90 So. 217 | La. | 1921
Defendant was indicted and tried for murder and was convicted of manslaughter.
Of the several bills of exceptions in the record, we find it necessary to dispose of only one. It refers to the judge’s charge on the subject of involuntary manslaughter, as distinguished from accidental and excusable homicide. The defendant, who was under the age of 15 years, had shot and killed another boy. The defense was that the gun went off accidentally. Under those circumstances, the most important subject on which the judge had to instruct the jury was the legal distinction between involuntary manslaughter and accidental homicide. The instruction complained of was as follows, viz.:
“The law, gentleman of the jury, presumes that every person who kills another killed him with malice aforethought if the killing was premeditated, willfully and unlawfully done, unless the circumstances are such as to raise a contrary presumption; and the burden of proving circumstances of justification, excuse, or provocation is upon the person who is shown to have killed another; and it has been held that the evidence of excuse, justification, or extenuation must preponderate, and tliat it is not enough to raise a reasonable doubt in such killing.”