[¶ 1] Pursuаnt to a conditional plea agreement, MR.Crim. P. 11(a)(2), by which he pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(E) (2010), Derek W. Boutilier appeals from the Superior Court’s (Oxford County,
Ni-vison
and
Clifford, JJ.)
denial of his motions to disclose the identity of a confidential informant and to suppress. Boutilier asserts that the court erred by denying (1) his motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant who рrovided information included in the warrant request, and (2) his request for a hearing pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware,
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶ 2] On September 18, 2008, Maine Drug Enforcement Agency Special Agent Milligan applied for a warrant to search Boutilier’s property in Albany. In support of the warrant apрlication, Milligan submitted an affidavit, which contained allegations about Boutilier’s conduct that were based on Milligan’s observations and on information provided to Milligan by a confidential informant and by a Bеthel police officer who owns property in Albany. The affidavit stated that the confidential informant had reported that Boutilier (1) grows marijuana around his home and in the woods around Albany and sells it; (2) owns а .22 rifle; (3) had sold marijuana to the informant more than once since Boutilier’s 2004 arrest for marijuana trafficking and marijuana cultivation while armed; (4) dries his marijuana in his trailer or inside a shed on his property; and (5) hides his marijuana in vehicles parked in his yard, in his outbuildings, under his trailer, or buried in his yard.
[¶ 3] The affidavit also stated that the Bethel officer had learned from his cousin, who was identified by name, that his cousin had recently seen Boutiliеr and another man leaving a wooded area on the officer’s land, carrying a large marijuana plant. The cousin alleged that when the two men saw him, Boutilier threatened him with harm if he approаched Boutilier’s plants and that the two men chased him, while he was on his four-wheeler, in Boutilier’s dark GMC pickup truck.
[¶ 4] The affidavit also stated that (1) Milligan had confirmed with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles that a dark GMC pickup was registered in Boutilier’s name; (2) the Bethel officer had conducted multiple searches of his own property, ultimately finding nearly four hundred marijuana plants, including some with evidence of recent harvesting; (3) while searching his property, the Bethel officer had observed skid marks consistent with his cousin’s description of the threatening manner by which Boutilier had operated his truck; and (4) Milligan had flown over Boutiliеr’s property and saw “what appeared to be a
[¶ 5] The Disti'ict Court (Rumford, McElwee, J.) granted Milligan’s application and issued a search wаrrant for Bouti-lier’s property. On September 19, 2008, law enforcement officials executed the warrant. On October 16, 2008, based on evidence found by law enforcement officers who executed the search warrant, Boutilier was indicted by the Oxford County grand jury for unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1— A)(E), and marijuana cultivation (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 1117(1)(B)(3) (2010). Bout-ilier pleaded not guilty to both counts.
[¶ 6] Boutilier filed a motion for identification of the confidential informant whose information Milligan used in the search warrant application. The Superior Court (Nivison, J.) denied the motion in July 2009. Boutilier next filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to thе search warrant, requesting a Franks hearing on the veracity of the information in the affidavit provided by the confidential informant. In a subsequent filing, Boutilier argued that Milligan’s statements in his affidavit evinced a reckless disregard for the truth. In January 2010, the court (Clifford, J.) denied the motion.
[¶ 7] On May 20, 2010, Boutilier withdrew his not guilty pleas to the charges and entered a conditional plea of nolo con-tendere to the unlawful trafficking charge, pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The State dismissed the , cultivation charge. Following sentencing and entry of judgment, the court (Clifford, J.) stayed execution of the sentence pending this appeal.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Motion for Identification of the Confidential Informant
[¶ 8] The State may decline to disclose the identity of “a person whо has furnished information relating to or assisting in an investigation of a possible violation of a law to a law enforcement officer.” M.R. Evid. 509(a). An exception applies when the informant “may be able tо give testimony relevant to any issue in a civil or criminal case.” M.R. Evid. 509(c)(2).
[¶ 9] When a defendant alleges that a warrant is invalid based on facts attributed to confidential informants, the trial judge must decide whether in the сourt’s sound discretion disclosure of an informant’s identity is warranted.
State v. Chase (Chase I),
[¶ 10] When disclosure of an informant’s identity is sought to support a motion for a
Franks
hearing that is based on an allegation of a faulty warrant and a clаim that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed, the defendant is not required to show that the informant is able to contribute information relevant at trial as required pursuant to M.R. Evid. 509(c)(2).
Chase I,
[¶ 11] When the defendant has “presented no evidence that the informant may have knowledge relevant to the crime charged,” disclosure of the informant’s identity is not warranted.
State v. Chase
[¶ 12] We review the decision to disclose or withhold an informant’s identity for an “abuse of discretion or other error of law.”
State v. Faust,
[¶ 13] A review of the record reveals that Boutilier hаs not presented adequate evidence to support his allegation that the confidential informant’s statement served to enhance the charges against him or that the informant would have information relevant to the case at trial. Since the State specified that it relied only on the evidence found in the search of Boutilier’s property in bringing the charges against him and did not plan to call the informant at trial, Boutilier failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the informant may possess relevant knowledge that could assist in his defense at trial.
[¶ 14] Boutilier also has not met the requirement of
Chase I
that in order to succeed in requiring disclosure of an infоrmant’s identity for the purposes of a
Franks
hearing, he must raise a legitimate question or doubt as to the affiant’s, not the informant’s, credibility.
Chase I,
B. The Motion for a Franks Hearing
[¶ 15] A
Franks
hearing is an evi-dentiary hearing in which a defendant is permitted to challenge the truthfulness of statements made in an affidavit in support of a search warrant.
Franks,
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s rеquest.
Id.; see also State v. Dickinson,
[¶ 16] Boutilier argues that the court should have conducted a
Franks
hearing to ascertain whether the affiant, Special Agent Milligan, evinced a reckless disregard for the truth in his “apparent failure to make any kind of inquiry [into]
[¶ 17] Boutilier’s arguments and thе evidence provided “do not constitute a substantial preliminary showing” that Milli-gan’s warrant affidavit “misstated or omitted facts ... in reckless disregard of whether such misstatements or omissions would mislead the warrant judge.”
See Dickinson,
[¶ 18] Regarding the second element of the
Franks
standard, whether the “allegedly false stаtement is necessary to the finding of probable cause,” there was sufficient evidence — even without the statements attacked by Boutilier — presented in the affidavit to support a finding of probablе cause.
See Franks,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. We decline to address the issue of which standard of review, clear error or de novo, applies to review of the denial of a
Franks
hearing because the court’s decision must be affirmed under either standard.
See State v. McInnis,
. Boutilier also challenged the other paragraphs of Milligan’s affidavit for a variety of alleged failings, none of which are relevant to the Franks inquiry. As such, we do not address those concerns.