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State v. Bolder
635 S.W.2d 673
Mo.
1982
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*1 Missouri, Respondent, STATE of

Martsay BOLDER, Appellant.

No. 62362. Missouri,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

July 1982. Aug.

Rehearing Denied

WELLIVER, Judgе. mur- was convicted 1978,1 565.001, and the der, RSMo § 565.- pursuant § him to death sentenced orig- jurisdiction has 008(1). This Court V, 3. Our art. appeal. § inal Mo.Const. al- both consideration includes review review of the errors and leged trial affirm both We sentence. 565.014. the sen- murder and conviction tence of death.

I Missouri in the offense occurred Appellant Bolder Penitentiary. degree mur- for first serving a life sentence der. approximately 3:15 March

On Giboney m., Kenneth vocational teachers p. truck returning by Luecke were and Arthur they came University. As from Lincoln *5 A B as 5 & building identified around the and the maintenance headed toward and ap- what shop, Giboney observed machine and told fighting two inmates peared to be got men truck. Both stop Luecke to from the thirty feet out of the truck some inmate, later They saw an altercation. King, lying against identified as Theron A sitting position. partially wall in a inmate, appellant, as later identified second making strik- King and standing was over King’s toward stabbing motions ing or trying King appeared to be stomach. attempt get in an from side to side move in- third An unidentified way. out of the or three within two approached to mate back with dropped and then pair feet of the iden- The inmate later his in the air. arms up, backed straightened appellant tified as toward then headed away King, from and building. No 5 A & B the entrance of the present at were known to be others a Luecke saw Giboney nor scene. Neither Levine, City, appel- Lori Jefferson for J. at the time. weapon lant. B for the 5 A & headed appellant As started entrance, King rose and Ashcroft, Gen., building Nancy Kelley Atty.

John shop. and machine Baker, Gen., the maintenance City, Jefferson toward Atty. Asst. and King’s T-shirt blood on Luecke saw respondent. statutory indicated. unless otherwise references are to RSMo 1978 1. All pursued appellant back, the 5 A on building into & B tion a one and one-half inch not more than fifteen seconds behind him. wrist, right laceration on his three Johnson, Burt another officer corrections long inch stab in his wound abdomen. scene, who had arrived at the also entered Dr. at the hospital Doerhoff arrived with- building pur- and ascended the stairs in forty-five stabbing. minutes after the appellant. suit of When reached Johnson cava, King’s inferior vena which carries top steps he saw stand- intestines, kidneys, from the legs, blood ing wiping behind a desk and blood off his heart, liver to the was lacerated with a hands handkerchief. was stabbing. Dr. Doerhoff had massage wearing green jacket and a trousers red King’s heart with his hand in order to start type Luecke had seen man same on the pumping again. Because of the serious- standing King over and making stabbing wound, ness of the Dr. Doerhoff held the at motions him. Bloodstains on inferior vena cava shut with his hand while King’s were of same type clothes King was moved the operating into room. appellant, blood. Johnson frisked no found King was in surgery about an hour and weapons him, on took him back down- minutes, during given fifteen which he was stairs. pints twenty-four thirteen of blood and weapon A was search conducted in the pints of other fluids. stabbing. weap- immediate area of the No Dr. Doerhoff testified that such serious scene, on found outside but a injury to the inferior vena cava fatal plastic bag clear stained with blood ninety percent of the time. emergency The type same as King’s nearby. was found great so that Dr. did Doerhoff contained, plastic among folder other believe he had time to establish sterile things, paper appellant’s per- inmate condition and save King’s still life. He correspondence. sonal Prison officials performed operation King found knife with fresh blood the 5 on it in wearing cap, a mask although he did building padlocked A & B behind a set of gloves. sterile surgical wear twenty metal doors fifteen to down a feet hallway and to left of the entrance King was then transferred to the Univer- entering. had been seen A seven- *6 26,1979, Medical sity Center. On March he eighths space separates inch the bottom surgery remedy pericarditis, had to an in- the doors from the floor. The was knife flammation of the sac surrounding the enough thin to have been slid beneath the King again heart. underwent surgery on doors. When investigation the area was 3, 1979, April because he had suffered a completed, appellant was the taken to of- heart attack. Various other procedures Lock, fice of Urban a penitentiary investi- were conducted in order to determine the gator, for questioning. apparent cause King’s infection in Jeffries, Officer Homer who had arrived 14, 1979, abdomen. On April King had a scene, King walking at the saw the toward operation prevent- fourth because infection shop. maintenance and machine He fol- ed the scar holding tissue from one of his King approximately lowed and reached him knife wounds closed. seventy feet from where he had been King April Lowery died 1979. Dr. stabbed and started to escort to him the Arnold, performed who autopsy the on hospital. prison traveling After about King’s body, in testified his medical feet, King go said he could no further. opinion King generalized died from a infec- King was then carried to the penitentiary caused by tion a stab wound to the abdo- on hospital Dr. Bow- stretcher. Richard men. King ers examined and called immediately Lock, Investigator returning surgeon, to his office King Dr. Doerhoff. was Alan duties, appellant from other found and the in shock when Dr. first saw him at Bowers hospital. guard brought ques- who had him King had a one inch lacera- there shoulder, right tioning. Investigator tion on his a two inch lacera- Lock saw red stains yard names. He left and returned clothing appeared to be appellant’s bag right plastic containing papers and appellant’s a cut on with the blood and saw knife, it right got put He correspondence. smeared blood on his finger index and bag, King wanted to and where appellant plastic asked if he returned to hand. Lock incident, re- he appellant King and what had Appellant talk about the was. asked Leroy earlier, Lt. “a plied King pussy- he wanted talk to and called him said Looten was and came Appellant pulled Looten. Lt. called out assed-nigger.” then Lt. Looten went into within minutes. King.2 knife and stabbed and, office, appellant’s request, Investi- closed the

