State v. BridgesState v. Bridges
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Andrey L. Bridges, pro se.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Andrey Bridges, pro se, appeals the trial court‘s denial of several postconviction motions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court.
{¶ 2} Bridges has an extensive history with this court related to his 2013 convictions.
{¶ 3} In November 2013, following a jury trial, Bridges was found guilty of murder, felonious assault, tampering with evidence and offenses against a human corpse in connection with the death of Carl Acoff, Jr. Bridges was sentenсed to an aggregate term of 18 years and six months to life in prison. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100805, 2014-Ohio-4570 (“Bridges I“); see also State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100805, 2015-Ohio-1447 (denying application to reopen appeal). The Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction over Bridges’ discretionary appeals. State v. Bridges, 142 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2015-Ohio-1353, 28 N.E.3d 123 (direct appeal); State v. Bridges, 143 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2015-Ohio-2911, 34 N.E.3d 932 (application to reopen appeal).
{¶ 4} On July 23, 2014, while his direct appeal was pending, Bridges filed, pro se, a petition for postconviction relief. Bridges argued that his convictions violated various provisions of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, because (1) the state “failed to reach its burden of proof,” no eyewitness identified him as the perpetrator to the crime, he was “actually innocеnt” and a police report “pointed to someone other than [Bridges] being responsible for the crime,” (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel‘s alleged failure to investigate “an alternative suspect” identified in the police report, failure to
{¶ 5} In March 2015, Bridges filed, pro se, a “petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence pursuant to [
{¶ 6} In August 2015, while his appeal in Bridges II was pending, Bridges filed a motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial (“delayed motion for new trial“) based on claims оf ineffective assistance of counsel (arguing that trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress, notice of alibi and “other defense motions“), “actual/factual innocence” (arguing that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence) and the alleged improper denial of his motion for a private investigator. In May 2016, Bridges filed a motion for leave to correct error in his conviction due to insufficient evidence (“motion to correct error“), in which he raised challenges to his convictions based on the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court denied both motions. Bridges appeаled the trial court‘s rulings, and, in October 2016, we affirmed the trial court. State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103634 and 104506, 2016-Ohio-7298 (“Bridges III“). In affirming the trial court‘s denial of Bridges’ delayed motion for new trial, we concluded that Bridges had failed to establish that he was unavoidably prevented from timely filing his motion for new trial and that the claims set forth in the motion were barred by res judicata. Bridges III at ¶ 24-28. In affirming the trial court‘s denial of Bridges’ motion to correct error, construed as a petition for postconviction relief, we found that his claims were barred by res judicata and that Bridges’ petition was untimely. Id. at ¶ 31-39. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept
{¶ 7} In December 2017, Bridges filed, pro se, a “motion [for] leave to file void or voidable judgment,” claiming that he was denied due process and that his sentence was contrary to law because the trial court had improperly considered facts outside the record (including considering the victim‘s sexual orientation or “gender life style” as motive for the murder) and had made “illegal determination[s]” when sentencing him. The trial court denied Bridges’ motion, and Bridges appealed. We affirmed the trial court, finding that Bridges’ motion was an untimely petition for postconviction relief and that, even if it were not untimely, his claims were barred by res judicata. State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106653, 2018-Ohio-4113, ¶ 12-17 (“Bridges IV“). The Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction over Bridges’ discretionary appeal. State v. Bridges, 154 Ohio St.3d 1510, 2019-Ohio-601, 116 N.E.3d 1289.
{¶ 8} On April 8, 2019, Bridges filed a “motion to rebut violent offender database and duties and raise factu[a]l innocence.” The trial court denied the motion; Bridges did not appeal. On June 26, 2019, Bridges filed a “motion to proceed with finding of fact and conclusion of law,” arguing that the trial court was required to provide reasons for denying his April 8, 2019 motion. The trial court denied the motion, and Bridges appealed. Construing Bridges’ motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law as a successive petition for postconviction relief, we affirmed the trial court on the grounds that a trial court has no duty to issue findings
The Current Appeal
{¶ 9} On November 29, 2021, Bridges filed, pro se, a “motion to correct/revised post-conviction judgment entry” (“motion to correct postconviction judgment entry“), requesting that the trial court (1) amend its September 3, 2014 judgment entry2 to issue “proper” findings of facts and conclusions of law with respect to its denial of his July 23, 2014 petition for postconviction relief and (2) order the clerk to send him a copy of the “corrected” judgment entry so that he could “have meaningful appeal rights.” On November 30, 2021, Bridges filed, pro se, a “motion [for] leave to allow defendant to amend/supplement post-conviction relief,” seeking leave to amend or supplement his July 23, 2014 petition for postconviction relief to make additional arguments and identify additional evidence in support of his previously asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.
