The defendant, Pamela A. Boardman (date of birth: January 27, 1954), was indicted by the New Castle County Grand Jury for possession of a central nervous system stimulant drug in violation of Title 16, Chapter 49, § 4903(c). On the date the offense was allegedly committed, January 24, 1970, Miss Boardman was fifteen years old and on the date of the indictment, March 2, 1970, Miss Boardman was sixteen years old.
The defendant, John Dowling (date of birth: December 31, 1951), was indicted by the New Castle County Grand Jury for possession and use of a dangerous drug in violation of Title 16, Chapter 47, §§ 4722-4723. On the date the offenses were allegedly committed and the date of the arrest, December 15, 1969, Mr. Dowling was seventeen years old and on the date of the indictment, February 2, 1970, Mr. Dowling was eighteen years old.
The defendants Boardman and Dowling moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that, by reason of age, exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses rests with the Family Court. 1
The defendant, Debra Collins (date of birth: September 12, 1952), was arrested for рossession of a central nervous system stimulant in violation of Title 16, Chapter 49, § 4906(c) and for possession of a dangerous drug in violation of Title 16, Chapter 47, § 4722. On the date the offenses were allegedly committed and the date of the аrrest, January 24, 1970, Miss Collins was seventeen years old. Miss Collins has not been indicted. A motion was filed requesting an order requiring the Attorney General and/or Grand Jury not to proceed against Debra Collins. By stipulation, the Attorney General agreed not to proceed until the Superior Court decided whether or not it has jurisdiction over juvenile drug offenders. The argument in the Collins case is therefore in the nature of a prohibition proceeding.
On May 26, 1969, the Governor signed the laws in issue here, 57 Del.Laws, Ch. 101 and 102. The first amended Chapter 47 of Title 16 and the second amended *594 Chapter 49 of Title 16 by striking the entire chapter and substituting a new Chapter 49.
Chapter 47 deals in part with the possession and use of dangerous drugs and includеs Section 4732 which reads as follows :
“ § 4732. Jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of the State of Delaware shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of any violation of this Chapter any other Delaware law notwithstanding." (Emphasis added).
Chapter 49 deals in part with the possession of a central nervous system stimulant drug and includes Section 4912 which reads as follows:
Ҥ 4912. Jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of the State of Delaware shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of any violation of this Chapter, notwithstanding any other provision of the Delaware Codе to the contrary." (Emphasis added.)
The defendants have made several arguments in support of their motions. In substance, the following points have been argued by one or more of the defendants:
1. The statutes were not intended to alter the jurisdiсtional division between Family Court and other Courts and should not be interpreted as repealing as to drug cases the jurisdiction of the Family Court.
2. The statutes are unconstitutional because they violate Article II, Section 16 of the Stаte Constitution, the section which provides that no bill “shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title.”
3. The statutes are unconstitutional under due process and equal protection standards.
There has bеen much discussion concerning the policy the State should adopt in regard to Court jurisdiction over juvenile drug offenders. Initially, therefore, the role of the Court should be stated. The Court must determine what the General Assembly has done аnd whether what has been done is Constitutional. The Court does not determine the public policy and members of the judiciary in this State have a duty to refrain from injecting their personal public policy views in their legal decisions interрreting statutes. In construing a statute, the Court can only be concerned with the intention of the Legislature. In re Panousseris’ Will,
In Delaware, legislative intеnt must be gleaned from the language used in an enactment. As the Supreme Court said through Justice Carey in Angelini v. Court of Common Pleas,
The statutes in question, 16 Dеl.C. § 4732 and § 4912, are plain and clear upon their face. Moreover, the statutes expressly contemplated that other laws would be affected. The legislative intent is simply that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over violations of Chapter 47 and Chapter 49 of Title 16. If the public is dissatisfied *595 with such a policy or if any legislators had some intent not expressed in the statute, the remedy lies in the legislative forum. This Court does not sit as a super legislature and this Court enforces thе Constitutional public policy set by the legislature.