gator Lock left room and II spoke less appellant door. Lt. Looten Appellant the trial court argues that minute, than thir- probably than not more overruling judgment motion for erred in his seconds, ty only him forty-five and told at the of the state’s evi acquittal close actually truth because would to tell the it submitting dence and in was be to do so. said he better instruction, directing verdict MAI-CR2d statement, thereupon and ready to make 15.02, because there was no credible evi into the Investigator Lock called back upon dence which the could have found rights, said Appellant was room. read (1) guilty stabbing cutting King, and him them, signed he a waiver. understood (2) intending King, knowing to kill promises, no evidence There was practically King’s he was certain to cause threats, other coercion. Nor was there death, (4) reflecting fully and cooly appellant under- any allegation that did not King upon killing doing before so. In as signed. Appellant waiver he stand the evidence, sessing sufficiency we before he was read his made no statement accept as true and infer must all evidence rights. refused to written state- He make a tend to verdict support ences that ment, in Lt. Looten’s he made presence all inferences to disregard evidence and Lock. Investigator an oral statement contrary. inquiry Our is limited whether oral Appellаnt’s statement offered evidence, light most viewed fa sentencing phase in the of the trial. state, support vorable to the is sufficient to Lock Investigator testified that Turner, the verdict. State v. 623 S.W.2d said the incident went back four to six 1981); Strickland, (Mo. banc King to when was his cell mate. months 1980). Appellant said that who mur- King knew single of a testimony witness tell appellant’s dered brother but would not identity is sufficient to establish the of a Lindsey him. Frank became cell defendant believes Thereafter, criminal if King mate after moved out. beyond a reasonable v. Tuck King began harrassing telling doubt. State *7 91, er, (Mo.1970); appellant Lindsey that were en- 451 S.W.2d 95 State v. others and Stockdale, 769, (Mo.1967); 771 gaging Appellant in homosexual S.W.2d activities. Williams, 133, Ap- said got he tired of such accusations. State v. 376 S.W.2d witness, pellant (Mo.1964). on walk- said that March 14 he was In this case not one two, ing appellant standing A B he saw building King to the 5 & when observed over King sitting making striking stabbing and another on the or motions inmate and ledge. They appellant King’s Appellant called as he names toward stomach. was Ap- an by, wiping walked and followed. found blood off his hands with a handkerchief; pellant being not called he said he did like clothes when shaped ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍Investigator hearing Lock the on with a white handle and with a hole in recounted at however, suppress testimony, of the blade. the motion to that statement the end was not elicited the port, This sentencing phase appellant during said that he saw officers the of when trial, building Investigator he written walked into the 5 A & B and tossed and Lock’s re- may appellant may the knife. He said described the which not have included facts, long a homemade one inches was not admitted into evidence. knife as about ten these found type were of the same The evidence King’s support was sufficient to the wearing; assailant was and the stains on verdict.

his clothing were of blood of the type same King’s. Second, the knife wound in Ill King’s abdomen severed one of the major Appellant a number of raises constitu- blood body, vessels in and killing “[a] challenges tional through a deadly weapon the use of on a statutory procedures Missouri’s part vital for im- of the victim is body suffi it, posing all of which we find permit finding cient to of meritless. intent to kill.” Strickland, State v. 609 S.W.2d at 394. It King

makes no difference died from an A infection resulting stabbing from the rather Appellant argues that the death sen stabbing than from the itself. tence punish violates the cruel and unusual legally responsible. nevertheless is See eighth ment clause of the amendment and Brandt, 948, (Mo. State v. 467 S.W.2d process еqual protection due clauses 1971); 544, Cooley, State v. 387 S.W.2d of the fourteenth amendment the United (Mo.1965). Third, the jury could have He argues States also Constitution. that it found from the seriousness of the stab I, violates process the due clause of Art. appellant wound that knew he practi 10, the punishment § cruel and unusual cally King’s certain to cause death. Final- I, clause of Art. and the ly, the “natural § beyond could have found I, right to life” clause Art. 2 of the § reasonable doubt the killing occurred Missouri Constitution. Our premeditation deliberation, after discussion in which Newlon, State v. may be 627 S.W.2d inferred from 612-13 circumstances of cert, (Mo. 1982), homicide, Strickland, petition filed, for (U.S. 5, 1982) (No. May 81-6660), S.W.2d at 394. U.S.L.W. present Premeditation is equal protection claim, whenever the answers all but defendant thinks about the time, id., find, any length act for and we cannot however does not short, Wood, offer, sustaining State v. a reason it. We see no denied, banc), cert. accept appellant’s 101 reason to invitation to (1980), 66 L.Ed.2d 98 previous before he reconsider our holding. finding acts. A depends of deliberation not so much upon upon the time involved as B

inference drawn reasonably from the evi Appellant contends that the sentencing dence surrounding and circumstances hearing, separated guilt phase from the Appellant’s act. Id. statement was not trial, 565.006(2), unconstitutional during before the jury guilt phase unduly because burdens his decision trial, but the nevertheless could whether to in his testify own behalf in have premeditation found from the facts against violation of privilege self-in- the attack occurred in an area not crimination conferred the fifth towers, amend- visible guard prisoners from the are ment; (2) adequate it denies him assistance weapons, carry allowed to and there counsel, in contravention of the sixth was no King evidence of bruises either amendment, because there is inadequate that would indicate that an prepare punishment time to preceded altercation stabbing. phase Those *8 of might déliberation, factors the trial but, guilt also indicate after conclusion of the event, phase; in any (3) and is provoca “cooling evidence of there no off” “[w]ith period tion lacking, previously guilt the between punishment demonstrated the and intent provided phases permit jurors to kill “to objective, deliberation.” State the an Sturdivan, 139, 142 unbiased, (Mo.1973), unprejudiced S.W.2d examination of the grounds, overruled on other State v. Ander factors in assessing pun- must consider son, 1974). S.W.2d ishment.” sentencing strategy choose betwеen his and respect to the

Appellant argues guilt in order testifying during phase the that the statute “extends first contention his We fail jury story.” those that the does hear pre-sentence hearings only to criminal impinges upon appel- how charged with and convicted of to see the statute defendants not to murder,” testify right lant’s even if it does “impossible is to capital whether, and predict be indeed burden his decision opportunity whether an will case, to when, explain testify. The facts in this mitigate to or after the available furthermore, support theory or do not a guilt phase whether should defendant] [a during deprives the of effective testify phase to insure that statute by restricting his stra- evidence reaches the finder of assistance of counsel mitigating cap- fact,” tegic options.3 Appellant, and that a “is to convicted of defendant forced plain posed. argues capital murder in which the 3. The state that under the lan- In cases penalty may imposed by jury guage be be a or of 565.006 would entitled § judge sitting jury, presentence hearing regardless of a additional to a which without the procedure guilty rights, provided that his in 565.012 shall crime-he was found therefore, and section abridged. jury, judge way can in no be The or in cases be Section followed. the by provides: judge, tried fix a a shall sentence within 565.006 by prescribed judge the impose law. The shall upon limits 1.At the conclusion of all trials by jury fixed the sentence the or capital indictment or information for murder cannot, judge. jury jury, If within a reasona- by argument the of heard a and after coun- time, agree punishment, judge court, ble to the proper charge the sel and from the the impose jury guilty shall law; sentence within the limits of the shall retire to consider a verdict of that, except judge guilty any the shall in no in- or not punishment, without consideration of when, ascertain, impose by stance cases upon the death in and their verdict by jury, jury agree guilty capital a the cannot the of tried whether defendant murder, degree, punishment. in murder in the fírst murder the degree, manslaughter, appeal or not 3.If the trial court is reversed on the second only any nonjury presentence guilty capital in error the of offense. In because of hearing, cases, may trial which murder the court shall likewise first the new be ordered finding guilty only punishment. guilty apply a or not shall to the issue of consider of with- Moore, (Emphasis added.) any punishment, by In State consideration of and out its verdict is ascertain, (Mo.App.1981), argued whether the the state defendant murder, capital just provides guilty opposite i.e., murder in that the of the first statute — presentence hearing only degree, slaughter, degree, murder in the second man- for ant is when a defend- any guilty charged or is of offense. with and convicted of not jury judge prevailed. Regardless returns whether 2.Where or a ver- murder—and appellant’s argument of meritorious, finding guilty provided question dict or of as in sub- is decide, section, expressly 1 of this the court shall re- we do not the state’s incon- section sume the trial and conduct a sistency presentence gives us cause concern. Further- more, hearing jury judge neglects point before or state out which H.B.251, by 565.006 amended § time the issue shall be the determination 80th Gen. Assem., punishment imposed. Reg.Sess., The of the hearing, subject to be In such 1st 1979Mo.Laws 634. evidence, September amended to the laws of version became effective 28, 1979, jury judge or additional the trial in case. The shall hear evidence before this extenuation, mitigation, aggravation changed and to read as amendment follows: subsection including any punishment, the record of prior of pleas upon guilty At the of all an indict- criminal convictions conclusion trials defendant, pleas ment by proper heard or of nolo contendere of the or informаtion murder argument any prior jury, absence such criminal and after of counsel or the convictions court, jury pleas. Only charge shall such from evidence guilty aggravation prosecution verdict not has made retire consider a or guilty any punish- prior consideration of to the defendant trial shall without known be cases, nonjury capital jury judge ment. admissible. The or shall also In murder finding argument by first or his coun- court shall likewise consider hear sel and the the defendant attorney regarding guilty guilty any prosecuting not consideration imposed. punishment. jury capital give punishment prose- In each to be case, attorney cuting open shall not instructions shall defendant the court included offense which could shall conclude the lesser presented judge. Upon supported be the evidence conclusion of the evidence and judge give jury ap- arguments, the 565.006(1), shall case. Supp.1981 (emphasis propriate RSMo add- instructions and the shall ed). language punishment deleted the to determine the be im- The amendment retire *9 murder, ital presentence hearing received a sentence at the same time it determines and thus was given opportunity guilt.

