Dеfendant was found guilty of receiving stolen property. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.
Pursuant to a search warrant which authorized a search for a Whirlpool dryer that had been stolen from the Northern States Power Company, two St. Paul police officers arrived at the BarB-Q-King Bestaurant, operated by defendant, Louis Boykin. They asked him whether he was the owner and he replied that he ran the restaurant. Sergeant Floyd Baker gave defendant a copy оf the search warrant and had defendant accompany him while he searched the basement. When defendant and Sergeant Baker returned upstairs, Detective Gustav Johnson told Sergeant Baker that the stolen dryer was in the corner of the kitchen. Defendant was then placed under arrest and advised of his Miranda rights.
On appeal defendant has raised a number of objections to his conviction. All are without merit.
1. First, defendant contends that he should have been given a warning of his rights as rеquired by Miranda v. Arizona,
When the officers entered the restaurant, they went through the dining area and saw defendant in a back room. Sergeant Baker said to defendant, “Louis, we have got a search warrant to search your place here. Are you the owner ?” He replied, “yes, I run the place.” Sergeant Baker said he then gave defendant a copy of the search warrant. Detective Johnson testified that he was not certain whether Sergeant Baker asked defendant if he were the owner before giving him a copy of the search warrant. From this evidence the trial court could properly conclude thаt the question was asked pursuant to service of the search warrant.
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This one question is the only instance defendant cites of alleged improper questioning before he was given the Miranda warning. It was a proper part of the prescribed procedure for serving a search warrant. Minn. St. 626.16. Miranda requires that the defendant be warned of his rights before police officers begin custodial interrogation, which is defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona,
2. Next,, defendant сontends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction. The state must prove that defendant intentionally received stolen property, as required by Minn. St. 609.53, and defendant claims that this knowledge or intent was not proved. However, the record satisfies us that it was.
Defendant’s lack of a satisfactory exрlanation for his possession of the stolen property is evidence that he knew it was stolen. This alone is enough evidence to take the issue to the jury. Many сourts have so held many times. E. g., State v. Monroe,
When the dryer was in the restaurant defendant told Miss Janine Evans, an employee, to cover the dryer with newspapers and asked her to call Northern States Power Company to find out the price, since he intended to sell it. These facts also indicate that he knew it was stolen.
3. Defendant claims that Miss Evans was an accomplice and
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that her testimony was not corroborated. According to State v. Smith,
4. Defendant contends that he was not given the necessary latitude to crоss-examine Miss Evans. He tried to impeach her by inquiring about prior arrests. The trial court was correct in not allowing this method of impeachment. Only convictions may be used for impeachment. Minn. St. 595.07; State v. Currie,
Defendant claims he should have been allowed especially wide latitude since Miss Evans was an accomplice. Even if she were an accomplice, the special consideration given would be to allow him to show any inducements given her to testify, and defendant thoroughly went into all possibilities of inducement.
5. Sergеant Baker testified that after defendant was given his Miranda warning he was asked whether he wanted to say anything about the dryer and defendant said that he did not, but that he wanted to call his lawyer. Defendant objected to the admission of this statement, claiming it was hearsay. The court admitted the testimony under the res gestae exception.
The statement was not hearsay, since it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It was offered only to show that defendant said it. This testimony had little, if any, рrobative value, but it was not prejudicial.
*281 6. Defendant claims that crimes other than those listed in the so-called Spreigl notice 1 were admitted into evidence over his objection. This is not correct.
First, defendant claims that the state tried to show that he burglarized Miss Evans’ apartment. According to the record, defendant рurchased a stolen Zenith TV and Miss Evans kept it in her apartment. Her apartment was then burglarized. The police found the stolen TV in defendant’s apartment. The state did not attempt to show that defendant stole the TV from Miss Evans, but merely wanted to show the TV’s whereabouts between the time defendant purchased it and the policе seized it. Whatever inference there was that defendant may have burglarized Miss Evans’ apartment was not sufficiently prejudicial to justify a new trial.
The second crime alleged to have been admitted erroneously concerns Detective Johnson’s inadvertent mention of a gun named in the search warrant. The state had bеen forbidden to go into the matter of this gun. As soon as the gun was mentioned, the testimony was stopped. The jury could not see what connection it had with anything. It was not discussеd again; thus, there was no prejudice.
7. The state introduced evidence that defendant possessed the stolen Zenith TV. Defendant objects to admission of this crimе. The state argues that his possession of the Zenith TV is part of a common scheme or plan and that evidence of that crime is therefore admissible. It is doubtful thаt there is enough evidence of a common scheme or plan to make the evidence admissible on this ground.
However, when knowledge or intent is an elemеnt of the crime, other crimes may be admitted to prove knowledge or intent of the accused. State v. Hines,
8. Defendant argues that the totality of the circumstances amounted to a cumulative prejudice that entitles him to a new trial. We cannot agree. Rather, it appears that the only possible errors were the mention of a burglary of Miss Evans’ apartment and the mention of a gun named in the search warrant. These were not substantial and not prejudicial.
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
See, State v. Spreigl,