State v. . BrandonState v. . Brandon
The first question, which the record presents, is, whether the declarations of defendant were competent, in his behalf, to show how he received a certain wound.
It is stated that the declarations were made shortly after the homicide. There is no princiрle, upon which these can be held admissible, except as a part of the
“ res
gestee,” and the statement of the case excludes the idea that they were of this nature. The declarations were after the act was past and done. This question hаs been brought under review in this Court on several former occasions, which will be seen by a reference to the cases of
State
v.
Scott,
The second question arises upon a position taken by the prisoner’s cоunsel, that if the killing was to protect prisoner’s property from the trespass of the deceased, it would be an extenuated case of homicide. In this position, it seems, the Court did not concur. The matter involved in this point, has been before this Court heretofore, on more occasions than one. It seems to have been first carefully considered in the case of the
State
v.
Morgan,
3 Ire. 186, and, again, in the
State
v.
McDonald,
The third and last quеstion, made upon the record, arises out of proofs, in respect to the mental condition of the prisoner. The reсord states the prisoner’s counsel insisted that, although the prisoner knew it was wrong to kill the deceased, yet, if he was impelled to the act by a moral power, which he cordd not resist, he was excusable. The words, “ moral power,” may mean threats, duress оf imprisonment, or an assault imperilling life, which is the usual sense of the phrase, or it may mean, some supernatural agency. The former construction would make the position of the counsel entirely inapplicable to the case ; we, therefore, adopt the latter. The position, thus interpreted, does not fall within any approved definition of a “ non compos mentis.”
It assumes that the accused knew the nature of his act and .that it was wrong. The law does not recognize any moral power compelling one to do what he knows is wrong. “To know thе right and still the wrong pursue,” proceeds from a perverse will brought about by the seductions of the evil one, but which nevertheless, with the aids that lie within our reach, as we are taught to believe, may be resisted and overcome, otherwise it would not seem to be consistent with the principles of justice to punish any malefactor. There are many appetites and passions which by long indulgence acquire a mastery over men more or less strong. Some persons indeed deem *468 themselves incapable of exerting strength of will sufficient to arrest their rule,- — -speak of them as irresistible, and impotently continue under their dominion; but the law is far from excusing criminal acts committed under the impulse of such passions. To excuse one from criminal responsibility the mind must, in the language of thе Judge below, be insane. The accused should be in such a state from mental disease as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong, and this should be clearly established. This test, a knowledge of right and wrong, has long been resorted to as a general criterion for deciding upon legal accountability, and with a restricted application to the act then about to be committed, is approved by the highest authorities. But we do not undertake to lay down аny rule of universal application. It seems to be chimerical to attempt to do so from the very nature of things, for insanity is a disease and, as is the case with all other diseases, the fact of its existence is not established by a single symptom, but by a body of symptoms, no particular one of which is present in every case. Imperfect as the rule may be, it covers a great variety of cases and may aid the tribunals of the country in judging of this most difficult subject. The case put of a criminal act committed under the beliеf that it was commanded by God, would fall under the rule. The perpetrator in such would not know he was doing what was wrong, but on the contrary, bеlieve he was doing what was right in obeying a power who had a right to command him. This condition of mind would constitute insane delusion in respеct to the particular act committed, and if clearly established by proof of pre-existent facts, would excuse from responsibility.
It will thus be seen that instructions, in conformity with the argument of prisoner’s counsel, ought not to have been given. If the prisoner knew thаt what he did was wrong, the law presumes that he had the power to resist it, against all supernatural agencies, and holds him amenable tо punishment. There is no error in the instructions actually given *469 upon this subject, and in the absence of any prayer for other speсific instructions, there is no omission, of which the prisoner has a legal right to complain.
' There being no error found upon the reсord, this must be certified to the Superior Court of law for Caswell, that the said Court may proceed again to pronounce the judgment of the law.
Judgment affirmed.