present story jury. his to the He chose not fact, appellant to do so. In offered no C guilt еvidence at all at either the or sen- Appellant next contends that tencing phase of the trial. the aggravating circumstance jury Both appellant’s second and third case, found in this capital mur “[t]he contentions concern the time between the der was by person committed a in .. . the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. In lawful custody place of a ... of lawful 946, v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d confinement,” 565.012(2)(9),is § unconstitu 1981), we rejected the claim that tional subjects because it prisoners because phases time between the is insufficient for of their status as such to a more severe a convicted to prepare argu defendant penalty than it does other members of soci ments for the sentencing phase. The ra ety. applied tionale we applies in that case Unless a statute creates a classification equal force third that burdens suspect group a impinges or here jury has an insufficient time upon interest, a fundamental in which to “we will not “cool off” after rendering a overturn varying verdict of unless the guilty. We noted that treatment “rather [it] defendant, than work a hardship groups persons on a different is so unrelat- system bifurcated is ‘an high extension of a ed to the achievement of any combination ” procеss order of the due the accused.’ Id. of legitimate purposes that we can only at 950. The Supreme United States Court conclude legislature’s actions were Gregg 153, said in v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 96 irrational.” 93, Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 2909, (1976), S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 859 97, 939, 942, 99 S.Ct. (1979). L.Ed.2d 171 a human short, life is at stake and when In [w]hen a classification trammels “[u]nless must prejudi have information personal rights fundamental or is drawn question cial guilt to the but relevant upon inherently suspect distinctions such as to the question in order to race, religion, alienage, pre- our decisions impose sentence, a rational a bifurcated sume the constitutionality of statutory the. system likely is more to ensure elimina require discriminations and only that tion of the constitutional deficiencies challenged classification rationally be relat- identified in Georgia, 408 U.S. [Furman ed to legitimate state interest.” Fried-

238, (1972) S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d 346 ]. Rogers, 1, 17, man v. 440 U.S. 191-92, (1979) Id. at 59 L.Ed.2d (quoting Appel City S.Ct. 2933-34. Dukes, lant New Orleans concedes that “[a]rguably, legisla 2513, 2516, ture need not have (1976)). extended individualized L.Ed.2d 511 sentencing hearings of the Prisoners have never type established been held to consti- suspect Furthermore, 565.006.” tute a Doubtless the will be class. prone impose less whom pas society sentence under has deemed should be system, sion in a bifurcated deprived, significant in which there to a degree, оf their is at least some time in which it can “cool liberty, and thus the classification here in- off,” than it would were it to impose the volved cannot be said to impinge upon “fun- the old subsection that allowed conviction a lesser included offense and that under sub- degree (2), language first or second murder or man- section of which was un- slaughter apparent attempt provide changed by amendment, in an presentence presentence hearing only hearing after a defendant would be held if even the defendant guilty convicted of murder. The italicized lan- were found of a crime other than guage version, however, added passed upon to the amended murder. We have never the ra- judge allows appeals the trial to instruct on lesser in- tionale that the court of articulated in language appears Moore, cluded offenses. That to im- and we do not do so now. Neither do decide,

ply, although apply we do not that the trier of we decide whether it would finding guilty fact can return a verdict or amended version of § 565.006. *10 D The rational re personal rights.” damental lationship appro is therefore the standard is uncon- Appellant argues that 565.012 § gauge the constitu priate one which to (1) (1)(4), stitutional because subsеction 565.012(2)(9), tionality of and under this § sentencing authority the requires which passes muster. The United test the statute mitigating a sufficient consider “whether Supreme has noted that be Court States which circumstance or circumstances exist principal purposes” sides the “two social outweigh aggravating ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍the circumstance “retribution and deter capital punishment, exist,” impermissi- circumstances found to by prospective crimes of rence bly places the burden on the defendant to fenders,” incapacita purpose a third “is the circumstances; (2) negate aggravating the dangerous criminals and the conse tion of jury required beyond the is not to find may quent prevention of crimes that aggravating that the cir- reasonable doubt Gregg otherwise commit the future.” outweigh cir- mitigating cumstances the n.28, Georgia, 428 at 183 & cumstances; (3) application the purpose 2929 & n.28. The latter is one 565.012(2)(9). ap In this case underlying statutory aggravating circumstances in sub- § already serving a life sentence pellant was section creates a new crime for which degree did for first murder. That sentence defendant can be convicted without first committing not deter him from a second being charged. legislature, adopting The murder. 565.012(2X9),reasonably could have con § Appellant’s argument respect penalty appropriate

