in loaning money on real estate; that he was financially responsible and worth from $45,000 to $60,000; that he had under his control $500,000 to loan upon farms, and that he would make Mattox a loan of $3000 on his farm, at an interest rate of five per cent, and a. commission of $120, one-half of which was to be paid at once and the balance when the loan was completed; and that, relying on these representations, Mattox contracted for the loan and sent Briggs a draft for $60, the value of which was realized by Briggs. It was alleged that the representations were false and fraudulent; that Briggs had no money to loan and was not engaged in making loans on farms; that he had neither money nor credit, but was wholly insolvent; and that he never intended to effect a loan, but made the false and fraudulent representations with the intent to cheat and defraud Mattox out of the draft and the $60 obtained upon it. By motions to make definite and certain and to quash appellant challenged the sufficiency of the information.
The motion to make an information definite and certain is an anomaly in criminal procedure. Ordinarily an indictment or information which fails to particularize or lacks in fulness of statement is open to attack by a motion to quash. Courts sometimes require specification of particular things in what is known as a bill of particulars, but the making of such an order
Upon the motion to quash it is contended that the representations alleged are not material, and are mere promises to be performed in the future. It is true, as contended, that a mere promise to do something in the future, however false, is not an offense. “The false pretense relied upon to constitute an offense under the statute must relate to a past event, or to some present existing fact, and not to something to happen in -the future.” (In re Snyder, Petitioner, &c., 17 Kan. 542, 556.) Although some of the representations were mere promises, others were of existing facts, and are material. It was alleged that Briggs represented himself to be a responsible agent, engaged in making loans on real estate and to the farmers of southeastern Kansas, whereas he was not so engaged, and was not making loans on real estate to farmers. A misrepresentation as to the business in which a person is engaged, made for the purpose of defrauding another, and by
Then, there were the representations that appellant had a large amount of property and was in good financial standing, whereas it is alleged that he was absolutely insolvent. Added to these was the representation, which was also negatived, that he had $500,000 at his command and under his control. These representations were not mere promises, nor can they be regarded as immaterial. (19 Cyc. 398.) That there may have been connected with them future promises or other matters of less consequence does not relieve the false pretenses' of their criminal character. It has already been determined that “the mere fact that a false pretense of an existing or past fact is accompanied by a future promise will not relieve the defendant or take the case out of the operation of the statute.” (The State v. Gordon, 56 Kan. 64, 67, 42 Pac. 346.) It is not necessary to a conviction that the false pretenses should be the sole inducement to the obtaining of the money or property; it is enough if they have a controlling influence, although some minor considerations may concur. It was said in In re Snyder, Petitioner, &c., 17 Kan. 542:
“It is not necessary, to constitute the offense of obtaining goods by false pretenses, that the owner has been induced to part with his property solely and entirely by pretenses which are false; nor need the pretenses be the paramount cause of the delivery to the prisoner. It is sufficient if they are a part of the moving cause, and, without them, the defrauded party would not have parted with the property.” (Syllabus.)
Appellant complains of the admission of the testimony of three witnesses to the effect that he had made the same representations to them he had to Mattox, and had conducted similar transactions in regard to loans on farms, but that he had not effected a loan. This testimony was doubtless admitted, and was admissible, for the purpose of showing knowledge of the
“Evidence of similar' offenses, involving the making of other "false representations, is admissible against the prisoner to show that he was aware of the falsity of the statements made by him in the present instance, and that, knowing them to be false, he made them with the intent to deceive. Evidence of similar false pretenses is particularly relevant when it appears that the fraudulent act for which the accused is on trial does not stand alone, but is a part of a scheme, not merely to defraud one individual, but to swindle the community at large.” (See, also, The State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, 52 Am. Rep. 389; The State v. Jackson, 112 Mo. 585, 20 S. W. 674; DuBois v. The People, 200 Ill. 157, 65 N. E. 658, 93 Am. St. Rep. 183; Commonwealth v. Lubinsky, 182 Mass. 142, 64 N. E. 966; State of Iowa v. Dexter, 115 Iowa, 678, 87 N. W. 417; State v. Southall, 77 Minn. 296, 79 N. W. 1007; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 47 N. E. 883; Crum et al. v. The State, 148 Ind. 401, 47 N. E. 833; Carnell v. State, 85 Md. 1, 36 Atl. 117; Farmer v. The State, 100 Ga. 41, 28 S. E. 26; Rafferty v. State, 91 Tenn. 655, 16 S. W. 728; Tarbox v. The State, 38 Ohio St. 581; People v. Henssler, 48 Mich. 49, 11 N. W. 804; Wood v. The United States, 41 U. S. 342, 10 L. Ed. 987; Regina v. Rhodes, 68 L. J., n. s., [Q. B.] 83, 79 L. T. Rep., n. s., 360; Reg. v. Ollis [1900], 2 Q. B. 758, 83 L. T. Rep., n. s., 251; Hughes, Crim. Law & Proc. § 647; 19 Cyc. 443.)
Other objections are made to rulings on the admission of testimony, but there is nothing substantial in them. The requested instructions which the court refused were manifestly incomplete and incorrect' and the charge given by the court fairly presented the