State v. BoudetteState v. Boudette
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Appellant, Gregory W. Boudette, challenges the constitutionality 1 of two traffic-law-enforcement statutes, and raises three issues on appeal:
(1) IsA.R.S. § 28-1075(B) void for vagueness because it does not specify what evidence of identity, other than a driver’s license, a driver may offer, and is therefore subject to arbitrary enforcement?
(2) IsA.R.S. § 28-1075(B) unconstitutional because it punishes people for exercising their right to remain silent during the investigation of a traffic offense?
(3) IsA.R.S. § 28-1074 unconstitutional because it empowers police officers to stop vehicles to investigate civil traffic violations, rather than for suspicion of criminal activity?
We agree with Boudette that part of
FACTS
A Phoenix police officer stopped Boud-ette to cite him for allegedly turning left on a red arrow, in violation of
Boudette was cited for failing to remain stopped for a red traffic signal, in violation of
Boudette contested all three citations. Boudette sought to suppress his statements to the officer on the ground that they were coerced. The municipal court judge denied all of his motions. The court found Boudette responsible on the red-light violation and guilty of the other two traffic violations. At sentencing on December 3, 1987, the court fined Boudette $65 for failing to remain stopped at a red signal, $119 for failing to produce identification, and $411 for driving on a suspended license. The court denied Boudette’s motion to vacate the judgment. Boudette appealed the convictions to the superior court, which affirmed all three.
Boudette challenges
The statute states:
The operator of a motor vehicle who, after stopping as required by subsection A of this section, fails or refuses to exhibit his operator’s or chauffeur’s license as required by § 28-423 or an operator who is not licensed and who fails or refuses to provide evidence of his identity upon request is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor.
1. Vagueness
The thrust of Part B of this statute is to penalize motorists who refuse to display their driver’s licenses or, if they do not have licenses, who refuse to give other identifying information. Boudette argues that this provision in the statute is unconstitutional because it allows police officers to arbitrarily determine when unlicensed drivers have sufficiently. identified themselves and because it fails to give drivers fair and adequate notice of what proof of identity suffices to comply with the statute.
The Attorney General of Arizona has interpreted “evidence of his identity” as requiring unlicensed drivers to produce the functional equivalent of a driver’s license that would enable a law-enforcement officer or traffic agent to fill out the standardized Arizona traffic ticket and complaint. Ariz.Atty.Gen.Op. 188-016 (1988). This functional equivalent of a driver’s license, according to the attorney general, must be a government-issued identification card that provides the officer or agent with information such as the driver’s full name, residence, physical description, social security number and date of birth. Id. at 2, 3.
However, the Phoenix City Attorney, on behalf of the state, concedes that the statute is vague as it applies to unlicensed motorists, citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). In Kolender, the United States Supreme Court struck down a statute that allowed police officers to arrest people who loitered or wandered on the streets for failure to provide “credible and reliable” identification. Id. at 353-54, 103 S.Ct. at 1856, 75 L.Ed.2d at 906. The statute thus gave a police officer virtually complete discretion to determine whether the suspect provided sufficient identification. Id. at 358, 103 S.Ct. at 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d at 909. The Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encouraged arbitrary enforcement “by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute.” Id. at 361, 103 S.Ct. at 1860, 75 L.Ed.2d at 911.
We agree that the part of
The part of the statute which is invalid is severable from the balance of the
When
We therefore hold that the part of
2. Fifth Amendment
Boudette argues that
The right to use the public highways is not an unlimited right; it is always subject to reasonable regulation under the state’s police power. State v. Burns, 121 Ariz. 471, 591 P.2d 563 (App.1979); Wood-head v. Kansas Dep’t of Rev., 13 Kan. App.2d 145, 765 P.2d 167 (1988). A driver’s license is a statutorily mandated condition for operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways. We hold that the police reasonably demanded production of Boudette’s driver’s license in exercise of the state’s police power to regulate the use of motor vehicles.
AUTHORITY TO STOP MOTORISTS FOR CIVIL TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
Finally, Boudette argues that the officer had no authority to stop him for violating a civil traffic law. To lawfully stop a motorist, Boudette contends, police
In 1983, the Arizona Legislature amended
We recognize that the fourth amendment applies to any governmental action, not just one arising out of possible criminal activity. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) (federal inspection under interstate commerce power of health and safety of work place); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (inspection of warehouse for municipal fire code violations); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (inspection of residence for municipal fire code violations). The essential purpose of the fourth amendment is to impose a standard of “reasonableness” upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement officers, in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by the government. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979). The constitutionality of a governmental seizure, therefore, must be judged by balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s fourth amendment interests against the importance of the legitimate governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).
Stopping an automobile and detaining its driver to serve a traffic citation is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, even though the detention is brief and the purpose of the stop is limited. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 99 S.Ct. at 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d at 667. Therefore, a stop to serve a traffic citation must comport with the constitutional requirement of reasonableness.
Moreover, even if we accepted Boud-ette’s argument that the officer could not stop him for a civil violation, his interpretation of the law is hypertechnical at best. Fourth amendment cases often use the term “public offenses” when discussing search and seizure issues.
See, e.g., State v. Ochoa,
112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097 (1976). The word “crime” includes violations of public laws, such as traffic regulations.
See, e.g., Callan v. Wilson,
127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888);
People v. Babb,
103 Cal.App.2d 326, 229 P.2d 843 (1951);
see also State v. Inman,
301 A.2d 348 (Me.1973);
Squadrito v. Griebsch,
1 N.Y.2d 471, 154 N.Y.S.2d 37, 136 N.E.2d 504 (1956). In Arizona, an offense for which a sentence is a fine only is considered a petty offense, as defined in the criminal code.
For the above reasons, we hold that
CONCLUSION
We reverse Boudette’s conviction for violating
Notes
. Boudette relies only on federal constitutional law. As a result, we do not address any state 164 Arizona Reports — 8 constitutional issues.
.
Every licensee shall have a legible operator’s or chauffeur’s license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the license, upon demand by a justice of the peace, a police officer or a field deputy or inspector of the department. However, no person served a complaint for violating this section shall be found responsible if he produces in court or the office of the police officer, field deputy or inspector of the department a legible operator’s or chauffeur’s license or an authorized duplicate of the license issued to him and valid at the time of the alleged violation of this section.
.
A. A person violating any provision of this title, or failing or refusing to do or perform any act or thing required by this title, is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor, unless the statute defining the offense provides for a different classification. This subsection does not apply to any provision or requirement of chapter 3, 4 or 6 or chapter 7, article 8 or chapter 8, article 3.2 of this title.
B. Any violation of or failure or refusal to do or perform any act or thing required by chapter 3, 4 or 6 or chapter 7, article 8 or chapter 8, article 3.2 of this title constitutes a civil traffic violation unless the statute defining the violation provides for a different classification. Civil traffic violations are subject to the provisions of chapter 6, articles ?0 and 21 of this title.
(Footnotes omitted.) Chapter 3 deals with motor vehicle registration; chapter 4, operators and chauffeurs; chapter 6, traffic laws; chapter 7, article 8, motor carrier financial responsibility; chapter 8, article 3.2, vehicle service transporter plates. Chapter 6, article 20 deals with parties, procedures upon arrest and reports in criminal cases, and article 21 outlines procedure for adjudication of civil traffic violations.