cluded that the death is proof burden of is misconceived. The imprisonment already imposed when does aggravating existence of one or more cir imposition not deter murder. The outweighed by mitigat cumstances not capital punishment rationally related ing circumstances does mean that obviously legitimate to the state’s interests imposed must be automatical in preventing protecting crime and other ly. jury’s finding that one or more persons, prison employees such as and other statutory aggravating circumstances exist inmates, prisoners with whom come in con requirement is the threshold that must be tact. can, jury considering met before the after reject For this ap reason we also evidence, all the recommend the death sen pellant’s jury exceeded contention jury impose tence. The cannot death if it scope charge when, finding of its after mitigating finds that the circumstances out aggravating circumstances that “the de circumstances, weigh aggravating prior fendant has a criminal conviction for that situation one which the degree”4 murder in the first and that “at punishment is mandated. Under no circum King time of the murder of Theron jury obliged impose stances is the death. [ljawful custody defendant was in thе of a jury required “The is not to find miti confinement,”5 place opined it gating circumstance in order to make a “appears the life sentence [that of mercy binding recommendation that is already serving] was no deterant [sic] court, on the trial ... but it must find a jury’s to further crime.” The excess verbi statutory aggravating circumstance before not, age appellant argues, an at recommending a sentence of death.” tempt aggravating another circum find Gregg Georgia, 428 U.S. at was, rather, nothing stance. It more than Indeed, jury at 2936. was instructed in jury’s expression of the rationale under you if Instruction No. 21 decide lying statutory aggravating circum “[e]ven mitigating already stance that it had found. that a sufficient circumstance circumstance, nonstatutory statutory aggravating aggravating 4. This is a circum- 5. This is a 565.012(2)(9), could stance that could consider under that the consider § under 565.012(1)(1). 565.012(1)(3). § outweigh circumstances do not exist which the trial sentencing court’s discretion is *11 aggravating circumstance or guided circum- and channeled by system that exist, you stances found to are not com- focuses on the circumstances of each indi- pelled punishment.” to fix death as the vidual homicide and individual defendant deciding whether penalty the death believe, do not con We imposed. to be tends, that requires Constitution that 258, Id. at 96 at S.Ct. 2969. beyond find a reasonable doubt aggravating that circumstances out reject We therefore also weigh mitigating circumstances. Guilt argument application that the of the statu must of course be established beyond a rea tory aggravating circumstances creates a Winship, sonable doubt. In re 397 U.S. new crime for which can con be 90 (1970). S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 368 So victed being charged. without first Appel also must statutory aggravating cir argues lant capital murder for which upon cumstance or circumstances which the penalty the death imposed can be is “a jury bases its recommendation of death. separate crime from murder with 565.012(1)(4). Gregg Georgia, See v. 428 § the penalty prison of life in fifty years and 196-97, at impo U.S. S.Ct. at 2936. The parole.” without That analysis is flawed. punishment, however, sition of is not a mat crime—capital murder—is the same in by ter resolved the determination of fact both instances. The aggravat existence of subjective alone. It is a more process in ing mitigating circumstances relates not which “there be taken into account [must] guilt punishment to the therefor. the circumstances of the together offense with the propensities character and E offender.” Id. at 96 S.Ct. at 2932 Appellant argues that 565.014 is uncon- (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan (1) stitutional because the lack of similar Ashe, 51, 55, 59, 60, U.S. S.Ct. gives cases Missouri this Court no stan- (1937)). L.Ed. 43 It suffices to say that in by dard which to determine under subsec- Florida, 242, 250-53, Proffit v. 428 U.S. (3)(3) tion the sentence of death “[w]hether 257-58, 2960, 2965-67, 2969, 96 S.Ct. is excessive or disproportionate pen- (1976), L.Ed.2d 913 the United States Su alty imposed cases, in similar considering preme Court thoroughly considered this defendant”; both the (2) crime and the statutory balancing process and found no (5) because subsections do not re- infirmity. constitutional The Court stated quire this Court “to consider all murder had, cases wherein the defendant any at the various factors to be con- [w]hile point in the proceedings, been charged or by sentencing sidered authorities do chargeable murder” and there not have numerical weights assigned to therefore adequate is no standard of re- them, the requirements of Furman are view. sentencing satisfied when the authority’s guided discretion is and channeled re- Appellant’s argument with respect quiring specific examination of factors to the first contention is that “only seven argue against imposi- favor of or persons in the State of Missouri have been tion of the penalty, death thus eliminat- assessed the penalty death and in no case ing capriciousness totаl arbitrariness and are the facts similar to those in the case at imposition. in its bar.” This presupposes that we given

The directions can consider those judge cases in which the by the ... statute are sufficiently penalty imposed clear has been under the precise 26,1977. aggra- enable the various law May effective is not the Such vating weighed circumstances to be case. Our concern is that there be “even against result, mitigating handed, rational, ones. As a imposition and consistent Currently, Penitentiary. 17 men are on death row in the Missouri State processing herent in the sentences under law.” Jurek v. of death 262, 276, 96 2950, 2958, “[njothing suggests because ... Texas, case” 428 U.S. the decision to afford an individual defend- (1976). inquiry would 49 L.Ed.2d 929 Our mercy ant violates the Constitution.” unduly compare only slanted were we to be at 2937. Relevant cases in which the death has those appropriateness cases for a review of the imposed. been We therefore can consider judge the sentence are those in which the in which both death as similar cases “[t]hose guilty defendant jury first found the imprisonment and life were submitted to capital murder and thereafter chose be- Mercer, jury.” imprisonment tween death or life *12 banc), denied, - U.S. -, (Mo. 11 cert. fifty possibility parole of for at lеast 432, (1981). 102 70 L.Ed.2d 240 See S.Ct. need not years.8 comparison Our therefore n.56, Gregg Georgia, v. 428 at 204 96 U.S. include cases such as those in which the at 2939 n.56. Included are those cases charge with state chose not defendant appeal, have been affirmed on v. that State murder, capital agreed plea to a the state Mercer, 11, 618 at and those that S.W.2d bargain whereby pled guilty a defendant pred was have been reversed if the reversal charge, a lesser the conviction was for an upon disproportionality icated of the murder, capital less than or the offense sentence, e.g., McIlvoy, v. 629 S.W.2d State penalty. state waived the death (Mo. 1982). may banc We also consider pending before this in order to cases Court F juries penalties determine what have im Appellant’s challenge final to the factually in posed similar situations. See constitutionality system is that Williams, 619, (La. v. State So.2d capital procedure bifurcated denies Williams, 75, 1980); 56, v. 205 Neb. equal protection argu him of the laws. His denied, (1979), 287 N.W.2d cert. charged capital ment is he is with 101 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d 120 murder, wholly prose a decision within the (1980). argument, Appellant’s carried to its discretion, subject cutor’s and thus is to the conclusion, logical cap would mean that our process; prior bifurcаted that his convic punishment ital statute was unconstitution aggravating tions and other circumstances al from the instant it became effective be him; against thus can be trial used point cause at that there were no similar required court is the jury to instruct on comparison.7 accept cases for We cannot degree manslaughter second murder and this rationale. capital lesser offenses included within mur accept argument

