¶ 1 Aaron Boozer appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of marijuana. Boozer’s counsеl filed a brief in compliance with
Anders v. California,
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2 “We view the facts and аll reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions.”
State v. Powers,
¶ 3 Looking through the passenger side window, Offiсer D noticed what he believed was the handle of a handgun protruding from underneath the driver’s seat. He whispered
¶ 4 Boozer was charged with possession of marijuana, a class six felony. The Statе alleged Boozer had two historical prior felony convictions and also filed an allegation of aggravating circumstances other than historical priors. Prior to trial, Boozer filed a motion to suppress all evidence seizеd as a result of the search, alleging the officers did not have a search warrant or reasonable suspicion to search his vehicle. The court held a two-day hearing on the motion, during which the court heard testimony from Officers P and D, as well as Joseph Romani, Boozer’s investigator. At the conclusion of the heai’ing, the trial court denied Boozer’s motion to suppress evidence of the marijuana found during the search.
¶ 5 Boozer waived his right to a jury trial. The parties submitted the issue оf guilt to the trial court on a stipulated record, which included the testimony of Officers P and D and Romani from the suppression hearing, as well as the results of the chemical test on the marijuana found during the search. The court found Boozer guilty of pоssession of marijuana, sentenced him to the presumptive prison term of one year, and awarded him 57 days of presеntence incarceration credit. This appeal followed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12 — 120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031 (2001), and 13-4033(A) (Supp. 2008).
ANALYSIS
¶ 6 Having considered defense counsel’s brief and еxamined the record for reversible error,
see Leon,
¶ 7 We have determined, however, that the trial court incorrectly calculated that Boozer was entitled to 57 days of presentence incarceration credit. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-709(B) (2001), a defendant is entitled to presentence incarceration credit for “[a]U time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonmеnt....” The record reveals that Boozer was in custody for two days, on January 4, 2005, and December 27, 2006, before being taken into сustody again on April 9, 2008. He remained in custody from April 9 until he was sentenced on June 4, 2008. Boozer, therefore, was incarcerated for a total of 58 days prior to sentencing, and he should be awarded one additional day of presentence incarceration credit. We hereby modify the sentence to reflect this.
See
Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.17(b);
State v. Stevens,
¶ 8 Pursuant to
State v. Shattuck,
CONCLUSION
¶ 9 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Boozer’s conviction and sentence but modify his sentence to reflect one additional day of presentence inсarceration credit.
Notes
. We note that Boozer was eligible for mandatory probation under A.R.S. § 13-901.01 (Supp. 2008). At the sentencing hearing, however, Boozer rejected probation, and the trial court was therefore required to sentence him to imprisonment. See A.R.S. 13-901.01(H)(3) (person shall be sentenced pursuant to Chapter 34 if court finds the person rejected probation).
