{¶ 3} On August 31, 2006, the State moved for revocation of appellant's community control following a violation in which appellant approached a three year-old child. The evidence presented at the hearing in this matter demonstrated: On May 4, 2006, Ella Murphy was outside on her porch with her grandchild waiting for the child's school bus to arrive. As she sat on the porch the phone rang, and she went into the house for approximately 30 seconds. While in the house, she heard the child talking about taking a walk. When she returned outside, the child was talking to appellant approximately thirty-five feet from the house. Murphy asked the child what he was doing, and he replied "this man is taking me for a walk." Appellant lived four houses up on the opposite side of the street.
{¶ 4} Via Judgment Entry of August 31, 2006, the trial court revoked appellant's community control sanction. *3
{¶ 5} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error:
{¶ 6} "I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE REVOCATION HEARING TO PROVE AN INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE ACCUSED'S PROBATION.
{¶ 7} "II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE REVOCATION HEARING TO SHOW A VIOLATION OF PROBATION.
{¶ 8} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT ORDERING A COMPETENCY EVALUATION OF MR. BRANK PRIOR TO THE REVOCATION HEARING. THUS VIOLATING THE ACCUSED'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSITUTION."
{¶ 10} Because a community control revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, the State does not have to establish a violation with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Payne, Warren App. No. CA2001-09-081,
{¶ 11} Once a court finds that a defendant violated the terms of her community control sanction, the court's decision to revoke community control may be reversed on appeal only if the court abused its discretion. Columbus v. Bickel (1991),
{¶ 12} Appellant asserts there was insufficient evidence presented to support the trial court's revocation of his community control.
{¶ 13} The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Jamison (1990),
{¶ 14} Upon review of the record, the evidence presented at the revocation hearing demonstrates appellant had contact with a three year-old child. Ella Murphy testified she was sitting on the front porch with her grandson, and left to answer the phone. While in her house, she heard her grandson talking with someone, and when *5 she returned to the porch, her grandson was standing near the street, approximately thirty-five feet from the house, with appellant.
{¶ 15} Based upon the above, we find there was sufficient evidence appellant violated the terms of his community control, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in it's decision to revoke appellant's community control sanction.
{¶ 16} Appellant further argues the terms of his community control were overbroad and unconstitutional.
{¶ 17} Community control sanctions must be reasonably related to the statutory ends of community control and must not be overbroad. State v.Talty (2004),
{¶ 18} "R.C.
{¶ 19} "Nevertheless, a trial court's discretion in imposing probationary conditions is not limitless. Jones,
{¶ 20} "Having so limited our analysis in Jones, we set forth the test for determining whether a condition reasonably relates to the three probationary goals-as reflected in former R.C. 2951.02(C)-of "doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and insuring good behavior." 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 604. We stated that courts must "consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation." Jones,
{¶ 21} As set forth in the statement of facts and case above, the trial court imposed as a term of appellant's community control he have no contact with children under the age of eighteen years during the five year term of his community control sanction. We find the restriction imposed by the trial court was reasonably related to the statutory ends of community control, and had a direct relationship to the crime for which the offender was convicted, being gross sexual imposition involving his six year-old grandson. The restriction relates to conduct which is reasonably related to future criminality.
{¶ 22} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 24} At the revocation hearing in this matter, appellant's counsel informed the court he had been contacted by the jail administrator relative to appellant's mental health. On one occasion appellant asked the administrator where his shoes were, when *7 they were on his feet. Numerous times appellant asked the deputy his name. Appellant's attorney told the trial court appellant was not sure why he was in jail. Further, the police report indicates appellant told the police he could not remember what happened during the incident.
{¶ 25} In unsworn testimony, appellant's wife testified as to changes in appellant's conduct and behavior
{¶ 26} The trial court stated on the record,
{¶ 27} "I'm going to hold the hearing and hear what the evidence is and then will be making a decision concerning the issues that are before the Court. I'm going to go forward with the hearing."
{¶ 28} Tr. at 15-18.
{¶ 29} Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court concluded:
{¶ 30} "I'm going to conclude with that Mr. Brank as I indicated in my opening remarks, after Ms. Brank gave the Court assistance as his spouse addressing the issue of Mr. Brank's conduct and ability to appreciate and understand, I'm going to conclude that the competency of Mr. Brank to testify viz a viz
{¶ 31} "And I'm going to conclude that the evidence has proved by a preponderance that Mr. Brank violated the community control sanctions to which he was sentenced by entry of November 5th, 2005, and more specifically that he has violated the non-residential sanction on page 5 which reads verbatim, "The Defendant shall have *8 no contact with children under the age of 18 years during the period of community control sanctions."
{¶ 32} Tr. at 24-25.
{¶ 33} Prior to the trial court resentencing appellant, the following exchange occurred:
{¶ 34} "The Court: Thanks, Gerry.
{¶ 35} "Mr. Brank, you understand what we're going to be doing right now?
{¶ 36} "The Defendant: I'm afraid so.
{¶ 37} "The Court: What do you think I'm going to be doing right now?
{¶ 38} "The Defendant: Sentencing me to a period of incarceration.
{¶ 39} "The Court: Okay. You're absolutely right. What do you have to say about that? Do you wish to say anything to me about that?
{¶ 40} "The Defendant: I can't even remember the day that the offense was supposed to have occurred.
{¶ 41} "The Court: I understand that. Do you have any comment to me about the sentence to prison that's about to be imposed?
{¶ 42} "The Defendant: I have no comment. I just wonder why? What'd I do? What law did I break?
{¶ 43} Tr. at 27-28.
{¶ 44} Initially, we note, the decision whether to grant a hearing on competency at a revocation hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. State v.Qualls (1988),
{¶ 45} Upon review of the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for a competency hearing. The trial court specifically concluded appellant's competency to testify was not an issue at the hearing for the reason the testimony presented by the State was so clear and so disconnected from appellant's ability to assist his counsel in defending him. We agree.
{¶ 46} The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 47} The August 31, 2006 Judgment Entry of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
*10By: Hoffman, P.J. Farmer, J. and Edwards, J. concur