Neither do we der; charged that defendants with second that we must consider all murder cases in degree manslaughter murder or are not point which the defendant had at some in subject process to the bifurcated and cannot proceedings charged chargeable been prior aggravating have convictions and cir them; capital Supreme with murder. The Court against cumstances used and that Gregg rejected analogous in greater an claim of therefore bears a burden unconstitutionality opportu based “the charged on than do defendants with second in- discretionary degree manslaughter. nities for action that are murder or majority rejected Judge Supreme Mercer of The United States Court has found the Court infirmity comparison argument no constitutional in the Seiler’s dissent “similаr capital punishment meaning 565.014.3(3) cases decided under old cases” within the of § inception procedure encompasses statutes “at the of the new “all cases in which the state any post-Furman capital the absence of penalty, in which life waived the death all cases comparison.” Gregg cases available taken, imprisonment given appeal and no n.56, Georgia, 428 U.S. capital ... all cases in which murder was n.56, (1976). 49 L.Ed.2d 859 We have not charged guilty but the found defendant necessary found it to do so. capital than Id. at lesser crime murder.” J., (Seiler, dissenting). 20-21 implicit 8. This was in our decision in State v. Mercer, 1981). 618 S.W.2d 1 In noted, however, recently As we spurious. Appellant hypothesis. This is murder, ... capital convicted of not second studies are not conclusive.” “[t]he Mercer, at 7-8. degree manslaughter. murder or He makes State Since neither evidence nor capital no contention that the murder sen- we have before us bias, allegation we tencing procedure applied differently of other evidence among deny request evidentiary hearing. of that of- for an defendants convicted charged fense. Whether defendants the tri Appellant argues next of a lesser murder but convicted Witherspoon overruling court viоlated ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍al equal protection offense are denied no prosecutor in limine because the his motion equal pro- concern to him whatsoever.9 His questions thus was allowed to ask not aimed rights abridged. tection have not been exposing “unmistakably predis clear position opposition” irrevocable IV punishment impossible that “makes it for a arguments next makes three juror finding guilt regardless to make a concerning questions prosecutor asked presented.” Witherspoon of the evidence their views the death veniremen about from applies answers elicited venire penalty and the trial court’s dismissal of *13 questions men rather than the asked on voir one venirewoman for cause. Furthermore, nothing Witherspoon dire. in first contends that a may indicates that venireman be excused trial committed constitutional error court only for cause if his view of the death prohibit when it overruled his motion to penalty prevent would him from ever re prosecutor asking jurors they from whether turning guilty. Supreme a verdict of The objected opposed capital punishment. to or stated, rather, in Witherspoon Court that argues allowing He state to chal that may veniremen be for cause if excused lenge peremptorily for cause or strike ve “unmistakably make clear ... that their opposed will penalty niremen to the death penalty attitude toward the death would conviction, produce jury rather is prevent making impartial them from an rejected penalty, prone. than death We guilt.’’ decision as to the defendant’s 391 Mercer, this v. 618 State n. at 1776-77 U.S. at 522-23 88 S.Ct. 7-8, Mitchell, v. S.W.2d at and State (some added). emphasis n.21 See also Ad 223, 229(Mo. 1981). banc Neverthe S.W.2d Texas, 38, 45, ams v. 448 U.S. 100 S.Ct. less, appellant, citing Griggs Mabry, v. 637 2521, 2526, (1980) (“[t]he 65 L.Ed.2d (8th 1980), for the requests F.2d 525 Cir. may jurors insist ... will con State appeal granted first time on that he be impartially”). decide the facts sider and evidentiary hearing to show that his death- reject appellant’s We also third qualified was biased toward conviction jury contention that the trial court erred in ex thereby prejudiced. he was The and that cluding one member of the cause Illinois, Witherspoon v. Supreme Court in panel. After venirewoman Bealmer indi 1770, 1774, 510, 517, 88 391 U.S. scruples against capital punish cated her (1968), noted that evidence L.Ed.2d ment, following occurred: fragmentary to establish “too tentative and Would the fact that [PROSECUTOR]: jurors opposed penalty to the death not there, the death would that prosecution favor the in the deter tend to judge the facts? your ability affect Witherspoon sev guilt.” mination of Since BEALMER: empirical stu eral scholars have conducted VENIRE[WOMAN] disprove the Yes.10 attempt prove in an dies colloquy follows: defend- 10. The entire was as 9. We intimate no view on whether all of, with, charged ants those convicted ... [PROSECUTOR]: subject to the bifurcated murder are judge you charge here is mur- The told supra. procedure. See note 3 der, charge that has Martsay lodged against been the defendant determining it has in added.) sound discretion (Emphasis Thereafter the trial in crimi- court, appellant, grant from whether to a continuance objection Oliver, prosecutor’s challenge 572 S.W.2d nal case. See State sustained Witherspoon 1978). violation. We find no cause. question specific, was and the answer court also has discre The trial of her view to- unequivocal. Because tion whether to order a defendant re penalty, the death venirewoman

ward is necessary strained whenever it to main appellant’s guilt could not have determined security tain order in the courtroom. impartially. Allen, 337, 343, Illinois v. 397 U.S. V 1057, 1060, (1970); 25 L.Ed.2d Appellant contends the trial court Richards, (Mo.1971). Giv in refusing grant erred a continuance recalcitrance, en the trial court go forcing and in him to to trial in chains justified ordering appellаnt bound. prison clothing and with an armed Appellant, upset the trial court’s re argues guard at his side. He that he was grant fusal to the continuance and to re given time to down and that his calm counsel, move appellant’s appointed over appearance prejudiced in such condition library pretrial turned a table confer against him. guards approximate ence and scuffled with minutes; ly five over his chair in knocked began 5,1980. Appellant’s May trial attempting courtroom while to rise and dire, At conference before voir by guards; had to be subdued resisted be orally requested a in order continuance ing witnesses, placed required in his chair and potential interview four in four all him; guards and continually in the to hold assert penitentiary. Appellant’s ap mates ed that he remain in pointed ap counsel stated that he had told would not the court *14 pellant appellant present repeatedly that would no evi room. The trial court ap told May pellant dence until at least 6. The trial court that he would not be bound if he promised denied continuance and indicated that it He Appel to behave. did not. contends, nevertheless, issue subpoenas poten would the four lant that he should tial witnesses so рast would be availa not have been shackled the first day of actions, interviewing morning ble for of trial. May Given and the cannot say We that the trial court abused fact that been appellant had convicted of Bolder, you right I indicate to now we intend BEALMER: Do I have VENIRE[WOMAN] penalty yes to seek the death on the case. Is to answer or no? anyone there here the first row who be- You have to answer [PROSECUTOR]: as religious scruples you you of cause against either or moral best as truthful can and can. you penalty you the death don’t think BEALMER: Well VENIRE[WOMAN] guilty bad, death,