I turn now to the Constitutional questions raised. One general comment is in order. Prior to the enactment of special status laws for juvenile offenders, juveniles were referred to the rеgular criminal court. The juvenile therefore has no special common law rights in regard to criminal jurisdiction and, if the legislature deems it reasonable to grant some special privilege to juveniles, it can generally do so on such terms and with such limitations as it deems fit. See State v. Little,
The title of both bills failed to indicate that they divested the Family Court of jurisdiction in drug cases and placed exclusive jurisdiction in the Superior Court. The defendants argue that the stаtutes are unconstitutional because they violate Article II, Section 16 of the State Constitution, Del. C.Ann., since they “embrace more than one subject” and do not note the jurisdictional changes in the title. This point has already bеen considered by the Delaware Supreme Court insofar as the amendment to Title 16, Chapter 47 divested the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction in certain drug cases. State v. Slattery, Del.Sup.,
The defendant Boardman has raised an argument based on due process. But no case has been brought to this Court’s attention which would require the State, as a matter of Constitutional law and fundamental fairness, to maintain a special court for juveniles or require a non-amenability determination in regard to such a special court as a Constitutional prerequisite to a criminal proceeding in the normal criminal court. Since the argument has not been substantiаted, it must be deemed to be without merit.
In addition, the defendant Boardman has challenged the jurisdictional provisions on the basis of equal protection of the laws. Contrary to the argument of the defendant, the one case cited, Van Winkle v. State,
The statute treats all persons who violate its provisions in the same way. The equal prоtection claim here is evidently based on the proposition that juveniles violating these drug laws are treated differently than juveniles violating other criminal laws where the offender is permitted to fall within a special status under thе Family Court Act. And the defendants generally present a chamber of horrors as to an imaginary case of an extremely youthful defendant.
3
The State counters the
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equal protection argument by the mere statement without citation to the effect that, since the General Assembly was dealing with a class of crimes and all persons who violate that class of crimes, equal protection is satisfied. Compare State v. Ayers, Del.Sup.,
The Court will assume that, in order to satisfy equal prоtection, the jurisdictional separation of these drug laws as to juveniles from other illegal juvenile activity must be on some reasonable basis and reasonably related to the legislative purpose and not arbitrary or сapricious.
The purpose of the statute is to control drug abuse. It is not necessary to go beyond the records of this Court to realize that drug abuse is a staggering problem from high school age, to say the least, through adulthoоd. In support of the statutory purpose, it is within the bounds of reason for the General Assembly: to designate a single Court to deal with a common problem which cuts across normal age distinctions; to, give to that single Court not only penal powers but specific supplementary medical examination and treatment powers in drug area which would require additional budgeting; to identify publicly drug offenders; to demonstrate the seriousness of the offenses by placing jurisdiction with the criminal trial court of general jurisdiction; to educate the public as to the extent and nature of the drug problem and especially drug abuse by youth by exposing juveniles to public trial; to place jurisdiction in a statewide court with a potential flexibility in judicial case assignments. All of the above points are included in the passage of this jurisdictional change. It is at least debatable that there is a reasonable relationship between the placing of exclusive jurisdiction in the Superior Court and the control of drug abuse. Thus, the legislative action cannot be classified as arbitrary or capricious.
The motions of the defendants B'oardman and Dowling to dismiss the indiсtments are denied. It is so ordered.
The application of the defendant Collins for an order prohibiting prosecution in the Superior Court is denied. It is so ordered.
Notes
. In Dowling’s case, it is questionable that the motion has any merit even if thе arguments presented here are valid because he was eighteen when indicted although under eighteen when arrested. State v. Fowler,
. The case does present a good statement of the role of the judiciary in construing statutes. See
. Although not directly pertinent, for the record, it may be wise to review some common law concepts of criminal incapacity due to age which would govern any prosecution in this Court. State v. George,