No. 91-191 | N.H. | Jun 17, 1992
The defendant, Robert Blow, was found guilty of the crime of burglary in a jury trial (Groff, J.). He asserts that the State introduced insufficient evidence as to whether he was licensed or privileged to enter the premises that were burglarized, RSA 635:1, and that the State impermissibly argued that his post-arrest silence was a basis upon which to find the requisite lack of privilege or license. We affirm.
On July 26, 1990, Vitto’s Market, a convenience store located on Bartlett Street in Manchester, was the subject of a burglary. Steven Marshall, who lived across the street, had a “vivid” view of the front of the market from his second floor apartment window. The area in front of the store was lighted by street lights and spotlights. In the early morning hours of July 26, Marshall saw a person in front of the store behaving in a peculiar manner and acting furtively by hiding from the view presented by the headlights of approaching vehicles. Marshall soon thereafter heard the breaking and crashing of glass and saw the same person pulling and breaking jagged pieces of glass
The defendant concedes that the store was closed at the time of the incident. At the time of his arrest, the defendant said nothing, offering no explanation for his presence in the market. Later that day, however, he told the police that on the night in question, he drove around the city and determined that Vitto’s “looked like a good place to break into.” He explained that he parked his car, removed a tire iron from it, and broke the glass in the store’s front window. He recounted that once inside the store he removed a canister of coins and cigarettes, and upon seeing a police officer, he departed through the rear door.
On appeal the defendant presses two arguments: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the State’s burden of proving his lack of license or privilege to enter the premises; and (2) that the prosecutor in arguing the case to the jury improperly sought to rely upon his silence at the time of arrest as evidence as to whether his presence in the building was either licensed or privileged.
RSA 635:1,1, states:
“A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied section thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for burglary that the building or structure was abandoned.”
One of the elements of the offense which the State has the burden of proving is the defendant’s lack of license or privilege to enter the building that was the subject of the burglary. This element is customarily proved by the State calling as a witness an owner of the premises or someone such as an agent or store manager who has firsthand knowledge of those persons or classes of persons who may lawfully enter the building and eliciting testimony that excludes the defendant from that group of persons. Such an approach to the proof of a necessary element of the State’s case would appear to be the better and safer practice. In this case, however, the State relied upon circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s admissions, to prove this important and elementary point in its case.
We hold that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient. There was evidence that the defendant was seen by an eyewitness
The defendant’s second claim is that the trial court should have declared a mistrial as a result of the prosecutor’s final jury argument. When arrested, the defendant said nothing and offered no explanation for his presence in Vitto’s Market. The prosecutor referred to the defendant’s silence at the time of arrest in the following comments:
“Other evidence that you heard was that the defendant didn’t tell the police when they handcuffed him, hey, it’s okay for me to be here. It’s okay. You know, no problem. I have license and privilege to be here. Store’s opened, you know. There’s no problem. You don’t worry about it because I busted through this door and I went through the plate glass window. I have a reason to be here.”
The defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that in effect the prosecutor was shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to prove a lawful presence in the building. The court denied the motion and gave the following curative instruction to the jury:
“I just want to remind you that the defendant in this case has no obligation to prove his innocence, has no obligation to offer any testimony or any defense at all. The State has the absolute burden to prove every element of this case beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has an absolute right during the entire course of the proceedings from the time he’s arrested until the present time not to say anything to the police, not to tell them anything about what happened whatsoever. In fact, he availed himself of these rights and*643 cannot be considered by you in any way as evidence of his guilt. And I want to reiterate that very strongly to you. That the defendant has no burden to produce any evidence, no burden at all to prove his innocence. The State has the absolute burden to prove each and every element of this case beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Without determining whether the prosecutor’s comments crossed the line to improper argument, we conclude that the court’s instruction adequately cured any improper inferences which the jury might have formed as to the defendant’s obligation to speak out at the time of his arrest. State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540" court="N.H." date_filed="1989-12-28" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/state-v-fowler-8050663?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8050663">132 N.H. 540, 547, 567 A.2d 557, 561 (1989); State v. Fowler, 110 N.H. 110, 113, 261 A.2d 429, 430 (1970). Thus, the trial court did not err by denying the motion for a mistrial.
Affirmed.