{¶ 10} In June 2022, Bridges filed a “motion to vacate a void judgment of common law ancestry” (“motion to vacate a void judgment“) in which he argued that his constitutional rights had been violated and “the judgment in this case is void” because: (1) the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the lesser-included
{¶ 11} Bridges appealed, raising the following six assignments of error for review:
Assignment of Error I: The trial court abused its discretion, under common law, and due process was denied, when the court failed to
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Assignment of Error II: The trial court abused its discretion, and due process was denied, when [the] trial court used res judicata to end a void jurisdiction.
Assignment of Error III: Appellant is prejudicially denied void jurisdiction under common law, and due process is denied and erred, when appellant went to trial with no defense under ineffective assistance of counsel while appellant being factually innocent.
Assignment of Error IV: Appellant is prejudicially denied the right to redress the courts of law and trial court abused its discretion.
Assignment of Error V: Appellant is prejudicially denied, and due process is denied and erred, when Appellant went to trial with no defense under ineffective assistance of counsel when a police report shows Appellant innocence.
Assignment of Error [VI4]: The trial court abused its discretion, when it did not review the record/transcript before ruling on the motion.
{¶ 12} For ease of discussion, we address Bridges’ assignments of error out of order and together where appropriate.
Law and Analysis
Motion to Vacate a Void Judgment
{¶ 13} In his first, second, third, fifth and sixth assignments of error, Bridges challenges the trial court‘s denial of his motion to vacate a void judgment. In his first assignment of error, Bridges asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate a void judgment because the trial court “committed
{¶ 14} We construe Bridges’ motion to vacate a void judgment as a successive petition for postconviction relief. “Courts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12, citing State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio-3993, 773 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 10. “[A] vaguely titled motion to correct or vacate * * * may be construed as a petition for post-conviction relief where the motion was filed subsequent to a direct appeal, claimed a denial of constitutional rights, sought to render the judgment void, and asked for a vacation of the judgment and sentence.” State v. Meincke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96407, 2011-Ohio-6473, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Caldwell, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-05-07, 2005-Ohio-5375, citing State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997), syllabus; see also Bridges III at ¶ 31; Bridges V at ¶ 7. Bridges’ motion to vacate a void judgment satisfies all the criteria for it to be construed as a petition for postconviction relief.
{¶ 15} Pursuant to
{¶ 16} A trial court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief unless the petition satisfies the criteria set forth under
[A] court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in [
R.C. 2953.21(A) ] or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless * * * [b]oth of the following apply:
(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner‘s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.
(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the рetitioner was convicted[.]
{¶ 17} We review a decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion. State v. Hatton, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 38, citing State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 51-52, 58. However, whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief is a question of law, which we review de novo. Hatton at ¶ 38, citing Apanovitch at ¶ 24.
{¶ 18} In this case, Bridges’ petition did not satisfy the requirements of
{¶ 20} In an attempt to avoid the application of res judicata, Bridges asserts, in his second assignment of error, that res judicata is not a bar to his claims because his 2013 judgment of conviction was void and res judicata does not apply to void judgments.
{¶ 21} Although Bridges is correct that res judicata does not apply to void judgments, a judgment is void only if it is rendered by а court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See State v. Hudson, 161 Ohio St.3d 166, 2020-Ohio-3849, 161 N.E.3d 608, ¶ 11, 14; State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 42; State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 34-37. If the
{¶ 22} Here, the common pleas court was the proper forum for trying the offenses for which Bridges was convicted. It had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and pеrsonal jurisdiction over Bridges. See
{¶ 23} Challenges to jury instructions that could have been raised on direct appeal are barred by res judicata. See, e.g., State v. Nunez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104917, 2017-Ohio-5581, ¶ 46; State v. Taulbee, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 19-CA-26, 2019-Ohio-3855, ¶ 16; State v. Sullivan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-861, 2014-Ohio-1260, ¶ 15. Because Bridges could have challenged the trial court‘s jury instructions on direct appeal, his claims are barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we overrule Bridges’ first and second assignments of error.