would be able someone to find on the is I don’t like but— charge capital you of murder? Let me ask this: Do [PROSECUTOR]: think, you knowing your BEALMER: Yes. VENIRE[WOMAN] if verdict is you again, Let me ask penalty [PROSECUTOR]: based death on the fact that the you scruples against indicate of that because you background, there in do think that penalty you you the death don’t believe your could ability judge would interfere facts, to with guilty capital find someone murder? you impose proof a would burden VENIRE BEALMER: I don’t [WOMAN] greater penalty— on me if the death think so. object, I he is [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: be- the State of Missou- If [PROSECUTOR]: ginning juror. argue to with guilty jury ri—If returns verdict of THE COURT: Sustained. you phase go into the second Would the fact that [PROSECUTOR]: trial, punishment. then issue is there, penalty your death would that affect jury presеnted After the issue is ability judge to the facts? jury still has to assess BEALMER: Yes. VENIRE[WOMAN] that, imprisonment. Knowing you life do (Emphasis added.) your ability think it would interfere to judge guilt stage the facts on the murder? another, evidence is admis Demonstrable trial for and was on one murder light upon relevant any sible “if it throws have be- reasonably could the trial court issue,” Murphy, v. material matter at State might be that another disturbance lieved 1979), (Mo. or if it banc S.W.2d were not bound. forthcoming appellant if fact in issue or ... “tends to establish Furthermore, was no evidence there any way arriving at aid the court did not abuse The trial prejudice.11 verdict,” Holmes, 609 v. correct State its discretion. “Articles, 1980). S.W.2d a tend weapons instruments and that have ap to compelled was not Appellant explain the manner in which ency to prison in identifiable pear before the that are found at or crime was committed Williams, 425 U.S. clothing. Estelle v. See subsequent crime to near the scene of the (1976). 48 L.Ed.2d generally are the commission of a crime clothing, civilian but Appellant was offered Neal, admissible.” 591 S.W.2d he his size and that he said there was none (Mo.App.1979). The trial court has dis put no small clothes on.” going was “not to to admit or exclude demon cretion whether the trial the court point another before At Murphy, strable evidence. State put to whether he wished appellant asked at 730. into the clothing before he went on civilian wit is true that none of the It courtroom, nonresponsive, appellant, at trial ever saw the nesses who testified going “I am not in the courtroom.” replied, Neverthe appellant’s possession. knife in wearing objected no to Appellant at time less, linking appellant to there is evidence clothing during the trial. prison “[T]he linking the knife and both objection make an to the court as failure to Appellant the attack. was seen knife to clothes, for whatever being tried such stabbing standing King making over reason, presence negate is sufficient Appellant motions toward his stomach. necessary establish a con compulsion building in the 5 A & B was later found 512-13, stitutional violation.” Id. The knife was wiping blood off his hands. cannot now be at 1696-97. off the hall in 5 A & B found in a room complain. heard building twenty was fifteen to feet entering.

from the doors seen in which the The steel doors to the room VI padlocked, were knife was found *15 trial court Appellant argues next that the inch between the floor seven-eighths space Exhibit No. admitting State’s erred large the doors was and the bottom of Theron allegedly used to stab the knife through. enоugh for the knife to slide photo- King, and Exhibit No. State’s fingerprints were no detectible on There there was graph thereof. He contends that knife, when found was but the knife knife tending prove to that the no evidence wet with blood that matched blood still victim, possession in his or that had ever been of the and blood matched that of the victim.12 This deadly wounds. clothes had been used to inflict the King’s during jurors questioned that blood contained factor oath also testified 11. The under PGMl, enzyme, indepen- hearing they new trial stated that is inherited on the motion for PGMl. dently appellant system the facts that had not discussed and thus is a further of the ABO present guard was discriminating genetic was shackled and an armed and that those facts did not influence State v. factor. See their Rolls, (Me.1978). The blood on 389 A.2d The four venirewomen who indicated decision. on voir dire that the appellant’s clothing type and contained was O presence guard Dr. Kwei was able to determine factor PGMl. impartiality did not serve on would affect their O, type that the blood on the knife jury. quantity was unable small she because of the argues, Appellant to test it for factor PGMl. Su, Highway 12. Dr. Kwei Lee a Missouri State therefore, rep- most this knife could that “[t]he serologist, testified that Theron Patrol forensic King pris- in the that there are knives resent is blood, approxi- type possessed which O mately possess. Dr. Kwei of Americans 45% evidence appellant Appellant linked with the knife at point speak that would not Lock, sufficiently justify Investigator but his admission of knife statement cannot be construed as an photograph and the indication that he into evidence.13 The desired remain silent. He wanted in- trial court did not abuse its discretion. speak stead to with another officer. VII Appellant was rights advised his Appellant contends that the trial court and knowing intelligent made a and waiver overruling erred in suppress motion to right of his speak to remain silent. After the oral statement that he made Looten, to Investi- ing with appellant Lt. said he was gator stabbing. Lock afternoon of the statement, ready to make a Investiga and (1) He claims that the oral statement was tor Lock thereupon was summoned back made after he had into refused to make a writ- the room. was read his them, rights, ten said he signed statement and after he understood already had cut officer; waiver. There interrogation off was no coercion (2) with one that authorities. Lt. Looten testified appel he made the statement under duress and lant was not during interroga shaсkled coercion and was not right advised of his tion, Investigator Lock testified that no silent; remain that he made no promises were made and knowing intelligent right waiver of his beaten, struck, not or otherwise threatened to remain silent and that the trial court Appellant’s coerced.14 to make refusal failed to find that his statement was volun- written statement has in this situation no tary. bearing on the voluntariness of his oral Appellant’s view of contrary the facts is Investigator statement. Lock testified that testimony uncontradicted elicited at appellant “said he would not a writ [make suppression hearing. Appellant bases ten statement], he give did not like to writ his first upon the statement in ten just statements and he as soon tell Arizona, Miranda v. S.Ct. Lieutenant Looten I and what occurred and (1966), 16 L.Ed.2d 694 leave it at that.” The trial court in overrul warnings have given, been [o]nce ing the motion to suppress implicitly found subsequent procedure is clear. If the in- that the statement was voluntary, see State manner, dividual any indicates in Royal, 610 S.W.2d at and the record time prior to or during questioning, that supports finding. The trial court did silent, he wishes to remain the interroga- overruling err in the motion sup tion must point cease. At this he has press. shown that he intends to exercise his VIII

Fifth privilege^] Amendment 565.014(1) Sеction mandates that we re- 473-74, (footnote Id. at 86 S.Ct. at 1627 view the death sentence when it imposed. omitted). Yet the uncontradicted testimo- Having found no among appellant’s error ny showed that Investigator when Lock error, assignments of we turn to a consider- told that he wanted to talk with punishment. ation of the him stabbing, about the appellant replied *16 that he wanted to talk with Lt. 565.014(3) Looten. provides: Section type King, on with the same blood as Theron five and thus error. We therefore do not ad- type experienced by approxi- blood mately which is question. dress this population.” of the United States 45% objection remoteness, however, goes This Appellant 14. testified for the first time at the weight the to be accorded the evidence rather hearing on his motion for new trial that Investi- admissibility, than to its because this ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍evidence gator slapped approximately Lock him five entirely is not so remote that it is without times, struck him four times with a stick or materiality. Feger, State v. 340 S.W.2d leg, wooden table or chair and cut his hand (Mo.1960). 725-26 during however, interrogation. testified, He also got that his “hand cut on the fence or appeal 13. makes no wall.” photograph that admission of the was cumula- 690 1982). sentence, (Mo. 333 In addition regard supreme S.W.2d banc to the

