*1 words, furtherance other act “arrangpng] ... a distribute ... con- STATE of Plaintiff and substance” trolled constitutes criminal Respondent, pursuant statute.42 offense to the We also necessary out
pointed that it is not for the David A. BLOWERS and James J. exchange defendant receive value Schofield, Defendants and drugs to be convicted under the stat- Appellants. ute.43 No. 19712. began purchas
When Imani first Supreme Court Utah. December, cocaine from Dickerson dealing Dickerson was out of her own April 1986. and defendant home was involved transactions. Dickerson When stated longer dealing she was no out of her home, defendant was thereafter involved in January transactions. Moreover 4th 10th, present defendant was when Ima- purchase was at
ni Dickerson’s to the co transactions, During
caine. both defend Drive,
ant drove Dickerson to Desert Dust
where, occasion, on at least one both de entered
fendant Dickerson the resi When
dence. defendant Dickerson re
turned, it was defendant who divided the gave Imani.
cocaine it to Defendant puffing drug’s quality. also From evidence, it
this was reasonable for the
jury to conclude that both defendant and
Dickerson obtained the cocaine at the resi
dence on Desert Dust Drive and that de directly
fendant was involved in the Moreover,
scheme. statements made
Gray and those Dickerson made properly
were admitted as discussed above “we,”
always opposed referred
merely Finally, Gray’s Dickerson. com concerning quality of the
ments cocaine
furthered distribution value of a
controlled substance.
The conviction and of the trial are
court affirmed.
HOWE, ZIMMERMAN, DURHAM and
JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., in the result. concurs Id. at 923-24. 43. Id. at 924.
42.
1322 appealed
fendants court, to the district upheld which Schofield’s conviction but re- versed Blowers’ conviction and ordered a new trial. Both Blowers and Schofield appealed. have We dismiss ap- Blowers’ peal jurisdiction because this Court has no over matter since no final U.C.A., 1953, been entered. 78-3-5 9A, (Repl.Vol. 1977, Supp.1985). We re- verse Schofield’s conviction. spent
Schofield and Blowers the after- April 23, 1983, noon of drinking beer. At p.m., they 7:30 about rode their horses Kaysville down a street toward a summer pasture. Schofield’s sister rode on Blow- ers’ horse behind Conflicting Blowers. evi- dence indicates either boys that two small frightened the horses or that Blowers and began racing. event, Schofield In as ran, the horses Schofield’s sister fell from Blowers’ horse and suffered a severe con- Following police cussion. investigation accident, charged of the Schofield was and driving convicted circuit court of a ve- hicle while he was under the influence of 41-6-44(l).1 alcohol in violation of section Court, Before this Schofield contends that his conviction process denies him due Henderson, Ogden, J. Keith for defend- of law because the statute under which he appellants. ants and give was convicted did not him adequate being riding notice that intoxicated while Wilkinson, Gen., Atty. L. David Bruce M. agree. horse was a crime. We Hall, Gen., Atty. City, Asst. Lake Salt plaintiff respondent. A criminal statute “must sufficiently persons clear and definite to inform of ordi-
ZIMMERMAN,Justice: nary intelligence what their conduct must requirements Defendants David A. Blowers and be to conform to its and to appeal James J. Schofield their violating convictions advise one accused of it what driving under the influence alcohol. constitutes the offense with which he is State, The charged.” Utah, convictions resulted from an accident Greaves v. 528 (citations (1974) omitted); that occurred when defendants were drunk P.2d ac- riding Packard, horses. The circuit court found cord State v. Utah driving applied (1952); Owens, that the Utah drunk law 250 P.2d State v. persons riding horses and convicted both 638 P.2d A stat- men under the influence of alco ute that does not meet this test is invalid hol process under section 41-6-44 of the Code. De- under both the due clause of the 41-6-44(1) pertinent part: any drug degree 1. Section states in to a renders the which vehicle, person incapable safely driving punishable provided It is unlawful and this section for hol content of who is under the influence of alcohol or physical any person or of a with a blood alco- to drive be in actual control greater by weight, or .08% vehicle within this state. added.) (Emphasis drug or the combined influence of alcohol con- to the federal fourteenth amendment cases where intoxicated stitution, see, e.g., Connally v. persons General ride horses. Section pro- 41-6-15 Co., 385, 391-93, “Every person riding 46 vides: an Construction 269 U.S. animal 126, —, driving any its animal-drawn vehicle 70 L.Ed. S.Ct. I, roadway subject chapter, counterpart this except article section 7 of Bradshaw, provisions those their nature can State v. Constitution. Utah Cf. *3 application.” have no (1975). This is a 800, 802 classic ex- 541 P.2d ample of a criminal statute that is too 41-6-44, under which Section Schofield vague its prohibitions to survive due convicted, prohibits operation of “ve- was a process challenge. impossible It is any- influence of hicle” while under the alcohol. determine, upon one to thoughtful even defines The motor vehicle code a “vehicle” reflection, portions which of the vehicle in, upon, by or “every as device which legislature code thought the should apply may transport- is or person property be to animals and animal-drawn vehicles and highway, a de- except ed drawn fact, which not. very should In the word- by power ex- vices moved human or used ing suggests of the section that legisla- the stationary clusively upon rails or tracks.” ture had no firm idea as to what it meant. U.C.A., 41-6-1(58) 5A, 1953, (Repl.Vol. § Section give anyone 41-6-15 does not prop- 1981). legitimate- This cannot be definition er notice of the pro- conduct it intends to ly read to include horses. certainly nothing scribe and does to cure operative The word in the statute vagueness problems the inherent in section dictionary is “device.” No we have exam 41-6-44. to ani encompass ined defines “device” an Blowers; as Dismissed to reversed as to
mal, and
“de
section 41-6-1 uses the word
Schofield.
in its
Both
process
vice”
usual sense.
due
usage
and common
restrain us from tortur
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DUR-
ing the
a
a
definition of “vehicle” to include
JJ.,
HAM,
concur.
