State v. BoddieState v. Boddie
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on October 3, 2019
On brief: Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Sheryl L. Prichard, for appellee.
On brief: Howard Boddie, Jr., pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
NELSON, J.
{¶ 1} Howard Boddie, Jr. appeals the trial court‘s denial of his Civil Rule 60 motion for relief from a judgment or order. We understаnd the order from which he is seeking relief to be the trial court‘s earlier denial of a motion for a new trial. He asked the trial court to revisit that denial because, he urged, failure of timely notice had denied him a fair shot at an appeal, apparently in his view necessitating a do-over that could refresh his opportunity to gain appellate review on new-trial merits. In explaining that we do not think this circuitous route works, we begin with a brief summary of the most recent court activity in the case.
{¶ 2} Mr. Boddie last year tried to appeal the trial court‘s denial of his motion for a new trial (a motion based, in part, on Mr. Boddie‘s submission reflecting that the main witness against him when he was convicted in 2010 of domestic violence and abduction now has reсanted). November 15, 2018 Notice of Appeal from October 15, 2018 Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motion for a New Trial Filed September 13, 2018 (with Notice bearing a certificate of service that originally stated a hand-delivery date of November 13, but that
{¶ 3} Mr. Bоddie then returned to the trial court, invoking “Rule 60” and seeking relief “FROM A JUDGMENT OR ORDER.” February 28, 2019 motion (making clear that it was being submitted pursuant to ”
{¶ 4} Although Mr. Boddie‘s April 1, 2019 Notice of Appeal makes clear that he аppeals now from the denial of his motion for relief as sought pursuant to Civil Rule 60, and although his “Rule 60” motion in the trial court was reasonably clear that he sought relief from the order denying his new triаl motion, Mr. Boddie‘s brief here attempts a wider scope. He posits four assignments of error:
[1.] The trial court and the clerk of courts has erred to the prejudice of defendant-appellant by refusing to afford an entry/order on three occasions through the U.S. Postal Service.
[2.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant appellant by refusing to grant a new trial pursuant to
2945.79(A) through (F) .[3.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant appellant by refusing to conduct a judicial review of an affidavit sworn and notarized by [the complaining witnеss], pursuant to
2945.79(F) causes for a new trial.[4.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant appellant by refusing to adjudicate on the merits defendant appellant‘s Rule 60 1 through 6, in violation of the
First ,Fifth ,Sixth andFourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution .
Appellant‘s brief at 5, 6, 7, 8.
{¶ 5} Assignments of еrror two and three thus relate to the merits of his previous new trial motion and were not set out in his “Rule 60” motion as predicated on the alleged failure of the trial court to provide him nоtice of its ruling. But this is not an appeal of the trial court‘s denial of the new trial motion (for Mr. Boddie‘s attempted appeal of that denial was turned away as untimely), and Mr. Boddie did not attempt again to persuade the trial court on the merits of a new trial when he filed his “Rule 60” motion: rather, that motion addressed his contentions regarding when he “officially” had received notiсe of the new trial ruling; his view that the trial court had “intentionally refused to afford” him proper notice in that as in other instances (“this is not a coincidence“); and his “on-line” discovery of “November 11, 2018” that the trial cоurt had ruled. Rule 60 motion at 2, 4, 6 (emphasis in original).
{¶ 6} We limit our review on appeal to matters that Mr. Boddie raised with the trial court in advancing that motion the denial of which he appeals. See, e.g., Open Container, Ltd. v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-133, 2015-Ohio-866, ¶ 4 (“An аppellate court must * * * limit its review of the case to the arguments contained in the record before the trial court“). We therefore overrule assignments of error two and three, nоting that we are not called upon here to address questions that might be relevant, say, to a successive petition for postconviction relief (such as whether and how Mr. Boddie had been prevented
{¶ 7} Assignments of error one and four relate somewhat to the trial court‘s rejection of Mr. Boddie‘s argument that he was entitled under Civil Rule 60 to relief from denial of the new trial motion because he did not timely receive the order denying that motion. We considеr those two assignments together in concluding that in this circumstance and on the motion submitted, we do not find that the trial court committed reversible error.
{¶ 8} As Mr. Boddie understands, and while considering questions of law afresh, we review a trial court‘s grant or denial of a motion under
{¶ 9} We cannot say on this record that the trial court erred in denying a
{¶ 10} Put another way, we do not believe that the trial court erred in declining to provide this requested route for accomplishing a delayed appeal. Mr. Boddie did not seek leave of this court to file a delayed appeal pursuant to
{¶ 11} Ohio courts have rejected similar attempts to invoke
{¶ 12} We overrule Mr. Boddie‘s first and fourth assignments of error. The judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in denying Mr. Boddie‘s
{¶ 13} We also overrule as unwarranted Mr. Boddie‘s “Motion to Appoint Counsel,” which revisits at least in part trial counsel cоnsultation issues already addressed both on direct appeal and on appeal from the denial of petitions to vacate judgments of conviction or sentence. See State v. Boddie, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-687, 2011-Ohio-3309, appeal not accepted in State v. Boddie, 134 Ohio St.3d 1451, 2013-Ohio-347, delayed appeal not accepted in State v. Boddie, 146 Ohio St.3d 1414, 2016-Ohio-3390; State v. Boddie, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-811, 2013-Ohio-3925.
Judgment affirmed; motion for appointment of counsel denied.
KLATT, P.J. and BROWN, J., concur.