With Mercer, we have affirmed Newton court shall determine: which capital cases in the choice twelve was (1) sentence death Whether the possibil life imprisonment or death imposed passion, under the influence of factor; parole fifty years submitted ity of was any arbitrary or other prejudice, Greathouse, jury. v. 627 to the State Bostic, (Mo.1982); 592 v. 625 S.W.2d State (2) supports Whether the evidence Thomas, (Mo.1981); v. 625 128 State S.W.2d finding statutory jury’s judge’s or of a Emerson, (Mo.1981); 115 State v. S.W.2d as enumerated aggravating circumstance Turner, (Mo.1981); 252 623 S.W.2d State v. 565.012; in section (Mo. 1981); v. 4 banc State 623 S.W.2d is the sentence of death Whether Jensen, (Mo.1981); v. 621 S.W.2d 263 State pen- or disproportionate excessive Baskerville, (Mo.1981); 616 839 S.W.2d cases, considering alty imposed in similar Mitchell, (Mo. v. 611 S.W.2d 223 banc State both the crime and defendant. Williams, 1981); 26 State v. 611 S.W.2d record Our review of the entire 1981); (Mo. Royal, v. banc State 610 S.W.2d im us the sentence was not convinces Borden, (Mo. 1981); v. 605 946 banc State passion, preju under posed the influence Downs, (Mo. 1980); 88 State v. banc S.W.2d dice, arbitrary factor. other (Mo.1980). 535 593 S.W.2d 565.012(2)(9) provides as a statu- Section tory aggravating circumstance that “[t]he This is first case we have re person murder committed imposed jury in which the the death viewed place of custody ... the lawful of a ... finding statutory aggra after as a рenalty The so found. lawful confinement.” vating that the defendant was circumstance no case that There is contention this time mur lawfully confined at the inmate at the Missouri appellant not an pending Two other such eases are der. the mur- Penitentiary at the time of State us, before and in both those der. Shaw, penalty. v. imposed death State (Mo. 17, 1982); argued May No. 62679 banc is final whether Our consideration Trimble, (Mo. 62523 ar v. No. banc State penalty, taking into account both death 15, 1981).15 Sept. considering After gued defendant, is and the excessive crime above, cited we con these eases and those imposed disproportionate in this penalty imposed clude that death our the enactment of similar cases. Since disproportion neither nor case is excessive 565.001, statute, current murder punishment imposed in similar ate to only has this reviewed affirmed Court cases. life sentence Newton, 627 State v. two death sentences. degree did already serving for first 1982), (Mo. petition S.W.2d committing from still (No. not deter filed, U.S.L.W., (U.S. May 5,1982) cert. imposition yet an Mercer, murder. The 81-6660); 1 another v. State denied, - U.S. -, purpose life would serve no banc), 102 other sentence cert. signal than to is no real (1981). have other there We L.Ed.2d S.Ct. prisoners kill in confinem of its cost for whо while one sentence because reversed McIlvoy, v. 629 ent.16 disproportionality. n.9, Louisiana, v. 428 U.S. Roberts these cases to ascertain 15. We consider n.9, (1976); punishment juries imposed in factu- have 49 L.Ed.2d 974 what doing ally 153, 186, intimate no Gregg Georgia, similar cases. In so we 96 S.Ct. v. disposition. concerning 2909, 2931, ultimate (1976). view their Lockett L.Ed.2d 859 See n.11, Ohio, 586, 604 438 U.S. significant United It to note that n.ll, (1978); 57 L.Ed.2d 973 Roberts 2964 Louisiana, *17 Supreme suggested an has States Court 1993, 633, n.5, 431 U.S. 637 97 killing by prisoner serving life a a intentional n.5, (1977); 52 Woodson v. L.Ed.2d 637 unrelated murder sentence convicted an n.7, Carolina, 292-93 North 428 U.S. may justify problem presents unique a mandatory penalty. imposition of the death judgment

The cause prisoners is affirmed. other did not persons like who committed of that crimes kind to Date of set August execution problem avoid this he intended to a commit capital murder. J., DONNELLY, RENDLEN, C. bra, He forced to don a Jerry punched HIGGINS, JJ., MORGAN and concur. him, and forced him to repeatedly to submit acts, oral and anal sex forced him to kiss SEILER, J., separate in dissents dissent- others, display rag and to a which had been ing opinion filed. anus, stuffed in his burned initials into his BARDGETT, J., dissents and concurs in arm, referred as his to him “woman” and separate SEILER, dissenting opinion of J.. Jerry forced to a write suicide note to his SEILER, dissenting. Judge, parents. Later gagged Trimble Jerry with towel, a they told going him were play to I respectfully dissеnt as to the review of “hangman’s game”, looped a knotted towel my opinion the death sentence. In the sen- neck, around his his against set knees Jer- tence death is excessive and dispropor- ry’s back proceeded to choke the victim tionate in this case. minutes, to death period over a of fifteen principal points out, As the opinion this is breaking one of the neck vertebrae in the the first case we have reviewed in which process. attempted Trimble then to make jury imposed the death penalty after suicide, the death appear aas and forced finding as a statutory aggravating circum jail other to agree inmates to tell the stance that the was lawfully defendant con guards it was a suicide on of the fined the time prin of the murder. The thing same happening to them. cipal opinion, however, takes into considera Shaw, defendant, In serving two a life pending us, tion other such cases before degree murder, sentence for first Shaw, intended No. 62679and State v. Trim ble, guards, kill one No. officer Clinton says nothing as to their Wyrick, the facts, uncle aspect warden. which is essential in Shaw deter room, entered vegetable mining seized whether are two similar to the and, knives, butcher warning, present casе. Based on the briefs and the plunged one side arguments into the of the officer oral this before court in these (Farrow) knives, cases, charge who was in two there was evidence in the record killing (Farrow him died within the supporting the hour verdicts follows: from blood). loss of Shaw then went in Trimble, In jail, the defendant was in Wyrick, search of officer found him in the charged rape, with sodomy, sexual abuse in commissary, Wyrick attacked with both degree kidnapping the first of two nine knives, butcher attack lasting 30 to 45 girls. man, old year large He awas six seconds,with Wyrick’s numerous wounds on feet, height, one inch weighing in arms, Wyrick chest and stomach. took thir- victim, The pounds. whom I will refer to recuperate. teen months to only by name, his first Jerry, age feet, height, weight five ten inches Any in reprehensible, murder is serious and pounds, quiet, mentally slow, shy, present and but the hardly murder in the case is jail comparable “scared death”. He was in on a viciousness extremes charge pinch, of auto theft. Trimble would the murders in the Trimble and Shaw cases. tease, and Jerry Jerry harass and when similarity main that the instant case asleep put lighted would matches between also occurred in If place confinement. toes. Trimble he wanted Jerry present declared murder in the case had occurred “punk”, i.е., further, homosexually; as his parking or on lot tavern or elsewhere walls, go prison he did not prison want to on the outside the someone not charges confinement, involving young girls the two be- would there have been no rea-

