STATE OF OHIO v. GREGORY A. BLOODWORTH
C.A. No. 29025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
April 3, 2019
[Cite as State v. Bloodworth, 2019-Ohio-1222.]
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR-2017-10-3655
CALLAHAN, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Gregory A. Bloodworth, appeals his conviction by the Summit County Court of Common Pleas and an order that denied his motion to withdraw a guilty plea. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Bloodworth pleaded guilty to one charge of burglary in violation оf
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
APPELLANT BLOODWORTH WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
{¶3} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Bloodworth argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in connеction with the guilty plea. Specifically, Mr. Bloodworth argues that had trial counsel not incorrectly guaranteed that he would be sentenced to five or fewer years in prison, he would not have pleaded guilty.
{¶4} A defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to raise issues related to ineffective assistance of counsel on appeаl unless they resulted in an involuntary plea. State v. Carroll, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 06CA009037, 2007-Ohio-3298, ¶ 5, citing State v. Barnett, 73 Ohio App.3d 244, 248 (2d. Dist.1991) and State v. Dallas, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 06CA0033, 2007-Ohio-1214, ¶ 4. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) deficiency in the performance of counsel “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and (2) that the errors made by counsel were “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial[.]” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that the Strickland test applies when a defendant challenges the effectiveness of counsel in connection with a guilty plea). A defendant who has pleaded guilty must demonstrate prejudice by showing “‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.‘” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶ 89, quoting Lockhart at 59.
{¶5} Mr. Bloodworth‘s argument that trial counsel‘s performance was deficient relies on statements that he alleges trial counsel made during the course of plea negotiations. Mr. Bloodworth‘s written pleа agreement, however, set forth the maximum possible penalty for a violation of
{¶6} In a direct appeal, it is “impossible to determine whether [an] attorney was ineffective in his representation * * * where the allegations of ineffectivenеss are based on facts not appearing in the record.” State v. Cooperrider, 4 Ohio St.3d 226, 228 (1983). Consequently, a claim of ineffective assistanсe that necessarily relies on proof outside the record is not appropriately raised in a direсt appeal. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 390-391 (2000). Mr. Bloodworth has argued that his attorney made statements to him during the course of plea negotiations that induced him to plead guilty based on the expectation of a shorter prison term. Because Mr. Bloodworth‘s argument is based on allegations that there was an agreement beyond what the record reflects, it сannot be reviewed on direct appeal. See State v. Walter, 9th Dist. Wayne Nos. 16AP0009, 16AP0010, 2017-Ohio-236, ¶ 19, citing State v. Zupancic, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0065, 2013-Ohio-3072, ¶ 4-5.
{¶7} Mr. Bloodworth‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT BLOODWORTH‘S CRIMINAL RULE 32.1 MOTION.
{¶8} Mr. Bloodworth‘s second assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without conducting a heаring.
{¶9} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to сorrect manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit thе defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
{¶10} Although a trial court must conduct a hеaring when a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, a hearing is not always required when the motion is filed after sentencing. State v. West, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011110, 2018-Ohio-1176, ¶ 6, citing Cargill at ¶ 11. Mr. Bloodworth has not developed any argument explaining why the trial court abused its discretion by denying his post-sentencing motion without a hearing. West at ¶ 11, citing
III.
{¶11} Mr. Bloodworth‘s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment оf the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court оf Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JEFFREY N. JAMES, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.