{¶ 24} In his third and fifth assignments of error, Bridges claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely request “an expert to investigate the prosecutor[‘s] case,” for failing “to file relevant motions to suppress,” for going to
{¶ 25} Res judicata operates to bar successive petitions for postconviction relief that raise claims that were or could have been raised on direct appeal or in a prior petition. See, e.g., State v. Waver, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108820, 2020-Ohio-2724, ¶ 32; see also State v. Mack, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101261, 2018-Ohio-301, ¶ 15 (“The doctrine of res judicata prevents repeated attacks on a final judgment for issues that were or could have been previously litigated.“); Bridges III at ¶ 33 (“[A] postconviction petition does not provide a petitioner a second opportunity to litigate his or her conviction.“). This is not a case involving new claims or issues that have not been litigated, or could not have been litigated, before. Compare Hatton, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3991, at ¶ 25.
{¶ 26} As detailed above, Bridges raised the same ineffective assistance of counsel claims (or slight permutations thereof) in prior petitions for postconviction relief and other motions filed with the triаl court and in prior appeals before this court. Because Bridges raised or could have raised the claims he now raises on direct appeal or in prior petitions for postconviction relief, his claims are barred by res judicata. See Bridges II at ¶ 7, 12-15; Bridges III at ¶ 25-27.
{¶ 27} Bridges’ third and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 28} In his sixth assignment of error, Bridges contends that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) denying his request for “proper authentic transcripts by the court reporter” and (2) failing to review the record and transcript before ruling on his motion to vacate a void judgment.
{¶ 29} On June 6, 2022, Bridges filed a motion for transcript in which he requested that (1) “proper authentiс transcripts by the court reporter” be provided for court use in ruling on his motion to vacate a void judgment (stating that he had only “copies” of the transcripts and lacked funds to purchase official transcripts) and (2) the trial court “use” the transcripts when considering his motion to vacate a void judgment to avoid being “blinded from the facts.”
{¶ 30} It is not entirely clear what Bridges claims should have been done differently here. The record reflects that the official trial transcripts (seven volumes) were prepared on Bridges’ behalf, at the state‘s expense, and filed in his direct appeal on March 3, 2014. Bridges acknowledges that he has copies of the transcripts and he included record citations to the transcripts in, and/or attached excerpts from the transcripts to, his motion to vacate a void judgment, affidavit of merit and supporting statements. Bridges was not entitled to another copy of the “proper authentic transcripts [prepared] by the court reporter” at the state‘s expense for use in his successive postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Bayles, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88094, 2007-Ohio-1008, ¶ 11 (“[T]he duty to provide a transcript at State expense extends only to providing one transcript for the entire judicial system.
{¶ 31} Further, the trial judge who ruled on Bridges’ motion to vacate a void judgment was the same trial judge who presided over Bridges’ 2013 trial and the same trial judge who has reviewed and ruled on Bridges’ voluminous postconviction motions and petitions during the last nine years. Accordingly, she is very familiar with the record in the case, including the issues Bridges has raised again and again in his postconviction motions and petitions. There is nothing in the record to support Bridges’ claim that he was denied “a fair right of adjudication on the merits” based on the trial court‘s alleged failure to review the record and trial transcripts before ruling on his motion to vacate a void judgment.
Motion to Correct Judgment Entry Relating to 2014 Petition for Postconviction Relief
{¶ 33} Bridges’ fourth assignment of error relates, at least in part, to the triаl court‘s denial of his November 2021 “motion to correct/revised postconviction judgment entry.” Bridges contends that the relief requested in his motion to correct postconviction judgment entry “should have been given and gone,” that he was “denied the rights to redress the courts of law,” that he “did not have a due process to appeal” and that the trial court abused its discretion (1) “by not ordering the clerk to issue each party a copy” of its signed September 8, 2014 judgment entry in accordance with Civ.R. 58(B) and (2) for failing “to send the record for [his] appeal(s)” of his July 2014 petition for postconviction relief. Once again, Bridges has failed to establish that he was еntitled to any relief with respect to his fourth assignment of error.
{¶ 34} The trial court denied Bridges’ petition for postconviction relief on July 30, 2014, and Bridges requested findings and fact and conclusions of law on August 6, 2014. In his November 2021 motion to correct/revised postconviction judgment entry, Bridges asserted that the trial court “did not provide a proper answer” to his August 6, 2014 motion for findings of facts and conclusions of law, which he contends “may have * * * been because the entry was * * * not signed,” and
{¶ 35} Civ.R. 58 was enacted “to preserve thе appellate rights of individuals.” State v. Tucker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95556, 2011-Ohio-4092, ¶ 9. Civ.R. 58(B) provides:
When the court signs a judgment, the court shall endorse thereon a direction to the clerk to serve upon all parties not in default for failure to appear notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Within three days of entering the judgment upon the journal, the clerk shall serve the parties in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B) and note the service in the appearance docket. Upon serving the notice and notation of the service in the appearance docket, the service is complete. The failure of the clerk to serve notice does not affect the validity of the judgment or the running of the time for appeal except as provided in App.R. 4(A).
