State v. BoysawState v. Boysaw
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Schaller
Opinion
The defendant, Antoane D. Boysaw, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct the sex offender registration requirement of his criminal conviction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion to correct the requirement that he register as a sex offender because his registration is not required under the current law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s appeal. On February 28, 1997, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of
The defendant claims that the court improperly relied on
At the outset, we set forth the applicable standard of review. “Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Tarnowsky
v.
Socci,
271 Conn. 284, 287, 856 A.2d 408 (2004). “A fundamental tenet of statutory construction is that statutes are to be considered to give effect to the apparent intention of the lawmaking body. . . . The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from
the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. [
A brief review of the pertinent statutory provisions is necessary to our resolution of the defendant’s claim.
We begin by noting that at the time of the defendant’s conviction in 1997, the defendant was subject to
In challenging the registration requirement, the defendant argues that the legislature would not have intended that young adults who are found to have committed sexual offenses as a result of having engaged in consensual sexual relationships be required to register as sex offenders. Essentially, the defendant asserts that the legislature intended that a distinction be drawn between such individuals and sexually violent offenders. The defendant contends that the legislature has manifested this intent by providing in
In considering the defendant’s argument, we turn to the statutory text.
Our rejection of the defendant’s contention that
We conclude that the defendant is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The defendant was initially charged with sexual assault in the second degree in violation of
The record does not reveal the date on which the defendant was asked to register.
The record does not indicate the court’s ruling on this application nor is this ruling challenged on appeal.
Section (3) (b) of P.A. 98-111 is codified in
A “criminal offense against a victim who is a minor” is in part defined within