State v. BolickState v. Bolick
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Campbell
ON MOTION TO REQUIRE ENTRY OF WRITTEN ORDER
PER CURIAM.In this case the state has filed a notice of its intent to appeal an order of the circuit court granting appellee Edward Bolick’s motion to dismiss charges of trafficking in cocaine, aggravated assault, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court apparently has refused to enter a written order of dismissal, and so the state has requested that this court require her to do so because a written order is necessary to secure the right of appeal. Billie v. State, 473 So.2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).1 However, because we find that the trial court’s decision would not be reviewable under any circumstances we decline to consider the state’s motion and instead dismiss this appeal.
Bolick’s trial began on December 18, 1986. After the jury was sworn and several witnesses had testified, the state sought to introduce certain incriminating statements allegedly made by Bolick following his arrest. Bolick objected to the admission of these statements on the grounds that the state had not proven corpus delicti. See Stone v. State, 378 So.2d 765 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 407, 66 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980). The trial court sustained Bolick’s objection. Hereafter the denouement becomes rather confusing. The court would not grant a directed verdict because the state had not yet rested
An order dismissing all or part of an indictment or information is among those from which the state is permitted an interlocutory appeal.
Motion denied; appeal dismissed.
RYDER, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and HALL, JJ., concur.
Notes
. In State v. Kahler, 224 So.2d 272, 275 (Fla.1969), Justice Ervin, concurring specially, opined that the state should be permitted to take an appeal from a minute book entry in those situations where the court obviously will do no more than orally dismiss or quash criminal charges. However, the definition of “order” in the rules of appellate procedure specifically excludes minutes or minute book entries.
. We do not mean to suggest that the state always should be foreclosed from appealing an adverse ruling just because a jury has been sworn. Conceivably a defendant who agrees to litigate in mid-trial an issue which should have been disposed of prior to trial, and which under normal circumstances the state would be permitted to appeal, might be estopped from complaining that a favorable ruling also necessitates termination of trial. However, because we view the trial court’s ruling in the present case as essentially a non-appealable judgment of acquittal, we are not faced with this precise question.