n.25, n.7, n.25, (1976). 96 S.ct. L.Ed.2d *18 likelihood, in opinion, peniten- of the serve for life. Most inmates the my sonable discharged, are either because tiary being capital able to obtain a prosecutor (and completed have their sentence or this conviction, pen- less the death murder much majority cases) up makes of because degree alty. It would work out as a second paroled. to life they are Of those sentenced murder case. imprisonment paroled, average who are In addition to the Trimble and Shaw length prison of time served in is some- above, principal opinion considers cases years. where between fifteen sixteen the two cases where the death sentence has different, course, It is much of with re- Mercer), (Newlon and one been affirmed sentence, spect capital to a murder life case where the death sentence has been possibility parole that is for life without disproportionality reversed because of fifty years. A murder defend- (McIlvoy), twelve cases where ant life under that sort of sentence knows punishment impris at life affixed he fifty must serve a minimum of possibility parole for fif onment so, however, years. Not for the inmate ty years rather than death. serving ordinary type of life sentence. trying compare apples This is like impris- Defendant was sentenced to life oranges. None of the twelve cases involved Although onment in 1974. he stabbed in- persons in lawful confinement. Without King mate it does not follow that exception killings in the twelve cases until that time he had not conducted him- were far more extreme and horrendous prison self in accordance with the rules and and, finally, than here even so in none of regulations and had caused no trouble. penalty the twelve was the death inflicted. nothing There is in the record con- comparable they To the extent the cases are He trary. may have been one of those penalty in the demonstrate that death serving a life sentence who otherwise would disproportion- present case is excessive and paroled have been in due course. How can ate. imposition it be said then that the of anoth- killings The same is true of the in the him, upon er life sentence this time without Newlon, McIlvoy Mercer and cases. None possibility parole fifty years, amounts persons involved in confinement and each signal to no more than a there “that is no killings of those is far more extreme and prisoners real cost for who kill while in case, present than that in the horrendous nothing confinement” and that less than instances, yet even in these in one case— slap death amounts to more than a on the McIlvoy was declared —the wrist? disproportionate. excessive and If that support There is no evidence before us to McIlvoy, certainly were true in it is true assumption the death sentence here. particular could serve as a deterrent to this principal opinion The real rationale of the I defendant others his class. am un- anything in the belief less than lies willing assumption to make the which the more death for this defendant would be no principal opinion has to make in order to wrist, slap already as he is than a affirm the defendant’s sentence of death. serving degree for first mur- life sentence principal opinion uses rational particular der. This assumes that this de- uphold constitutionality basis test life actually fendant would have served for test, 565.012.2(9). In order to use this degree charge, under his first an must first conclude that the statute does assumрtion which has no factual basis. impinge personal on “fundamental knowledge today

It is “life” rights” society already deprived common because has imprisonment Only prisoners liberty. agree is a misnomer.1 a small I cannot percentage analysis. person impris- of inmates with life sentences this Because a later, (1980-81), prison- Report According all Annual “Sooner 35th 98% ers are released.” Missouri Board of Probation and Parole

oned, a ON period whether for life or for short MOTION FOR REHEARING time, that person of does not mean that has PER CURIAM. personal right” life lost his “fundamental in Appellant in his motion for rehear The appropriate itself. standard of review ing court in contends that trial erred scrutiny of this classification is the strict failing degree to the jury instruct on first test because the statute trammel fun- does murder as a offense. There lesser included test, personal rights. damental Under this objection was no at trial failure so interest, we should look at state’s deter- jury, instruct did not mine whether it is then compelling, and point raise the in his for motion new trial. impinges determine if the statute on appel It is raised here for the time first in fundamental in re- personal right the least brief, reply attempts lant’s but it to raise a generally, strictive manner. v. Shapiro See reply new matter rather than to matters 1322, Thompson, 618, 394 U.S. 89 S.Ct. imper raised the state’s brief. Such is (1969); Tribe, L.Ed.2d 600 L. American 295, Brown, missible. v. (1978). Law ch. Constitutional Under (Mo.1973), denied, 973, cert. 416 U.S. analysis, this aggravating this circum- (1974). S.Ct. 40 L.Ed.2d 562 stance, 565.012.2(9),would be § unconstitu- Appellant argues that we should tional because it is overinclusive. It does point plain review the for error. Rule 29.- not differentiate those have between who 12(b). After careful consideration we con nothing killing more to lose for in prison clude that there has been no in “manifest unless penalty receive death justice id., or miscarriage justice,” of who those are not in that class. would necessitate reversal. trial court point I also out that principal opinion, instructed the on degree second mur itself, 565.012.2(9) as well as is overinclu- § der and manslaughter, and the thus It lumps everyone prison sive. into the had the opportunity to convict appellant of same category, whether on there a short Alabama, a lesser offense. See Beck sentence, minimum, such as a year two 65 L.Ed.2d 392 there a sentence which because of time Moreover, (1980). the evidence in case this already served will be completed in a short would not support an instruction on first time or by parole terminated in a reasona- degree (felоny) murder because none of ble time. many prisoners There are felonies, 565.003, five enumerated RSMo penalty whom imprisonment further present. process Due therefore is capital statute, under the involving Evans, -U.S. abridged. Hopper not does imprisonment as it life possi- without -, (1982). 72 L.Ed.2d 367 bility parole fifty years, for would be rehearing The motion for is overruled. strongest kind of justi- deterrent.2 Yet the principal fication used opinion for

affirming the do that to

otherwise means there is no real cost for

prisoners who kill while in confinement.

The facts of real life are otherwise. different, course, average It would be per year, for a increases on the 20of there already 1,000 murderer who is peni- under life sentence will be around such inmates in the possibility parole fifty years, tentiary for eligible before one of them is is not this case and the statute does so parole. I it is think to this class of inmates that limit itself. suggestions principal opinion which the at- my understanding ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍Supreme present popu- It is tributes to the United that the States Court City penitentiary killing by might lation of the that an state Jefferson intentional an inmate 2,000 1,900 approximately mandatory justify imposition pen- and that of the death approximately alty might apply. repeat, present these serv- to 85 inmates are To is not ing pos- murder life sentence without such case. sibility parole fifty years. group If this

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Bolder
Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date Published: Jul 6, 1982
Citation: 635 S.W.2d 673
Docket Number: 62362
Court Abbreviation: Mo.
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