State v. BradyState v. Brady
The defendant, Mark Brady, was tried by a jury and convicted of two counts of armed robbery, in violation of
Defendant‘s post-conviction procedural history is as follows:
June 9, 1986 - Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging the court erred in allowing the state to introduce a photographic display and in denying his motion to quash the information because of a speedy trial violation. July 1, 1986 - The trial court denied defendant‘s motion for a new trial and sentenced him to serve twenty-five years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. July 3, 1986 - Defendant filed a second motion for a new trial, claiming he lacked the mental capacity to assist his attorney throughout the proceedings. He requested the appointment of a sanity commission and a delay in the imposition of sentence. July 11, 1986 - Defendant filed a formal motion for the appointment of a sanity commission, and the court appointed Doctors Hypolite Landry and George Burke to the commission. Aug. 11, 1986 - The trial court conducted a hearing to determine defendant‘s mental capacity. Defendant presented no evidence, relying on the report of Dr. Frank Silva in which Dr. Silva stated that the defendant was competent to assist his counsel. Based on this report, the trial court found defendant competent and denied his second motion for a new trial. Sept. 3, 1986 - The court reimposed the same sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
We note three errors in these post-conviction proceedings. First, the record does not reflect that the trial court appointed Dr. Silva to the sanity commission. Thus, the trial court erred in using his report in its determination of defendant‘s competency and in continuing the proceedings without obtaining a report from the doctors it appointed to the sanity commission. Further, the record does not reflect that the trial court vacated the sentence it imposed July 1, 1986, before reimposing the same sentence on September 3, 1986. Despite defendant‘s motion for a delay in sentencing on July 3, 1986, sentence had been pronounced two days earlier, albeit in contravention of
It is well settled that a defendant can appeal from a final judgment of conviction only where the sentence has been imposed.
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.