State v. BridgesState v. Bridges
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Blanchard
Thе accused was indicted for manslaughter. A jury returned a verdict of guilty, with recommendation to thе mercy of the court, and he was sentenced to three years at hard labor. He aрpeals.
No bills of exception were taken during the trial.
Following his conviction, counsel employed after his trial to represent him, filed a motion for new trial, the grounds of which were:
(1) That he was deprived of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel learned in the law.
(2) That he was not accorded the process of the court and reasonable time in which to secure the attendance оf his witnesses.
(3) Newly discovered evidence.
(4) That the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence.
Evidence was adduced in support of this *531motion and three bills of ¡exception were taken to the exclusion of certain testimony-tendered.
None of these bills have been found to have merit. It is not deemed necessary to go into their disсussion, since the main reliance here, as shown by brief of defendant’s counsel, is upon the first two grounds of the motion, viz: — that he was not represented at the trial by counsel, and his witnesses werе not subpoenaed.
Both of these contentions are effectually disposed of by thе statement of the trial judge, who was sworn as a witness, on the trial of the motion, at the instancе of the defendant.
His testimony is as follows:
AT. J. Gray, sworn for the defendant, says: “The accused was brought into court, for thе purpose of having him arraigned, on Monday morning, the 13th of October. He was asked by the cоurt if he had employed counsel to defend him and he stated he expected Mr. Hatch, his еmployer, to procure counsel for him. Mr. Hatch came into court very soon and dеsired to have a conference with the accused. The accused and Mr. Hatch retired into one of the rooms of the courthouse for the purpose of having a conference. Mr. Broadway went into the room, where they were, soon afterwards. They remаined in the room, I suppose, 15 or 20 minutes, when they returned into the court room and it was announсed to the court that Mr. Broadway would represent the accused by power of attоrney, to which the district attorney consented, and Mr. Broadway stated that he was prepared to go to trial, and the case was fixed for trial for that afternoon by consent of Mr. Brоadway and the district attorney.”
Broadway was a neighbor of Hatch, the employer of the accused, and while he was not a member of the bar he had been a justice of the рeace and had such knowledge of law and legal procedure that both the aсcused and Hatch, who was assisting him in his trouble, deemed it safe to intrust him (Broadway) with the defense.
It thus aрpears that the accused had counsel of his own selection. He cannot now bе heard to complain that one was not appointed to him. The object of the judgе in asking him if he had counsel to defend him was, doubtless, to appoint one if he had none, or wаs unable to employ counsel. I-Iis. action in intrusting his defense to Broadway was a waiver of his right to have a member of the bar appointed to defend him.
Broadway announced his reаdiness for the trial that day. He could have had the process of the court for the obtaining of witnesses had he desired it. No subpoenas were asked to be issued. It seems Broadway, Hatch and the accused relied- upon the defense’s witnesses being present at the trial without being subpoenaed.
AThen the case was called for trial in the afternoon no objеction was made, and the trial was proceeded with as had been agreed upon in the forenoon by Broadway and the district attorney.
After this the accused is without cause of сomplaint that he was not accorded the process of the law and reasonable time to-procure the attendance of his witnesses.
The district attorney states Broadway managed the defense with considerable dexterity and that he argued the case tо the jury for over an hour ably and to the point.
The requirement of the Constitution (article 9), that the accused shall have the right to defend himself, to have the assistance of counsel and to have compulsory process for-obtaining witnesses in his favor, was reasonably met in thе case.
So also was the provision of the statutory law (Rev. St. § 992) that the trial judge shall, upon the request of an accused person, “assign to him such counsel as he shall desire.”
Nor was thеre undue haste in the matter of the trial. The killing occurred September 13, 1902; preliminary examination was had some five or six days later; indictment was returned on October 3d; and the final trial occurred October 13th.
Judgment affirmed.