Therefore,
horse.
to convict Schofield
Justice,
HOWE,
concurring:
violating
deny
section 41-6-44
him
would
I concur that a horse is not a “vehicle”
process.
due
and
section
that
41-6-15 because of its
attempts
The State
to avoid this result
process
vagueness
guaran-
violates the due
relying
juris-
on a
cases from
few
other
ty.
I also believe that the statute is uncon-
to
dictions where horses have been found
ground
related
closely
stitutional
the
the
the
be included within
definition of
legislative
attempts
delegate
pow-
to
that it
purposes
apply-
word “vehicles” for
Latsis,
People
v.
judiciary.
er to the
In
People
specific
They
statutes.
include
1055,
195 Colo.
578 P.2d
Crim.Ct.,
Szymanski,
N.Y.City
v.
311 N.Y.
Smith, Colo.,
again People
v.
(1978),
and
120,
(1970),
Conrad
S.2d
Misc.2d
The
cases
therein.
statute
State also
cited
power
by arguing
delegates legislative
sec
to the
which
Schofield’s conviction
mandate
judiciary violates a constitutional
tion 41-6-15 somehow makes section 41-6-
Smith,
powers.
apply
equestrians
which traffic rules
separation of
State v.
17,
ing, and other rules of the turns and Reese, al., States v. et 92 U.S. 23 turning; signals starting, stopping, L.Ed. 563 Chief Justice Waite standing parking; required equipment; commenting on a criminal statute couched miscellaneous rules. The State and various argues by application vague that the of common in terms said: sense, provi- courts can determine which certainly dangerous It would be if the apply persons riding to animals and sions legislature large enough could set a net example, suggests not. For it which do offenders, possible to catch all and leave provisions relating to li- that the driver’s step say it to courts to the inside and applicable, censes would not be such as detained, rightfully who could be upon revocation of driver’s license a convic- would, large. should set at This who be negligent tion for homicide under section extent, judicial to some substitute the 41-6-43.10(c) and revocation of driver’s li- legislative department govern- the of the cense for refusal to submit to a chemical ment. very section That test under 41-6-44.10. exactly legislature That the is what argument seems to be contradicted the attempted By to do in the instant case. a argument additional State’s single sweep, provisions of the traffic all requires special horse skill and more care- equestrians, code are made to operating than a motor ful awareness does excep- but the courts are invited to make horses, vehicle because unlike motor ve- tion without definite and ascertainable hicles, may unpredictably. react guide standard which to them. example argu- This demonstrates that an legislature acknowledge I the can might position able be taken for and delegate power enact a law to to deter against application many provisions the of things upon mine a fact a state of persons riding code traffic ani- application depends. of the law Tribbett v. highway. Application mals Marcellus, 607, 293 Village 294 Mich. may always yield each instance to our (1940); v. N.W. Marshall Field & Co. notions of common sense. The entire sub- 495, Clark, L.Ed. 143 U.S. S.Ct. applicability ject of is one which needs to (1892). imprac it is difficult or Where considered and determined with ob- definite, comprehen lay ticable to down a jective of each traffic rule in mind. This statute, application sive rule for the of a peculiarly legislature is task one legislature may discretionary pow vest persons testimony which can solicit from public to deter er in the courts or officials experienced highway safety. The sort- applies particu mine the law judges juries out is not for the whether it Examples lar instance. are whether judiciary do. The should eschew the invita- case-by-case “equitable” to certain tion to determine on a basis would be disconnect city, Village territory from a Tribbett v. Marcellus, supra; whether an act of a Latsis, fide,” People “bona
person was payment whether a for servic
supra; and “reasonable,” v. Ra
es was United States U.S. 86 L.Ed.
gen, 314 S.Ct. However, case, in the instant upon merely called determine
we are not under a certain state facts
whether been a crime committed. In
there has given
stead, assign are a much we broader viz.,
ment, whether under state of nature of our DUI statute lends
facts the application equestrians. That
itself to legislative
determination
call.
The STATE of Plaintiff Respondent, BANNER,
Nicholas Defendant Appellant.
No. 20371.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 1986. Jr., Bugden, City,
Walter F. Salt Lake appellant. for defendant Wilkinson, Sjogren, L. David L. Sandra Sandack, City, for Roger D. Salt Lake plaintiff respondent.
HALL, Justice: Chief Banner, Defendant, found Nicholas sodomy jury committing guilty by a child, in viola- degree felony, a first upon a U.C.A., 1953, (Supp. 76-5-403.1 tion of child, first 1983), abuse and sexual