{¶ 36} App.R. 4(A)(1) states: “Subject to the provisions of App.R. 4(A)(3), a party who wishes to appeal from an order that is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of that entry.” App.R. 4(A)(3) states: “In a civil case, if the clerk has not completed service of notice of the judgment within the three-day period prescribed in Civ.R. 58(B), the 30-day periods referenced in App.R. 4(A)(1) and 4(A)(2) begin to run on the date when the clerk actually completes service.”6 In other words, failure to perfect service as outlined in Civ.R. 58(B), tolls the 30-day period for filing an appeal. See, e.g., Tucker at ¶ 9; Howard v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-283, 2022-Ohio-4071
{¶ 37} The record reflects that after requesting and receiving proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from the state, the trial court filed written findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Bridges’ petition for postconviction relief on September 8, 2014. Bridges filed an appeal of that decision in Appeal No. 101938, but his notice of appeal did not include the signed version of the trial court‘s findings of facts and conclusions of law. Appeal No. 101938 was dismissed pursuant to
{¶ 38} The state concedes that the trial court did not comply with Civ.R. 58(B) with respect to its September 8, 2014 order. The trial court‘s September 8, 2014 order does not contain an endorsement from the trial court directing the clerk to serve the parties with the order. Likewise, there is no notation by the clerk in the docket reflecting the date on which any notice of the September 8, 2014 order was served on the parties. As a result, the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled pursuant to App.R. 4(A) until the clerk served notice of the оrder on Bridges. See, e.g., Tucker at ¶ 9; Howard at ¶ 14.
{¶ 39} Bridges, however, did not need to take advantage of the tolling occasioned by the trial court‘s failure to comply with Civ.R. 58(B) in order to file a
{¶ 40} As explained above, Appeal No. 101942 was later dismissed, sua sponte, pursuant to App.R. 3(A), 10 and Loc.App.R. 10. Even if there were some error in this court‘s dismissal of Appeal No. 101942, that was not a matter that could be addressed by the trial court nearly eight years later.7 The trial court did not err in denying Bridges’ November 2021 motion to correct postconviction judgment entry.
{¶ 41} Because Bridges has failed to establish that he was entitled to any relief with respect to his fourth assignment of error, we overrule Bridges’ fourth assignment of error.
{¶ 42} As detailed above, Bridges has repeatedly raised thе same issues in numerous postconviction motions or petitions filed in the trial court and in numerous appeals to this court appealing the denial or dismissal of those postconviction motions or petitions.
{¶ 43} Pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23(A), an appeal “shall be considered frivolous if it is not reasonably well-grounded in fact, or warranted by existing law, or by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Loc.App.R. 23(B) further provides that a party who “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engages in frivolous conduct,” may be declared a vexatious litigator subject to filing restrictions.
{¶ 44} We find that Bridges’ repeated, continued attempts to litigate the same issues constitutes frivolous conduct pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23(A). Thus, we find Bridges to be a vexatious litigator under Loc.App.R. 23. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110318, 2021-Ohio-2526, ¶ 22-25. Accordingly, Bridges is prohibited from instituting any future legal proceedings in the Eighth District Court of Appeals of Ohio without first obtaining leave, and he is further prohibited from filing any proceedings in the Eighth District Court of Appeals of Ohio without the filing fee and security for costs required by Loc.App.R. 3(A). Any request to file an appeal or original action shall be submitted to the clerk of this court for the court‘s review.
{¶ 45} Judgment affirmed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR
Notes
On December 20, 2021, Bridges filed, pro se, a “motion for leave to file judicial notice and correction and to modify the record pursuant to App.R. 9” in Appeal No. 101938, arguing that this court had “mistakenly dismissed” Appeal No. 101938 and Appeal No. 101942, asserting that “[a] review of the online docket will for sure show standing in each case for support of show” [sic] and requesting that the court reinstate his appeal in Appeal No. 101938. This court denied the motion, stating: “The decision in this appeal was released on October 1, 2014. This court no longer has jurisdiction over the appeal.”